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Directed by: Professor Sheldon Goldman 
 
In the shadow of a 15 year federal battle between the Courts and Congress over how 
much protection is afforded religious behavior, more than half of the states have declared the 
highest level of protection either through a Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), or 
through a court decision.  This study finds the results of the states‘ attempts by calculating 
how often actors seeking protection for a religious act win the judge‘s vote.  The study‘s date 
range is the eight years following the last volley in the federal battle City of Boerne v. Flores: 
1998-2005.  The unit of analysis is each judge vote, 3,254 in all.  And the research question is 
if and under what conditions are these institutional attempts actually helping religious actors 
win more judge votes? 
To make sure the effects of the institutional attempts are independent of other factors, as 
well as to conduct exploratory research on how other factors affect religious freedom, several 
controls will be used.  Those controls are specifically: characteristics about the judge and 
county, characteristics about the religious claimant and case, and characteristics about the 
legal opinion.  The results of the study show: 1) States appear to protect religious actors more 
than federal courts with a 44% favorable vote-rate in the state courts. But 2) neither 
legislative nor judicial attempts affect religious success, most evidence shows.  Judicial 
attempts can find some significantly positive results in specific models.  3) The most 
explanatory predictor is the way constitutional language is used in the opinion.
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case of two former drug treatment 
employees who were dismissed from their privately run drug treatment center for using a 
hallucinatory drug during a Native American religious ritual.  Alfred Smith and Galen 
Black then sought unemployment benefits from Oregon, but Oregon denied the benefits 
claiming the loss of their jobs was for a legitimate reason.  Smith and Black claimed that 
their drug use was protected under the Free Exercise of Religion Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.  The issue in the case was whether Oregon‘s policy could infringe on 
religious behavior because the state had a compelling government interest, and therefore 
the plaintiffs were not entitled to unemployment compensation.  Oregon would have to 
prove that it had such a compelling interest and that the policy was the least intrusive way 
of administering that policy.  This test that Oregon would have to satisfy is referred to as 
―strict scrutiny‖, and it is the most stringent standard of review a state must satisfy when 
defending a law that allegedly infringes on one‘s rights.1 
Early in Employment Division v. Smith, The Supreme Court granted defendants Smith 
and Black their wish and recognized the controlling law as the first words in the U.S. Bill 
of Rights: ―Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion nor the 
free exercise thereof…‖.  But whether Oregon persuaded the Court that it had a 
compelling interest will never be known, because the Supreme Court apparently 
understood decades of precedent on religious liberty in a new way:  ―The only decisions 
                                                 
 
1
 Despite the severe language, religious litigants succeeded in Free Exercise claims around one-third of the 
time or less.  Adamcyzk, Wybraniec, and Finke (2004, 248) and Arnold (1997, 151-52) show this.  An even 
more surprising estimate of a 12% Free Exercise success-rate comes from Forren (2001, 139 ff.)  The 
disparity between the two is discussed in the chapter on the dependent variable religious freedom. 
 2 
in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally 
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause 
alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other Constitutional 
protections….‖  Just how persuasive governments had to be when infringing the rights of 
the religious was lowered by Justice Scalia‘s opinion for the 5-4 majority.  The standard 
of review, in simple terms, was lowered.  And Justice Scalia did this without expressly 
overturning the stronger understanding of religious freedom that emerged from several 
decisions over more than fifty years, that came fully to fruition in Sherbert v. Verner 
(1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972).  In Smith, as quoted above, the Court made clear 
that if the religious act in question was not accompanied by another civil right (free 
speech or parental rights, for example), then the government needed to show simply that 
the legislature had a rational interest in passing the law (referred to as the rational basis 
test, the lowest of the three standards of review), rather than a compelling interest and 
with a tailored alternative.  Scalia‘s opinion summarizes key previous religious liberty 
cases before Smith, pointing out that in each, more than simply one religious behavior 
was at issue.  He calls this presence of more than one civil right a ―hybrid‖ claim.  That, 
he writes, is when states will have to satisfy a compelling interest test. 
An outcry from the right, left, and middle energized Congress to pass the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) three years later.
2
  The law was passed unanimously in 
the House and 97-0 in the Senate, and with language that left the clear impression that 
                                                 
 
2
 The introduction to Crane (1998, 236) cites fourteen articles criticizing the decision ―textually, 
historically, legally, morally, socially, and politically‖ all before the 1993 Congressional response.   
  
3 
Congress was letting the Supreme Court know it had made a mistake.
3
  But the Supreme 
Court struck down RFRA as an unconstitutional encroachment on the power of the 
Supreme Court to apply the standard of review it deems appropriate in constitutional 
cases.  This case, City of Boerne v. Flores was handed down four years after the federal 
RFRA, and had the effect of leaving the lower standard of review in place for the fifty 
states in terms of federal constitutional law.
4
 
The conventional understanding of First Amendment Free Exercise jurisprudence in 
the U.S. thus means only having to show that a law which burdens a religious actor is 
reasonable, and does not discriminate against the religious.  And unless there is a hybrid, 
or an accompanying constitutional claim, the federal court can adjudicate from that point 
forward.
5
  But this federal decrease in the standard of review does not necessarily mean a 
decrease in religious liberty, as 99.7% of all court cases are not federal cases.
6
  They are 
state cases concerning state constitutional and statutory law.  And researchers have not 
yet studied the state cases to determine if state and local governments are accepting the 
U.S. Supreme Court‘s policy that burdens religious actors more than in the past.  
                                                 
 
3
 The very title of the act implies the U.S. Supreme Court had taken away something that needed to be 
―restored.‖  And if the implication was not enough, the law stated ―in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
US 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens 
on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.‖  42 USCS § 2000bb (a)(4)  
4
 Although to be clear, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507 (1997) has no effect on federal territories as 
recent case law has shown RFRA to be a valid statutory increase in religious liberty.  See Christians v. 
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (1998), and the U.S. Supreme Court allowing the ruling to 
stand at 525 US 811 (1998). 
The most recent case upholding RFRA is Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita  546 US 418 (2006), decided 
February 21, 2006. 
5
 Before 2004‘s Locke v. Davey, the disclaimer would have read, ―unless there is a hybrid claim or the law 
is discriminatory on its face.‖  But because of this ruling in Washington, where a religious actor challenged 
a law that forbids a public benefit offered to everyone except those seeking a religious degree, the 
disclaimer arguably grows smaller. 
6
 Stumpf and Culver (1992, 2), and Carp and Stidham (1996, 133). 
  
4 
Surprisingly, more than half of the states seem to be rejecting a rational basis test, and are 
voluntarily returning to the older standard that allows them less latitude. 
Specifically, thirteen state legislatures have passed their own state-RFRA which 
restores the strict scrutiny standard of review.
7
  Another thirteen state supreme courts 
have issued rulings clarifying that their state will judge religious infractions under their 
state constitutions using strict scrutiny.
 8
  Three more states effectively have a strict 
standard by ignoring that Smith ever happened.
9
  And state courts in California and 
Maine are allowing pre-Smith standards to continue, but explicitly reserve the ability to 
change that standard until the issue seems more ―settled‖.10  But even with these 
institutional efforts, the question of whether these policies are effective is unanswered.  
Do these pro-religious freedom court precedents really result in more religious actor 
success?  The results of this model show that they do.  Do state RFRAs result in higher 
success rates for plaintiffs in free exercise cases?
11
  The results will show that they do 
not.  By looking into the state-level religious freedom cases, this study will be able to 
describe the facets of what may be the new arena for religious freedom decisions in the 
nation. 
Before this study, the results of the new religious freedom policies for the nation 
simply assume what is occurring in the thirty or so states that have a strict or heightened 
                                                 
 
7
 State legislatures have passed RFRAs in AZ, CT, FL, ID, IL, MO, NM, OK, PA, RI, SC, TX.  AL passed 
an amendment to its state constitution. 
8
 Judicial rulings make clear that these states will use strict scrutiny:  AK, IN, MA, MI, MN, OH, WI, VT.  
It is very likely that the following states will use strict scrutiny, although the legal language leaves some 
uncertainty:  KY, MS, NY, and WA. 
9
 NC, MT, and KS cited Smith and yet applied the stronger pre-Smith standard of review in their 
interpretation of their state constitutions. 
10
 Taken from Catholic Charities, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 90-91 (Cal. 2004) (finding state law 
unsettled and reserving resolution of the issue). 
11
 Note:  the words ―Free Exercise‖ are capitalized when referring to the U.S. Constitutional civil right, 
whereas state level ―free exercise‖ clauses are not capitalized. 
  
5 
scrutiny test, and which twenty (by default) have a rational-basis test.
12
  This study seeks 
to systematically test that assumption.  It will do so by showing that religious litigants are 
not winning a larger percentage of their cases in most increased scrutiny contexts. 
 
Literature Review 
Previous research in this area supports two broad findings: empirical studies have 
shown that Smith matters, although some scholars conclude that Smith hurt religious 
actors and others conclude that religious actors do not succeed enough for a decrease in 
success rates to be of consequence.  Secondly, state cases are where the variation in free 
exercise jurisprudence will (or should) occur more and more.  This review of literature 
will detail these findings further. 
The first of the two broadly supported areas is that the Smith line of cases altered how 
much protection is afforded someone exercising his or her religion.  Both the rate of cases 
brought and won by religious actors has decreased in federal courts.  
The most conclusive evidence that Smith results in less protection for religious actors 
is the drop-off in the rate of cases brought and cases won by those religious actors.  The 
literature is clear on this at the federal level. 
James Brent found in 1999 that rulings in favor of religious actors, and the number of 
those cases brought were depressed after Smith, and increased after RFRA.  He revisited 
                                                 
 
12
 The numbers here are unclear because the legal reasoning in some of these landmark cases is unclear.  
See Laycock (2004) for a full discussion of the ambiguity.  Thirty is a generous estimate, with a more 
conservative estimate of perhaps twenty-five.  Brief coverage of the method of classifying states for the 
model is covered in the methodology section of this chapter. 
  
6 
the analysis in 2003 to find if the increase held in the shadow of the U.S. Supreme Court 
overruling RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), and as he predicted, it did not.
13
   
Adamczyk, Wybraniec & Finke (2004) found essentially the same thing, adding that 
their ―analysis reveals that the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and 
immediate.  The percentage of favorable decisions for federal Free Exercise cases 
dropped from over 39% to less than 29% following Smith‖ but then ―returned to over 
45% after RFRA was passed.‖14 
In his 2001 dissertation, John Forren made perhaps the strongest empirical claim that 
Smith mattered when he found that federal and state courts using Smith as the controlling 
case ruled in favor of the religious claimant only one time out of seventy.
15
 
Robert Drinan speculates on the effect of this in that once governments do not have to 
satisfy the compelling interest test, religious actors are less likely to even bring suit.  And 
the drop-off rate will be unknowable because ―at some local level, zoning commissions 
will quietly deny access to Jewish temples, controversial denominations or Catholic 
schools.  Appeals will not be taken nor will there be any public outcry.‖16 
More support for this point comes from the fact that religious legal interest groups are 
abandoning the Free Exercise clause altogether and instead opting for the established 
strict scrutiny in the Free Speech clause.  Stephen Brown‘s Trumping Religion details the 
movement of Christian legal groups that have been defending their actions against 
Establishment of Religion claims, and moving toward the more successful strategy of 
claiming a minority status.  More specifically, this Christian legal strategy finds an 
                                                 
 
13
 Brent, 1999, 2003. 
14
 Adamcyzk, Wybraniec, Finke, 2004, 248. 
15
 Forren, 2001, 238.  
16
 Drinan, 1999. 
  
7 
opportunity for legal wins when local and state governments exclude religious groups 
from benefits to avoid an Establishment problem.  They argue this exclusion is viewpoint 
discrimination –a free speech violation.  Brown shows that the successful Christian legal 
strategy was to virtually abandon the religious clauses (both the defense of an 
Establishment claim as well as asserting a Free Exercise claim) and call religious acts, 
like worship and funding for evangelical newsletters, a Free Speech public forum issue.  
―In terms of substantive victories, the free speech strategy of New Christian Right 
lawyers has been far more successful than previous arguments that focused on the 
religion clauses alone.‖ (Brown, 144) 
The second broad area of agreement in the literature supports the assertation that state 
Courts are now where religious actors can, should, and will seek the court‘s protection of 
their religious freedom. 
Although the federal religious freedom cases will continue (and will continue to grab 
more attention) scholars see that the nation‘s religious freedom policy can and is shaped 
in the state courts, barring a federal Smith overruling.  
Dan Crane‘s Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age In The State 
Courts showed only one year after City of Boerne that the state legislatures and courts 
were taking their role in constructing religious freedom policy seriously.  Six state 
supreme courts had ruled that religious freedom will be kept at the highest scrutiny by 
1998, and Rhode Island actually had a RFRA on the books in 1993, making the father of 
American religious liberty Roger Williams‘ home state the first to enact such legislation.   
John Forren‘s (2001) study showed 343 state religious freedom cases relied on state 
precedent and law rather than on Smith.  It should be noted that Forren ends up claiming 
  
8 
that Smith‘s ambiguities allow federal courts to still hold governments to a strict scrutiny 
as often as they had before.  This view is somewhat contrary to the presupposition of this 
study, but not contradictory.  To Forren, states have become an important venue for 
religious freedom, if not the most important venue.   
Gary Gildin argues in multiple articles (2004, 2000) for a renewed push for religious 
liberty in the states, although he does lament the loss of a centralized arena that the 
federal courts played.  Richard Schragger also agrees that the local and state governments 
are now logical arenas for Free Exercise cases to be decided, but unlike Gildin finds this 
to be the proper arena.
 17
 
 
Research Questions 
This study hopes to find out how state attempts to affect religious freedom in the state 
courts have fared in terms of judicial voting behavior.  To answer that larger research 
question with much precision means controlling for other factors that could interfere with 
the relationships between judge votes and state judicial and legislative attempts to 
increase religious freedom.   
The control variables considered are:  county-level Presidential vote, state judge 
ideology, metro-area religious adherence rates, metro-area religious homogeneity, 
popularity of the religion seeking protection, deviant drug or sexual behavior seeking 
protection, prisoner asking for protection, economic impact of the case, free exercise of 
religion language used in the opinion, establishment of religion clause language used in 
                                                 
 
17
 RFRAs, whether national or statewide, are less-than optimal ―centralized blanket‖ ―religion-protecting 
legislative accommodations‖ which staunch the diversity of the nation‘s religions.  This in turn gets in the 
way of the competitive pitting of faction against faction, perhaps allowing religion a greater influence than 
the system can handle.  Schragger, 2004, 1819. 
  
9 
the opinion, and free speech clause language used in the opinion.  The relationships of 
these control variables to religious freedom are predicted and explored at length in the 
study. 
Put another way, the model this study constructs is: 
Figure 1  List of Variables and Predicted Directions 
 
Dependent Variable:  Judge Votes for Religious Actors  Predicted Direction 
Of Relationship with 
Independent Variables      Religious Freedom 
        
1) State legislative attempts to better protect religious liberty   + 
2) State judicial precedents to better protect religious liberty  + 
 
Independent Control Variables 
 
3) County-level Republican presidential vote     − 
4) State judge liberalness      + 
5) Metro-area religious adherence rate     + 
6) Metro-area religious homogeneity      − 
7) Popularity of religion seeking protection    − 
8) Deviant drug or sexual behavior seeking protection   − 
9) Prisoner asking for protection     − 
10) Economic impact cases      − 
11) Free Exercise of Religion used in legal reasoning   + 
12) Establishment Clause used in legal reasoning   − 
13) Free Speech used in legal reasoning    + 
 
The dependent variable is the judge‘s vote protecting or not protecting the claim of 
the religious litigant(s), and is referred to broadly as religious freedom.  This probability 
of a religious actor winning the vote can tell us if the states are protecting religious 
freedom more or less than the federal courts.  The probability of Free Exercise wins on 
the federal level has been widely studied and established, as covered in the literature 
review, and to be discussed further in the next chapter.  But a simple comparison of the 
two is a fundamental reason this study is interesting as no study has yet compiled a state 
level empirical analysis. 
The dependent variable, a vote for the religious freedom claim, in the end will be the 
product of a logit model.  This model is an appropriate way to look for multivariate 
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relationships in a dataset when the dependent variable is binary, such as it is here.  A logit 
model presents a dependent variable as the probability of success overall, and each 
independent variable coefficient can be transformed and interpreted as the probability of 
observing a success on the dependent variable.  Each variable‘s beta, and resulting Wald 
statistic, shows the direction and strength of the relationship to religious freedom.  If a 
linear regression were used on such a pool of data, serious inference problems would 
result.
18
 
The study began conceptually with two main independent variables: the political and 
legal efforts to increase religious freedom.  If the state legislature has tightened the 
standard of review to a variant of strict scrutiny via a RFRA (Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act), it was coded with a 1 in the legislative variable, and if the state court 
system signaled a return to strict scrutiny, it was coded with a 1in the judicial variable.  If 
not these variables were coded 0.  But because these simple variables proved generally 
insignificant, variables capturing more complexity of the institutional attempt, both 
legislatively and judicially, were constructed.  Closer readings of the legal language in 
the judicial attempt states, and tallies of the qualifications in the RFRA states allowed a 
scaled variable to be created.  That variable is explained further in the third chapter. 
To find out the independent effect of both RFRAs and judicial decisions, other 
variables are used as controls.  Does religious freedom instead coincide with a more 
religious area, a more conservative county, or the political leaning of the judge, for 
example?  Or are religious freedom cases better explained by the claimant being a 
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 Guidance with logit modeling comes primarily from Aldrich (1984), Boorah (2002).  Nixon, David C.  
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prisoner, or from a minor religion, or asking for their land or taxes back, or protection of 
something ―deviant‖?  Does the mention of the state or federal free speech, free exercise 
of religion or establishment clause correlate with certain results?   
 
Hypothesis 1:  States with RFRAs result in more judicial votes favoring religious 
freedom than states without RFRAs. 
 
The first independent variable, tests the hypothesis that states with RFRAs will result 
in more judicial votes for religious freedom than those states without RFRAs.  Twelve 
states have passed RFRAs:  Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Missouri, Texas, Oklahoma, 
Illinois, Alabama (constitutional amendment), South Carolina, Florida, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island.  There is a tendency for the RFRAs passed later to have certain exceptions 
as to what will receive strict scrutiny.  For example, the Missouri RFRA, passed in 2004, 
says that infringements on religious acts cannot be ―unduly restrictive considering the 
relevant circumstances‖ rather than the Sherbert wording, ―least intrusive alternative.‖19  
Missouri also lays out several acts that cannot be the subject of a free exercise claim, 
such as causing physical injury to another person, possessing an otherwise illegal firearm, 
failing to provide child-support and the like.  The interpretation of this variable will also 
allow us to see if the RFRAs passed later that are generally less protective show lower 
religious freedom success rates.  The predicted direction of the RFRA variable is 
positive, meaning that I hypothesize that states with RFRAs protect religious litigants 
more.  However, Drinan (1999) hints at a complication with that prediction.  If people 
seeking protection for their religious act reside in a lower scrutiny state, there may be a 
sharp decrease in the number of cases brought, which could mean an even higher success 
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 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398 (1963). 
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rate in these states.  This incentive structure may keep the weaker cases from being 
factored into the success rate in lower scrutiny states.  This will be considered when the 
results of this study are analyzed and discussed.   
 
Hypothesis 2:  State court precedent providing for the use of strict scrutiny or the 
equivalent protecting religious freedom result in more judicial votes favoring religious 
freedom than states without such precedent. 
 
The second independent variable tests the hypothesis that states with strict scrutiny or 
the equivalent affect judicial behavior.  Eighteen states have a form of judicial strict 
scrutiny:  Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont, 
Washington, Wisconsin and Tennessee.  But as with the RFRA variable, a simple binary 
variable may not capture enough of the variance.  Five states simply ignore previous 
precedent or are explicitly waiting for a better time to address the issue of scrutiny in a 
religious freedom decision.
20
  This study will therefore attempt a scaled variable which 
incorporates the difference from the strong to weak strict scrutiny states.   
 
Control Variables 
Judge & Community Variables 
Hypothesis 3:  County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less 
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level Democratic 
Presidential voting. 
 
Beginning with the control variables, the third independent variable is each county‘s 
Republican vote, standardized.  More specifically, it is how much more or less than the 
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national average an area voted for the winner of the Presidential elections of 2000 and 
2004.  Those two values are then averaged.   
This variable will capture the partisan tilt or political context of the geographical area 
in which the judge‘s court is located.  Predicting the direction of this variable‘s 
relationship to religious freedom was not immediately clear because of the bipartisan 
nature of the law passed.  Support for RFRA in Congress was vastly bipartisan, with a 
97-0 vote in the Senate, and a unanimous vote in the House of Representatives.  Liberal 
constituencies work towards the protection of minorities, including all religious 
minorities, while conservative constituencies hear the pleas of religious conservatives, 
yet, at bottom, religious liberty is a civil liberty and liberal Democratic constituencies are 
more sympathetic to civil liberties than are Republican conservative constituencies.
21
  
The variance of the issue was originally proposed as a minority versus majority 
difference where a status-quo upheld the sovereignty of laws over the claims of 
minorities on the left and right tails.
22
  But as the evidence mounted, this majoritarian 
theory captured less of the variance than did the simple partisan construction.   
The coding for this variable is as follows:  The value of ―county Presidential vote‖ is 
the county Republican vote minus the national average Presidential vote in 2000 and 
2004, in percentage points, to the thousandth of a point.  The predicted direction of the 
relationship with religious freedom is negative, as Democratic voting is hypothesized as 
being correlated with protectiveness more than Republican voting.   
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 Sociologist of religion Christian Smith (1998) has done work on a theory of religious tension with the 
status quo in this work with his ―Subcultural Identity Theory.‖      
22
 Marci Hamilton is an example of one voicing this perspective.  Most recently in her 2005 book God v. 
the Gavel, she asserts that Congress abdicates its responsibility by passing RFRA, in part because Congress 
is institutionally better situated to investigate when exemptions to laws should be offered, rather than 
courts. 
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Hypothesis 4:  More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than 
more conservative judges. 
 
The fourth independent variable is a measure of each state judge‘s ideology.  
Religious freedom is a civil liberty, and judicial behavior research has shown Democratic 
judges to be more sympathetic to civil liberties than Republican judges, but because the 
vote on the bill was unanimous, a prediction for Democrats to be more protective is not 
likely to capture ideology‘s effect.  A better measure than party identification is used.  
This measure seeks to capture the effect of a judge‘s ideology on her religious freedom 
vote.  The description of the variable in chapter four will elaborate.  The hypothesis, then, 
is that ideologically liberal judges will be more protective of religious freedom than 
ideologically conservative judges.  
 
Hypothesis 5:  Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support 
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence areas. 
 
The fifth independent variable is the religious adherence rate for the standard 
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA).  This variable will capture any effect an area‘s 
churchgoing-ness might have on religious freedom.  It is likely that the trial judges and 
the appellate judges of the state either came from, or live in the area the court is in.  But 
apart from the likelihood of a strong correlation between judge and county religious 
activity, I believe there is a case to be made regarding a context‘s influence on those 
within it.  In a recent federal judge voting pattern study the authors observed:  
―…to our knowledge this [contextual/community] dimension has not 
previously been explored in research on judicial decision-making.  One 
of the reasons for that neglect may be that, while correlating the judge‘s 
own religious affiliation to his or her decisions may seem intuitive, 
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suggesting a connection between aggregate data about a community 
collectively and individual-level judicial decisions naturally raises 
questions.[]  However, given that the religiosity of and religious 
demographics in an area may exert a structural effect on a community 
and everyone living and working therein, because ‗social context 
influences human behavior,‘[] an investigation of the possible 
association indeed is sensible.  Because judges as human actors and 
social beings live and work in a particular social milieu, the religious 
context or atmosphere of that community may influence a judge‘s 
perception of legal claims that implicate religion or that involve appeals 
to religious adherence.‖23  
 
I predict the relationship between adherent rate and vote for the religious freedom 
claim is positive.  It might be argued that religious minorities seek protection from 
governmental policies, but the adherence rate largely reflects the religious majority who 
put those policies into place, and therefore there should be a negative relationship.  But 
that intuitive answer inflates the difference between the average religious claimant and 
the churchgoer, as well as proximity between the churchgoer and policy-maker.  It has 
been shown at the federal level that the adherence rate is positively associated with 
religious freedom protective rulings.
24
  This is apparently because more churchgoers 
identify and sympathize with religious claimants, including minority religious claimants, 
rather than with the secular authorities.  I will note here that the predicted performance of 
the variable is less important than the fact that the variable is controlling for an 
adherence-rate effect in the model testing for significance of legislative and judicial 
increases in religious freedom. 
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 Sisk, Heisse, and Morriss, 2004, 585.  The empty brackets denote footnotes taken out of this cite.  Both 
cites were to Jeffrey W. Dwyer, Leslie L. Clarke & Michael K. Miller.  1990.  ―The Effects of Religious 
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The rate of adherents for each county is drawn from the data collected by the 
Glenmary Research Center.
25
  The data are basically church membership and attendance 
for each religious body, in each county, each decade, since 1980.
26
  The religion of the 
adherent is not taken into account in this variable. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater 
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim. 
 
The sixth independent variable is a religious density index for the SMSA.  This 
variable will capture any effect a religiously homogeneous or heterogeneous area might 
have on religious freedom.  Like the adherent rate, the effect will come through the 
correlation between judges and the area that produced them, as well as the affect a 
community has on the outcome of a case.   
The prediction of the variable, like the above, posits that heterogeneous areas are 
more likely to tolerate and protect religious freedom than religiously homogeneous areas.  
Research on the subject shows that in the homogenous areas judges were more likely to 
rule against religious symbols in public spaces.
27
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 Glenmary, 2002. 
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 Adherent is paraphrased here from Glenmary (2002):  All members, including full members, their 
children and the estimated number of other participants who are not considered members. If unavailable, I 
will estimate the number of adherents from the known number of members. (The Glenmary estimation 
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done for 67 groups.) 
Further defining:  The Catholic Church and some other denominations define an adherent as one that has 
been baptized. Other denominations define adherents as all members; including full members, their 
children, and the estimated number of other participants who are not considered members but are baptized 
but not confirmed or eligible for communion but regularly attend services and other functions sponsored by 
the church. 
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The measure of religious density used is called a Herfindahl index, and it tells the 
odds that any two random people selected will come from the same religious tradition.  
Originally constructed as a way of measuring business firm density, Innaccone (1991), 
and Ellison, Burr and McCall (1997) use the index with the Glenmary data to measure the 
density of religious affiliations.  The Herfindahl index formula is:  Hj = ∑S
2
ij where H is 
the odds of two random people from the same religious tradition meeting, S is an 
individual religious denomination divided by the total number of churchgoers within the 
area of analysis, ―j‖, and ―i‖ is the index of summation. 
The Herfindahl index ranges from 100 –perfect homogeneity to 0 –perfect 
heterogeneity.  The predicted direction then is negative.  This posits that the lack of 
diversity in an area will result in a lower tolerance for minority faiths.  And the more 
judges and their communities come into contact with other faiths, the more likely it is that 
those faiths will find protection from infringing laws. 
 
Claimant Characteristic Variables 
Hypothesis 7:  Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less 
success than those from majority religions. 
 
The seventh independent variable is whether the religious actor seeking protection is 
from a minority religion or majority religion.  This variable will control for effects 
associated with discrimination against minority religions.  The predicted pattern is that 
the farther from the mainstream the religion is, the less likely it is to win its case,
28
 but 
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 Minority religious litigants (defined in the study as Protestant sects and cults but without further 
clarification) make-up 18% of church goers yet account for 62% of Free Exercise cases, and significantly, 
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the opposite does have some support in the most recent study as minority religions at the 
lower federal level won at a higher rate than both Baptists or Catholics.
29
 The value of 
this variable will be the metro-area level popularity of the religious tradition to which the 
claimant belongs.  Notice that religious tradition is not a simple denominational coding.  
It is instead a categorization of denominations into families, to be explained further in 
chapter four.  The eight religious traditions are: Mainline Protestants, Evangelical 
Protestants, Black Protestants, Catholics, Jewish, Liberal Non-traditional (i.e. Unitarian, 
United Church of Christ), Conservative Non-traditional (i.e. Jehovah‘s Witnesses, 
Church of Latter Day Saints), and Other (i.e. Muslims, Buddhists). 
 
Hypothesis 8:  Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less 
likely to be supported than those that are not. 
 
The eighth independent variable is deviancy.  This variable tries to capture what 
happens to those who seek protection for an act that is outside of society‘s mores.  The 
predicted direction is negative.  Deviance here will be limited to sexual or illicit drug 
issues, and the discussion in the fourth chapter will further define the variable.  The 
variable is a dummy variable, coded 1 if it is a deviant case, and 0 if not.   
 
Hypothesis 9:  Religious freedom claims of prisoners are less likely to be supported than 
claims from non-prisoners. 
 
The ninth independent variable is whether the claimant is a prisoner or not.  This 
variable will capture the difference in success rate between free citizens and prisoners.  
Studies have shown that in the past that prisoners lose more religious freedom cases than 
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average.
30
  One might question the inclusion of prisoners in the model to begin with 
because of its bias –it is certain to bring the success-rate down because prisoners have 
fewer freedoms than non-prisoners.  But the flaw in this is equating what prisoners want 
and what non-prisoners want.  Prisoners ask for name-changes, prayer meetings and the 
ability to grow a beard –things readily available to the public.  So there is no conceptual 
reason for prisoners to have a lower success rate.  That they do, even after the lowered 
expectations, is understudied. 
Those seeking religious freedoms who are incarcerated are coded 1, all others are 
coded 0.  
 
Hypothesis 10:  Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money 
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do. 
 
The tenth independent variable is whether the religious claimant is seeking the 
government‘s tax monies or land.  The argument here is that if offering protection to a 
religious act does not cost the political entity any of its tax base or finite land, protection 
is more likely to be offered.
31
  Claiming that tax and land use cases comprise the costly 
cases to a government and all others are only symbolic is reductionistic, and clearly is no 
way to think through legal issues in this area.  But in a study which uses a statistical 
model, tax and land use cases do represent a different category of case than what can be 
uttered on the podium at a high school graduation or whether religious rhetoric biased a 
jury.  This variable will capture the difference between rulings on infinite resources 
                                                 
 
30
 Lupu, 1998. 
31
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versus those on finite resources by coding cases which are based on taxes or land usage 1, 
and the others 0.   
Legal Reasoning Variables 
Hypothesis 11:  When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern 
free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than if it is not. 
 
Hypothesis 12:  When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern 
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is less likely to be 
supported by the judge than if the separation of church and state is not involved. 
 
The eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth variables capture constitutional legal reasoning in 
the case, and predict that it is used in patterned ways.  If the judge mentions the state or 
federal right to free exercise of religion, I predict the religious actor is more likely to 
receive the protection than if the right was not brought up.  This is because the judge has 
already granted the religious actor something desired –the standard by which the question 
will be answered.  Once a question is understood as an issue of a civil liberty, it is more 
likely the judge will grant that protection than if a civil liberties issue is not recognized. 
Likewise, if the Justice reasons that a case is a separation of church and state 
question, I predict that protection for the act is less likely to occur.  This is because 
disestablishment clauses often prevent governments from granting religious actor 
requests because they may appear to be preferential in comparison to other religions, or 
they may appear to advance the religion in question, or they may entangle the state in an 
area deemed off-limits by the state or U.S. Constitution.   
The argument behind both of those predictions is not unlike a common reading of the 
two religion clauses themselves.  That reading understands the two clauses to be in 
tension.  Establishment clauses forbid governmental policies which benefit religion, but 
free exercise clauses protect religious action, which itself benefits religion.  Judges then 
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get to make the decision of who gets the benefit claimants seek: the religious claimants or 
their opponents.  These variables posit a correlation between the legal basis for the ruling 
and who won.   
 
Hypothesis 13:  When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it 
is more likely to be supported than if it is not. 
 
The third legal reasoning variable and thirteenth variable overall is a dummy variable 
for whether the claimant is making a free speech claim along with a claim for the 
protection for the religious act.  This strategy of coupling (or solely using) the Free 
Speech Clause is a phenomenon largely caused by the decrease in the protective power of 
the Free Exercise Clause after Smith, and introduction of hybrid cases.  If the act in 
question can be understood as a symbolic free speech claim (a civil right that is protected 
with a higher standard of review) then it makes sense that the claimant would try to get 
his or her case deemed a free speech case.  Stephen Brown‘s Trumping Religion details 
this legal strategy among the religious.
32
  His work shows persuasively that if a case is 
considered a Free Speech issue, the probability of a win increases sharply.    Examples of 
such U.S. Supreme Court cases are Agostini v. Felton, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center 
Moriches, and Rosenberger v. U. Va.
33
 where excluding the religious from public forum 
benefits is deemed unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.   
Free speech cases are coded 1, free exercise cases are coded 1, and establishment 
cases are coded 1, with all others 0, predicting a positive relationship in the first two, and 
a negative in the last. 
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Data Sources 
Assembling the dataset of hundreds of religious actor cases was facilitated by the use 
of the Religion Case Reporter (RCR), a digest which daily combs through local, state and 
national religion cases via both Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis.
 34
  Religious case digests go 
back to 1963, and this current digest is the sole digest after Campbell University‘s 
Religious Freedom Reporter ceased printing the same year (1998) Martin Fisch began his 
Religion Case Reporter.
35
  The search string he uses each day to continue work on the 
digest is proprietary, but with more than 1,600 topics of cases, it is likely that the search 
errs on the side of breadth.  Supplemental LEXIS searches and following the cited line of 
cases within RCR cited cases resulted in very few additions to the dataset.  
The cases are selected from the eight years during 1998 through 2005, beginning in 
the first full year after Boerne v. Flores.  States which went to strict scrutiny during that 
time can be analyzed for an effect before and after that change.  The model will account 
for that change and include cases from pre-RFRA or judicial increase states in the 
appropriate manner.  For the twenty or so states which are either under a rational basis 
test or the prevailing test is not clear, the whole of their free exercise cases will be 
reviewed going back to 1998. 
 
A further word on the predictions is necessary.  The study is asking whether a state 
legislature restoring strong religious freedom will matter, or whether a state supreme 
court restoring a high bar to clear for infringing on religious freedom will matter.  Some 
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studies essentially gamble on higher significance scores, and soothe the sometime loss of 
that gamble by stating that insignificance is still a finding.  It strikes me that this study is 
interesting with either outcome.  If state institutions trying to increase religious freedom 
are unsuccessful, then it begs the question of if not them, what could increase religious 
freedom?  Is religious freedom simply a random occurrence in courts across the nation?  
If on the other hand, the state institutions are successful and religious freedom in those 
states is more protected, what are the contours of that success?   
 
Case Selection 
The rules governing case selection are laid out here, and following that is the 
discussion of how the study determined that a religious freedom issue was involved. 
This study analyzed 3,254 judge votes in 1,230 religious freedom cases. 
The unit of analysis is each judge‘s vote in a dispute when someone asks the court for 
protection of a religious act.  Regardless of the stated issue or controlling law, whether it 
is state or federal constitutional or state statutory, civil or criminal law, the case selection 
criterion is whether an actor asks the court for protection of a religious act. 
This study includes more than explicitly free exercise decisions, and does so for three 
reasons.  The first is because state opinions are, as reproduced in LEXIS-NEXIS, may 
employ loose usage of religious freedom language.  Thus being too rigid, it may fail to 
capture the full scope of the data available for testing.  
The second reason, related to the first, is that constitutional law and statutory laws are 
especially hard to untangle in this area, and this is compounded by a lack of 
standardization and clarity among state opinions.   
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The third and most important reason this study is not confined to formal free exercise 
of religion decisions is due to an incentive judges have to base decisions which deny 
religious actors protection on bases other than the constitutional right to free exercise of 
religion.  For example, if a judge has reached the decision that a Catholic diocese must 
turn over documents for investigation into a criminal matter, the judicial opinion 
explaining that will be much easier to write if the primary bases are criminal rules of 
evidence rather than the right of religious organizations to be left alone.   
A problem with gathering case data that explicitly deal with free exercise issues is 
that the judicial opinion is the only data source that is available at every court level of this 
study.  For a federal study, litigant briefs and amicus curiae briefs would be useful in 
determining whether free exercise issues have been raised.  But because party briefs are 
not, for the most part, available in state cases, and because interest groups understand that 
a state amicus brief has one-fiftieth of the jurisdictional range of a federal amicus brief, 
state-level amicus briefs are also largely absent. 
To ensure that all relevant cases are included in the dataset, if a religious act is 
detected from the fact pattern in the opinion, I include that case and assume that the 
religious claimant asked for protection. 
The cases selected for inclusion are thus those where a religious issue is explicit or 
implicit.  Examples of implicit religious claims include: 
1) Preemptory strikes are used on potential jurors because of their identified religious 
tradition.
36
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2) There are 34 cases where either the judge, the prosecutor or the defense attorney use 
religious language on the public record and it is the subject of an appeal.
37
  There are 
also three cases where a judge acts religiously outside of the court, writing editorials 
or letters to editors, and his or her neutrality was questioned.
38
  If the appeals of these 
cases are construed as government officials seeking protection for their words in 
court, they are selected for coding here, even though the primary issue is better 
understood as an establishment one.  Once we leave the realm of legal reasoning and 
allow fact patterns to decide which cases are to be studied, accepting all the cases 
drawn in by a widely cast net means keeping all cases where someone seeks 
protection for a religious act.
39
  See numbers 4) and 5) below for further clarification 
of this rule. 
3) Jurors stricken during voir dire because their religious belief or simply their 
denomination was cited as conflicting with their role as jurors are selected here, even 
though the specific juror-to-be is not the one bringing the case.  In all fifty-eight of 
these votes, it is the defense or prosecution attempting to have a decision against their 
clients reversed.  But nonetheless, it falls squarely under the case selection method of 
this study, ―an actor seeking protection for a religious act.‖  Note that narrowing the 
selection to those who performed the act, or ―seeking protection for their act‖ would 
complicate the selection system in all cases of religious groups.  Or put another way, 
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this study seeks to illuminate how often the courts protect religious behavior overall, 
rather than a specific person‘s religious behavior. 
 
Examples of cases which were not included: 
1) If the actor seeking protection is a state or local government rather than an individual. 
2) If the actor seeking protection is an individual clearly representing a government.  An 
Attorney General being named as the party in an establishment case is an example of 
this. 
3) If both parties could seek protection for a religious act, the case was excluded.  For 
example, when members of a church are suing each other for control of the 
congregation or building. 
4) If the judge explicitly states no religious issue was raised, the assumption of a 
religious issue must be dropped, and so these cases were not coded.  
5) Churches seeking property through adverse possession.40 
6) If there are two religious acts to be protected, both equally important and distinct, and 
the court grants one but not the other, there is no easy way to code the outcome of 
that vote, so the case is not selected for coding. 
 
Derived Cases 
As I coded cases I noticed that most of the data I was drawing from each case were 
also available for the decisions which led up to the appellate case I was reading.  The 
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 Fulkerson v. Van Buren, 60 Ark. App. 257 (1998) is an example of a church claiming squatters‘ rights.  
But, the inverse is a case that is coded:  Walsh v.  St. Mary's Church, 248 A.D.2d 792 (1998) where a 
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outcomes, the judge, the decision date, the parties, the county –almost all of this 
information was given in the first few paragraphs of the opinion.  I collected these data.  
The pertinent information for the cases that came before the one I was reading that were 
not available were the legal reasoning variables (whether the judge relied on free 
exercise, establishment or free speech clauses).  Religious tradition of the claimant stayed 
the same, as did the essential facts of the case, and most importantly, whether the lower 
courts ruled for or against the religious actor. 
A total of 538 cases were derived from the eventual appeal which was published in 
LEXIS.
41
  So these derived cases a) add a generous portion to the dataset, and more 
importantly b) allow analysis of the lowest level of courts, which is effectively 
impossible without them. 
When an opinion was from an administrative court, tax court or zoning board 
decision, no case was inferred.  Only the three levels of state judicial courts were coded: 
Court of Last Resort (or Supreme Court), Intermediate Appellate, or Trial/District Court. 
Cases were selected only from 1998 until 2005, but derived cases go back almost six 
years to February 1992.  There are 258 judge votes that fall before 1998, and are used in 
the descriptive analysis.  Only cases from 1998 until 2005 are used in the model, as they 
are the cases which fall after states were clearly allowed to afford less religious freedom.  
I see two benefits, and two questionable effects from using the method just described 
to assemble the dataset. 
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 Those 538 cases make up 44% of all the cases.  But since the 538 derived cases are generally lower 
courts with smaller judge panels (mainly one judge), only 696 judge votes are cast in these derived cases.  
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The first benefit is the obvious increase in information.  Without the derived votes, 
the range of this study would be forced to change from state courts to ―state appellate and 
courts of last resort‖, thus leaving easily available information unanalyzed. 
The second benefit is as a correction to the appellate bias that occurs when one has to 
rely on LEXIS-NEXIS and case digests.  Furthermore, it is more accurate to note that the 
study is not of religious actor success in the state courts, but rather, religious actor 
success for cases published in LEXIS-NEXIS.  By deriving cases, all three levels of state 
courts are represented and can be analyzed with much more confidence than if this study 
simply took what the online legal databases gave.  I do note below how the shape of state 
cases are distorted by this method.   
There are two issues connected to these inferred cases that may bias the data.  The 
first is the possibility that deriving cases means oversampling from judges or states more 
likely to lay out the case history.  But this is unlikely as appellate opinions in general 
typically detail the case history.  Indeed, it is embedded in America‘s legal culture, so this 
possible bias seems very unlikely.  A look at the derived cases by state confirms this.  I 
calculated each state‘s percentage of the overall cases, and compared that to the state‘s 
percentage of overall derived cases to find that no state varied by more than a couple of 
overall percentage points.  New York has 7.3% of the overall cases, and is the most 
overrepresented of the derived cases with 9.6% of them, for a difference of 2.3% overall 
percentage points.  Washington state is the most underrepresented as its 5.7% share of 
overall cases drops to 3.3% of inferred cases.  48 of the states did not vary by a full 
percentage point.  So it appears that there is no state inflation or depression of derived 
cases and votes worthy of attention. 
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A second concern is that this method of data collection will introduce a bias toward 
cases more likely to be appealed.  Three hypothetical examples of this type of bias are a) 
those funded by rich claimants with no financial incentive to stop appealing, b) cases 
which appear to be good political vehicles and are funded by interest groups, and c) cases 
seen by prosecutors as good policy vehicles.  Although this issue is legitimate, it is hard 
to imagine any substantive bent this bias would cause regarding the goals of the study.  
Wealthy litigants are likely to tilt more conservative on economic issues, but that is not so 
clear for social issues, and since a simple partisan difference does not appear to explain 
much of the difference in perspectives on religious freedom anyway, this possible bias 
seems benign.  Interest groups exist on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as 
representing majoritarian or minoritarian interests.  And a concern with how state 
attorneys general bias the sample is mitigated by the fact that state attorneys general do 
not have the discretion to appeal cases that the U.S. Solicitor General does.
42
  This is 
related to the fact that attorneys general ―normally argue cases before the state supreme 
court only when a state agency is involved in the case.‖43  This means there are weaker 
norms in the states to pursue politically advantageous policies via their attorneys general. 
The benefits of 1) increased data, and 2) greater representation of courts of general 
jurisdiction appear to outweigh the negative aspects of 3) possible demographic bias, or 
4) bias toward the more ―appealable‖ cases. 
 
                                                 
 
42
 Carp and Stidham, 1996, 109. 
43
 Ibid. 
  
30 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two undertakes the explanation of the dependent variable, the judge‘s vote 
for the religious freedom claim.  A brief history of both constitutional and statutory 
religious freedom is followed by some descriptive statistics drawn from the cases.  I will 
discuss the federal win rate and cumulative state win rate in this chapter. 
The third chapter focuses on the legislative and judicial independent variables.  In the 
legislative, I will mainly describe differences among the twelve state laws.  A pattern to 
the RFRAs weakening religious freedom will be addressed here.  That is, the earlier 
RFRAs in Rhode Island and Connecticut were without disclaimers, but more and more 
disclaimers showed up until the last two states that adopted the rule (Pennsylvania, then 
Missouri) qualified the increased scrutiny when religious freedom claims are made in 
more than a dozen ways.  Whether other differences among the states play a role in those 
qualifications, and how this pattern will be dealt with in the model are also discussed. 
In the judicial variable, I will discuss how most of these states are intentionally 
raising the religious freedom bar, but a couple are waiting for the issue to settle more, and 
still others have not clearly addressed the national Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence at all.  
Explaining the contours of the twenty states that have increased scrutiny on laws 
infringing religious acts, and then taking that explanation and operationalizing the 
variable will be goal of the chapter.   
The fourth chapter details the three other sets of control variables: the judge and 
context variables, the claimant variables, and the legal reasoning variables.  The fifth 
chapter runs and analyzes the model.  The sixth chapter concludes the study. 
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CHAPTER 2   
 
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS RELIGIOUS ACTOR 
SUCCESS IN STATE COURTS 
 
Definition 
The goal of this study is to shed light on how religious freedom is faring in the state 
courts, and a simple calculation of how often religious litigants get or do not get 
protection for their religious act is the backbone of the answer here.   
But using the outcomes of only those cases deemed free exercise of religion cases has 
drawbacks.  One being that a judge is the one who declares whether a case is a religious 
freedom case, not some objective criteria.  Another is that state level free exercise of 
religion cases are specifically flagged as such.
44
  Determining whether the subjective 
judge even meant for the case to be understood as a religious freedom case can take a 
deep reading, and even then disagreement on whether it is a religious freedom case or not 
is still going to occur.  
Because of these reasons, religious freedom here is not limited by judges or any legal 
reasoning within the opinion.  Instead, the fact pattern of cases will be used to find actors 
seeking protection for what they claim are religious acts.  Each vote in these cases is the 
unit of analysis for this study.  If the actor has enough patience, energy and money to 
make it into a courtroom in his or her quest for protection of a behavior they see as 
religious, this study is curious about the outcome.  
Characteristics of the Dependent Variable 
This definition has the benefit of 1) avoiding any judge bias that may exist in the 
recognition of what constitutes a religion and if the act is worthy of protection as 
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religious.  2) Avoiding the very subjective work of deeming a case a religious freedom 
case.  Some subjectivity still exists in asking if the facts of a case present an actor seeking 
protection for a claimed religious act, but that subjectivity is much less.  And 3) 
standardizing effects of judge quality, level of court jurisdictional differences, and legal 
differences (statutory versus constitutional.)     
Two costs of this approach are 1) accumulating the cases with a unique method.  But 
as detailed in the previous chapter, the Religious Case Reporter has made this collection 
possible.  And 2), which in hindsight has proven very expensive, is the lack of 
comparison to the existing literature.  Conclusions drawn here will be on cases with 
religious actors, rather than on the standard actors in religious freedom decisions.   
History 
A brief look at the legal and sociological definition of religion serves as support for 
not wading into the decision to determine one faith as being religious and not others.  
In sociology, a definition of religion that is neutral and fairly settled states that it is 
any system of beliefs and practices concerned with ultimate meaning and that assumes 
the existence of the supernatural.  This came after decades of definitions that were too 
narrow and without enough variance (religion as monotheistic, or religion as even 
exclusively Christian,)
45
 or too broad (including Marxism, or ―secular humanism‖.)46  
In case law, the first instance of trying to define religion, or better, to limit others 
from claiming it when the court disagreed, was in Davis v. Beason
47
 (1890).  It likewise 
began as a monotheistic, suspiciously Protestant-looking definition, and because of 
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 Wybraniec, 1998, 71. 
46
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qualifications and what is likely prose born out of the difficulty Justice Field found after 
committing to defining religion, the clarification goes on for pages and cannot here be 
quoted.   
Although the courts have clarified that the 1890 description is no longer controlling, 
they still leave us with only an impression of what religion means, and that ambiguity is 
explicit:  ―The Supreme Court has never established a comprehensive test for determining 
the ‗delicate question‘ of what constitutes a religious belief for purposes of the First 
Amendment‖.48   
Increasing diversity in the U.S. in the 20
th
 century meant the assumption of a 
personal, singular God laid out in Davis would give way in religious freedom issues 
brought by Hindus, Buddhists and others.  That diversity would find its limit in 1968, in 
U.S. v. Kuch,
49
 as the Neo-American Church, whose church key is a bottle opener and 
whose motto is ―Victory Over Horseshit‖, was denied the same tax immunities as other 
religious traditions. 
Kuch came in between two Vietnam conscientious objector cases, the first of which 
held that ―while the ‗truth‘ of a belief is not open to question, there remains the 
significant question whether it is ‗truly held.‘‖  The defendant in U.S. v. Seeger50 (1965) 
was ―without a belief in God, except in the remotest sense,‖ yet the Court granted his 
request for a religiously based statutory exemption from fighting due to the religious-like 
sincerity he felt for his ethical standards.  Seeger was upheld five years later in U.S. v. 
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 288 F. Supp 439 (D.C. 1968) 
50
 380 U.S. 163 
  
34 
Welsh
51
 (1970), despite Welsh‘s complete removal of any doubt that he was an atheist, 
which Seeger left open.  Outside of the conscientious objector statute, a New Jersey 
school district offering classes on the Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental 
Meditation (SCI/TM) was ruled an unconstitutional advancement of religion despite the 
denial of being religious.
52
  The latest word on what religion means in courts may be in 
Smith v. Board of Commissioners
53
 (1987) as the plaintiffs sought an establishment ruling 
against textbook companies which advanced ―the religions of secularism, humanism, 
evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism, and others‖ to no avail.54 
 
Political research on this topic has not come up with a unique understanding of 
religion and simply borrows from law and/or sociology.   
This study‘s generous take-the-claimant-at-their-word method on the definition of 
religion appears to be unique in studies of this type. 
 
Summary of the Empirical Analysis 
The unit of analysis used in the model is each judge‘s vote, and there were 3,254 of 
them.  1,458 votes were for the religious actor versus 1,796 against, making the chance of 
a religious freedom vote 44.8%.   
Success Rates 
One of the most important conclusions the study can offer is the simple success rate 
of the 1,230 cases: 45%.
55
  The success rate over the same period for specifically Free 
                                                 
 
51
 398 U.S. 333 
52
 Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3
rd
 Cir. 1979) 
53
 827 F.2d 684 (11
th
 Cir. 1987) 
54
 In general, see McConnell, Garvey and Berg (2002). 
  
35 
Exercise of Religion federal cases is shown in the graph below.  Note that the comparison 
is not exact since the state cases here are not limited to Free Exercise of Religion cases. 
Table 1  Comparison of Federal and State Religious Freedom Voting Success Rates 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Federal: Brent Data
Federal: Adamcyzk,
Wybraniec, Finke Data
State: Concluded Here
 
Brent (2003, 558) specifically finds that the success rate prior to Smith was “approximately one third of all” 
Free Exercise claims, and that 1993-1997, the years between RFRA and Boerne saw a “return to pre-Smith 
rates.” 
 
The difference between the Brent and Adamczyk, Wybraniec and Finke studies has to 
do with Brent only collecting U.S. Court of Appeals cases versus all federal cases for the 
other.  But different search strings and coding play a role as well.   
The successful vote rate of this study looks more like the Adamczyk, Wybraniec and 
Finke data, but if in these data we take a look at only the cases when the Free Exercise 
clause was mentioned as part of the reasoning, the success rate drops to 35% in 1,339 
votes, which splits the difference between the two studies. 
The counter-intuitive nature of the drop in success for religious actors when the judge 
uses Free Exercise language is discussed more in the model analysis. 
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 The remarkable similarity between the vote-rate and the successful case rate (44.8% and 45%) comes 
from the fact that very few judges dissent (only 3.5% of the overall case dataset) which is not a unique 
finding for religious issue cases, as consensus generally prevails on state courts. 
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Time and Religious Freedom 
There is no significant linear pattern to the overall date range and vote outcome.
56
  
This outcome is somewhat surprising when one considers that over the time period 
several states enacted legislation and issued rulings attempting to enhance religious 
protection.  It seems logical that a positive correlation would result.  But perhaps the lack 
of significance and negative direction occur because the institutional attempt can also 
occur in the other direction (precedent accepting the rational basis standard or RFRAs 
voted down or vetoed.)   
September 11, 2001 marks a possibly interesting moment for religious actors in court, 
and the moment does not disappoint.  Pre-9/11, the success rate is 46% in 1,975 votes, 
and post-9/11, the rate drops to 42%, and the dip is significant at the .05 level.  But the 
shallow perception of what causes this dip –Muslims losing cases –is not supported.  In 
fact, Muslims and other minority religions in an Other Religion category see their success 
rate more than double.  15% favorable vote-rate in 248 votes prior to the terrorist attacks, 
and a 35% favorable vote-rate in 164 votes after the attacks, an increase that is significant 
at the .001 level.  And the reduction in cases for the Other religious category is exactly 
the same rate as the overall data from pre- to post-9/11. 
Number of Religious Claimants and Religious Freedom 
Women fared a full 25% better than men as religious claimants, and the increase is 
significant at the .05 level.  It is speculation, but that difference could be due to societal 
perceptions of women as more vulnerable and hence, in need of more protection.  But no 
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support is found for this speculation as controlling for Republican voting does not alter 
those findings, nor does controlling for cases in the South. 
When analyzing this variable, though, I noticed a pattern occurring with the missing 
claimant-gender data.  That data had a success rate that was very significant and very 
much higher than the parties that were coded with a gender.  The commonality among the 
missing data were that there were too many claimants to give it a male, female or ―male 
& female‖ coding, which occurred with three or fewer claimants.  In other words, the 
uncoded claimants were too large to code in that way.  All of this is best understood as 
the size of the claimant(s) having an effect.   
When the religious party was small enough to have a coded claimant gender, the 
chance of success was 33%.  Claimants with no coded gender (because they were 
churches or organizations mainly, although in two cases the judge never referred to the 
sex of the claimant) won 59% of the votes cast.  With around half of the votes in both 
categories, this sharp decline in protection is significant at the p < .001 level.   
The easiest explanation for that decline is the likelihood that financial resources and 
interest group assistance are more abundant when the size of the group or size of the issue 
are reflected in a larger pool of religious actors.  Nonetheless, that a single litigant can 
leap into a category which wins 78% more by seeking out likeminded litigants is an 
important finding from the study. 
 
The several insignificant variables included the level of court, whether there was a 
dissent in the case, whether the case was an appeal, unpublished, or a derived case, and 
how many judges heard the case. 
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The relationship of the model variables with the dependent variable religious freedom 
will be detailed as they are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3   
 
INSTITUTIONAL ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two ways states are attempting to increase 
religious exercise rights: legislatively through a state- or mini-RFRA, and judicially via 
precedent.  This chapter constructs three sets of variables.  The first set is referred to as 
the basic variables, and are dummy variables for either increased scrutiny or not.   
The second set captures how much the states actually wanted to increase religious 
freedom in a scalar variable.  Delving into the elements of the state RFRAs and decisions 
shows quite a bit of variance within them, which enables this more nuanced, complex 
version that does significantly capture more variance. 
The third set of strict scrutiny variables focuses on the difference the increase made 
by coding pre- and post-institutional moves.  It was necessary to have this time-series set 
because the previous two versions are not able to adequately focus on what happens in 
specific contexts before and after an increase.  But it was necessary to have the previous 
two because this focused version has too much missing data for the models to run. 
 
Introduction 
It is interesting to those who do not follow the courts that the story does not end with 
Boerne.  That the states can seemingly thwart the intentions of the U.S. Supreme Court is 
of particular interest.  Part of this is because those non-court-followers forget that states 
can increase civil liberties when the federal government elects not to.  And a second part 
of it is that the press has done a poor job of covering the story of half the nation‘s states 
attempting to increase religious freedom, probably due in part to the difficulty of telling 
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the story in the usual way.
 57
  This topic of judicial federalism and legal tests are not in 
great demand from readers, and it asks for prior knowledge that understandably scares 
away reporters and editors (because it scares away readers, that is).   
The states did not subvert a national policy of decreasing religious freedom, per se.  
They instead chose not to accept a federal grant of power.  That power being that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will not require states to justify injuries to religious actors with the 
strongest test (unless religious liberty is coupled with another civil liberty, creating a 
hybrid right).  What the states are doing is now clearly seen as offering more civil 
liberties under their own statutes and constitutions than the U.S. Supreme Court mandates 
under federal constitutional law.  
 
Set One: The Basic Dummy Variables   
Judicial 
States which offer more protective civil liberties judicially do so by interpreting the 
state constitution as requiring the strict standard crafted in Sherbert.  Like the state-
RFRAs, these decisions have a conceptual starting point with Smith, because before then 
a strict scrutiny ruling would be redundant, although there were several states that 
expressly clarified that their constitution was in agreement with the federal standard on 
religious freedom.  Unlike the state-RFRAs though, state court rulings can either choose 
to address the issue explicitly (Vermont clarified that their constitution ―protects religious 
liberty to the same extent that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act restricts 
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governmental interference with free exercise…‖), or more likely, with some reservation.  
States can use the known language ―compelling interest‖, or they can alter it as 
Massachusetts did in using ―sufficiently compelling to justify‖58 or as Alaska did in using 
―state interests of the highest order.‖59  And so where legislatures aim to mirror RFRA, 
the less deliberative and more insulated courts tend to take a more nuanced way to 
increasing religious freedom. 
 
The basic judicial dummy variable is a collection of the states that researchers in this 
field list as those increasing scrutiny, although there is some disagreement.  The 
preeminent scholar on this topic, Douglas Laycock sees 10 states‘ courts as having 
increased the standard of review, along with 5 more states which likely have signaled an 
increase.
60
  Three more scholars have done work in this area:  Gary Gildin lists eleven 
states overall, James Hanson lists only six states.
61
  The difference between the scholars 
is not explained by time, as all the researchers published in 2004, although one case 
decided in 2004 is missed on one of the three lists.
62
 
The simple dummy variable is constituted by the following.  The five states noted by 
all three scholars are MN, OH, WA, WI, and MA.
63
  MI, AK, and NY were mentioned by 
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two of the scholars.
64
  VT and IN were only mentioned by Laycock, yet the language 
from the cases is compelling.
65
  Gildin cites MT, NC, and KS, as does Laycock with 
some reservations, but not enough to justify leaving them out of the basic variable.
66
   
CA and ME have signaled that they used a strict standard in a single case at hand, but 
are reserving the final standard on the issue until the law is more settled nationally, and 
so they will not be considered as more protective in this simple variable.  Nor will KY, 
MS, and TN, although each of them had their courts interpret their state laws as 
mandating a strict standard of review prior to Smith:  1979, 1985, and 1975, respectively.  
This is because KY and MS have not clarified the law in the decades since, and 
Tennessee has accepted the more lax standard offered by Smith without explicitly 
overturning the previous lower court language.
67
  
Thirteen states, therefore, are in the simple increased scrutiny variable:  AK, IN, KS, 
MA, MI, MN, MT, NC, NY, OH, VT, WA, and WI.  
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Legislative 
States passing a RFRA are doing it in exactly the same way the Congress did it in 
1993.  They take the exact language from the protective Warren Court ruling in Sherbert 
v. Verner (―compelling state interest‖ and ―least intrusive alternative‖) and they 
statutorily create a standard which Smith said the U.S. Constitution did not require.  
Might the state supreme courts rule that these acts are unconstitutional breaches of the 
state‘s separation of powers?  Possibly, but it is not likely.  It depends on each state‘s 
constitutional provisions on legislative abilities to craft legal standards.  But more than 
that, it would be a unique ruling:  remember that Smith was not a separation of powers 
decision, it instead was an issue of the Congressional ability to require states to follow the 
strictest scrutiny.  It was a fourteenth amendment question about federalism, not an issue 
of the constitution‘s articles. 
The initial information regarding which of the states had passed restoration acts and 
their construction, effective dates and operation was drawn from a few general sources.
68
   
States are all coded as 0 until they pass a RFRA, at which point they are coded 1.   
 
Set Two: The Scalar Variables    
Judicial 
The vagaries of these decisions make the attempt at ordinal level measurement 
worthy.  This section will discuss the levels of protection offered by precedent, and then 
order the states accordingly. 
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There are eight states that are clearly adjudicating religious freedom cases with strict 
scrutiny of the law:  AK, IN, MA, MI, MN, OH, VT, and WI.
69
  In all of these states, the 
court of last resort has explicitly addressed the federal decreased standards and explicitly 
indicated a return to the compelling interest standard with the least restrictive alternative.   
There are four states that are likely holding themselves to a strict standard, but the 
legal precedent is less clear because it has not confronted Smith explicitly, or has lower 
court rulings which are contradictory and not yet clarified:  KY, MS, NY, and WA.  
Two states, CA, and VA, are considered the least clear because they have not 
discussed the federal leniency of Smith and they have not clarified contradictory lower 
court decisions.  California has recognized the lower court conflict recently, but even in 
the recognition, chooses not to resolve it.  In the same case the supreme court chooses to 
rule with strict scrutiny, as it has before, but chooses the standard almost incidentally.  
―In a case that truly required us to do so, we should not hesitate to exercise our 
responsibility and final authority to declare the scope and proper interpretation of the 
California Constitution's free exercise clause. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 4.) Here, however, we 
need not do so.‖  ―…In other words, we apply strict scrutiny.‖ 70 
The Virginia intermediate appellate courts have multiple times used compelling 
interest reasoning but the Supreme Court has not yet recognized or rejected that standard.   
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Six states are clearly not strict scrutiny states according to their own reasoning, but do 
afford religious actors an intermediate or heightened level of protection:
71
 AR, KS, NC, 
NE, ME, MT. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are four states who have made clear via 
precedent that they will judge free exercise of religion cases with only a rational basis 
standard:  IA, NH, OR, TN.
72
    
Which leaves fourteen states that leave it unclear how religious actors are to be 
treated in their courts (minus the known RFRA states to be discussed below):  AR, CO, 
DE, GA, HI, LA, ND, NJ, NV, MD, SD, UT, WV, WY.
73
   
There are three updates for 2005.  First, the Arkansas Court of Appeals relied heavily 
on the most protective federal case Sherbert v. Verner, but never explicitly detailed the 
state‘s acceptance of the compelling interest standard with least restrictive alternative 
when ruling for the unemployment compensation of a Sabbatarian in Guaranteed Auto 
Finance, Inc. v. Director,.
74
  The lack of explicitness, but reliance on the bellwether case 
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controversy started by denying Galen Smith‘s unemployment claim in 1990, and upheld that denial and 
rational basis in Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor, 903 P.2d 351, Oregon 1995.  State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 
878, 882-83 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (applying the Smith standard as synonymous with its Pack standard), 
and see also Tennessee v. Medicine Bird Black Bear White Eagle, 63 S.W.3d 734, 762 (Tenn. App. 2001). 
73
 Note that this list is not produced by my research as much as by my listing the states left after the 
previously mentioned legal scholars‘ groupings for increased and decreased states. 
74
 2005 Ark. App. LEXIS 600 In the preformatted pagination, p. 7 ―The Supreme Court in Sherbert held 
that the lower court's ruling denying [*7]  the claimant benefits forced ‗her to choose between following the 
precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.‘ 374 U.S. at 404. Additionally, our opinion in Haig 
cites to Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 67 L. Ed. 2d 
624, 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981), where the Supreme Court, relying on Sherbert, held that the denial of 
unemployment-compensation benefits violated the claimant's First Amendment right to the free exercise of 
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moves Arkansas one column into the heightened category, but not fully into the strict 
scrutiny categories.   
Second, Nebraska, which was considered a heightened scrutiny state, clearly accepted 
the rational basis standard in a March 2005 decision on religious exemptions to 
immunizations.
75
  ―Free exercise of religion does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability‖ and those laws 
―need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest‖.  Nebraska is therefore 
moved two columns and understood as a rational-basis state from April through the end 
of the dataset.   
The third update involves Washington state shifting one column to a less clear 
category because of language in Washington v. Gonzalez.  ―Mr. Gonzalez does not argue 
Washington‘s Constitution affords greater protection than the United States 
Constitution.‖  Although the language does not negate a strict scrutiny, it casts doubt on 
that by stating that it will not be offered since it was not brought up.
76
    
                                                                                                                                                 
 
religion. In that case, the Court stated that ‗where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon 
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate 
his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free 
exercise is nonetheless substantial.‘ Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.‖ 
75
 Douglas County v. Anaya, 269 Neb. 552, 561 
76
 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 614, 621-22 
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If the states are ordered in the following way, then we have an ordinal level 
representation of state supreme court respect for religious freedom, which I posit will 
capture more of the variance than the simple dichotomy found in the basic version. 
Table 3 shows the favorable vote-rates in each category. 
Table 3  Scaled Judicial Variable Category Successful Vote-Rates 
States Scaled by Degree of Judicial 
Increase 
Mean 
Religious 
Actor Case 
Outcome N 
Rational Basis .22 165 
Unclear .47 1412 
Least Protective Judicial Increase .42 236 
Least Clear Strict Scrutiny .43 215 
Less Clear Strict Scrutiny .45 546 
Most Protective Judicial Increase .47 680 
Total .45 3254 
 
The states that have made clear through their court system that they are accepting the 
federal lower standard are clearly ruling at lower rates.  And the categories of judicially 
increased states climb in steps from the least to the most protective.  The outliers are the 
Unclear states, which rule as protectively as the most protective increased states.  But 
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because they are ―unclear‖, and there were no expectations for their behavior, the scaled 
judicial variable appears to capture much of the variance it attempted to capture. 
Because there is a clear category of states which have accepted the lax standard to act 
as a foil against the states which have increased the standard, a variable which codes the 
Unclear states as missing can give the study a clearer idea of how the judicial policies 
affect outcomes.
77
  A quick analysis of this variable shows that it is in the predicted 
direction (as the variable with the Unclears coded 0), but unlike the full Scaled Judicial 
variable, this one is significant at the .001 level, with a correlation score of .09.  
A fuller consideration of the role of the Unclear category in these variables comes at 
the integration of these scaled variables in the latter half of this chapter. 
 
Legislative 
The state RFRAs look extremely similar because they all were derived from the act 
passed by Congress.  Even Connecticut‘s and Rhode Island‘s restoration acts, which were 
passed only months after the Congressional RFRA, and years before Boerne would make 
them noteworthy, use exactly the same legal language and triggers as the national law.   
Two years after Boerne struck the national RFRA, five states had passed their own 
RFRAs.  Two more state RFRAs were passed the following year, meaning more than half 
of the acts were passed within three years of Boerne.    
Like in the judicial description above, I will detail how a basic version of the RFRA 
variable is constructed, then I will attempt a more informative scalar version based on the 
                                                 
 
77
 The same cannot be created for the legislative variables as the No Legislation category serves as the 
reference category, and measures the proximity of the legislatively increased states to the non-legislatively 
increased states. 
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differences in the state RFRAs and what they say about the state‘s willingness to protect 
religious freedoms. 
 
Taking a look at these derivative laws, one sees several recurring legal themes.  These 
recurring themes are laid out here, and following their description is the chart that moves 
the states to more or less protective categories based on these points.   
1.  “Substantial” Burden?  The earlier two RFRAs along with Alabama‘s 
constitutional amendment refer to a burden of religious exercise as the subject.  The U.S. 
RFRA and all later RFRAs instead referred to a ―substantial‖ burden as the injury.  Idaho 
and Arizona go further and state ―‘substantially burdened‘ is intended solely to ensure 
that this chapter is not triggered by trivial, technical or de minimis infractions.‖78  For 
coding purposes, AL, RI and CT all not using the limiting term are considered more 
protective.  Use of ―substantial‖ or ―substantially‖ is considered the norm, and the Idaho 
and Arizona clarification that the term is meant to reduce possible claims puts them in a 
less protective category. 
2.  “Sincere” Religious Exercise?  Akin to the use of ―substantial‖, two states limit 
the religious exercise to only those that are sincere. 
3.  “Compulsory or Central” Religious Exercise?  Of the seven times religious acts 
are described as ―compulsory or central to a larger system of beliefs‖, it is to broaden the 
protection offered.  For example, from Arizona‘s act, ―‘Exercise of Religion‘ means the 
ability to act or refusal to act in a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, 
whether or not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious 
                                                 
 
78
 Idaho Code §73-402 (5), and the Arizona statute: A.R.S. §41-1493.01 E. 
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belief.‖  In the six positive occurrences of this concept, the phrasing is exactly the same.  
In the one limiting use of the concept, Pennsylvania defines a substantial burden as, in 
part denying activities ―which are fundamental to the person‘s religion.‖79 
4.  Range of Applicability.  Although the phrasing differs, in ten of the laws, the list of 
governmental bodies the law covers is seemingly exhaustive.  In two, Texas and 
Pennsylvania, there is an explicit exemption for the courts.  In the Texas act, once a 
remedy or punishment is given by the courts, that remedy or punishment is not then 
subject to the least restrictive alternative.
80
  The Pennsylvania act goes further.  ―This act 
shall not apply to actions of the courts of this Commonwealth or to any rules of procedure 
or to common law adopted by the courts of this Commonwealth.‖81  Texas and 
Pennsylvania are therefore penalized in the chart which follows. 
5.  Attorney’s Fees.  Pennsylvania is the one state to forbid reimbursement of 
attorney‘s fees, unless ―the actions of the agency were dilatory, obdurate or vexatious.‖82  
The six other states mentioning attorney‘s fees do so to compel payment of them if the 
government is shown to be at fault.  And further, in four of the six acts the reverse is not 
true:  the government will not be reimbursed if the religious actor does not succeed in 
making the case.  Forbidding reimbursed fees is coded a minus, the absence of language 
is not coded, mandating fees to claimant is one plus, and mandating fees to claimant, yet 
not if claimant loses is two pluses.   
6.  Notification and Remedy Limitation.  Two states lay out a series of procedural 
steps one must go through before bringing suit.  Those two states are Texas and 
                                                 
 
79
 Pennsylvania Statutes 71 §2403 (3) 
80
 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §110.003 (c) 
81
 71 §2406 (a)  
82
 ibid. §2405 (4)(f) 
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Pennsylvania.  The general procedure is a written notification to the offending body and 
one (PA) or two (TX) months time to allow for a remedy from that body.  Both states 
offer exceptions to this limitation.  Although codifying the procedure is beneficial in a 
number of ways, taking the decision out of the hands of the judge is a limit on the 
protection offered religious actors. 
 7.  Statute of Limitations.  Only one state adds a statute of limitations to their act.  
Texas disallows claims older than one year, and it will be considered a less protective 
RFRA because of this clause. 
8.  Waived Immunity.  Two states add an explicit statement waiving the immunity 
public officials may rely on in cases against them in the official capacity.  Most states 
(eight) simply include in the definition of the government ―officials, and those acting 
under color of state law.‖  Two states seemingly hold onto the immunity by not including 
single individuals in their definition of government.  I consider those states less 
protective, and the states offering an explicit clause revoking immunity to be more 
protective. 
9.  Other limiting Clauses.  There are several unique clauses in five of the laws that 
limit the protection offered.  Those limits are grouped into issue areas, rather than taken 
singly, and each issue area limitation will count singly against the RFRA.  So for 
example, PA gives a separate clause to limiting the effect of its RFRA on motor vehicle 
licensing, motor vehicle registration, financial responsibility for vehicle accidents, and 
others.  All of these will be grouped into a traffic issue area and counted as one limitation 
Pennsylvania wrote into its law. 
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Note that the assumption here that all limiting and protection clauses are equal and 
interchangeable is admittedly reductionistic.  But the general idea of comparing 
derivative laws by how many limits and protections they have written into them is 
conceptually sound.   
Table 4  Comparison Of Features Within The State-RFRAs 
 →      Chronological flow of Acts      → 
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 Illinois has one additional limitation.  The O‘Hare Expansion exemption means airport construction is 
not liable for any cemetery based claims.  §775 ILCS 35/30 
84
 South Carolina‘s act does not affect inmates, meaning they are still governed by separate law. 
85
 Texas has two additional limits to its law:  a) post-trial remedies are no longer open to suit, b) pecuniary 
damages capped at $10,000 
86
 Oklahoma specifies that their act does not authorize ―same sex marriages, civil unions, or the equivalent 
thereof.‖ 
87
 Pennsylvania has nine additional limits:  a) no court can award monetary damages, b) correctional 
facilities use a ―reasonably related to legitimate penological interests‖ test, c) Act does not apply to drug 
offenses, d) traffic offenses, e) health care licensing, f) health and safety regulations in public buildings, g) 
health care facilities regulations, h) construction codes, or i) requirement to report abuse. 
88
 Missouri has five additional limitations:  a) ―least restrictive alternative‖ in all other RFRAs changes to 
―not unduly restrictive‖.  B) Act does not protect causing physical harm, c) possession of illegal weapons, 
d) not paying child support, or failing ―to provide health care for a child suffering from life-threatening 
condition.‖  E) Inmates are subject to ―legitimate penological interests‖, but are protected insofar as an 
opportunity to pray, reasonable access to clergy, reasonable dietary requests, use of religious materials not 
violent or profane.‖ 
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The logic of Table 5 assumes that the minimalist laws of RI and CT, which allow 
courts plenty of latitude in deciding how to craft religious freedom, are neither more or 
less protective and that the grants of specific protection are better.   
The ordering of the state RFRAs and the distance between them is: 
Table 5  State RFRA Coding 
R
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The coding should be interpreted as steps above legislatively doing nothing.  PA, with 
the most limited RFRA, still enacted a restoration act.  
Alabama, because it is a constitutional amendment and thus takes 3/5ths majorities in 
each of its two houses of its legislature, as well as a passed referendum, is placed in the 
most protective RFRA. 
Notice from both Tables 5 and 6 that there is a clear tendency for the state RFRAs 
passed later to have more limitations written into them.  The last two written, make up the 
two least protective.  The first four written make up the four most protective.   
This correlation with time is fairly clear, but it is not unrelated noise that will throw 
off the analysis.  It is part of the explanation for weaker RFRAs.  In other words, that 
states slower to restore liberty are also more likely to write limiting clauses is clear, and 
trying to factor out that precondition might distort the analysis.  Unfortunately, this study 
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cannot go into the details of how the eager and reluctant states drafted the legislation, and 
what effect time had on that legislation.  As passage of state restoration acts tapers off, 
though, that study grows more likely. 
Table 6 displays the pro-religious actor vote-rate in these RFRA categories shows 
less-than-clear results of the variable.   
 
Table 6  Scaled Legislative Variable Vote-Rates 
States Scaled by Degree 
of Legislative Increase 
Proportion of Votes 
Favoring the 
Religious Actor N 
No Legislation .44 2386 
Least Protective RFRA .51 152 
10 .52 86 
11 .41 123 
13 .63 41 
14 .29 84 
15 .51 204 
Most Protective RFRA .42 178 
Total .45 3254 
 
The correlation between protectiveness and votes favoring the religious actor are in 
the predicted positive direction (perhaps unexpectedly after a look at table 6), but it is not 
significantly positive.  
 
Standardizing the Two Scaled Versions 
If we assume that judicial and legislative methods of increasing religious freedom are 
conceptually equally effective, then the two variables can be standardized.  
Superimposing the legislative and judicial orderings of states onto a single figure means 
simply collapsing the sixteen RFRA categories into the four judicial scrutiny categories.   
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1 0 -1 -2  -4 -5         -14   
      
Clearly Strict 
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Basis 
 
The nine most protective state RFRAs then fall into line with the most protective state 
supreme courts.  Texas and Missouri, because of their several limitations are grouped 
with the less state supreme courts, and Pennsylvania ends up in the least increased 
category.   
 
Adding an Executive Branch Indicator 
One last factor that can illuminate this scaling of states into more or less protective 
categories is whether the state‘s executive branch has acted in a public way on this 
matter.
89
  The ready-made example of this is filing an amicus brief for one of the sides in 
the watershed case of Boerne, and nineteen states did this.  Six states filed in support of 
upholding RFRA,
90
 and thirteen filed in favor of overturning.
 91
  States which filed for 
upholding RFRA move one column in the direction of more religious freedom, and those 
filing against move one column away, or to the right.    
These three indicators (judicial, legislative, and executive) are only loose and 
imperfect indicators of the state branch‘s support for religious freedom.  
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 ―Executive branch‖ here is used somewhat loosely, as the Virginia amicus brief was filed by the state 
legislature. 
90
 CT, MA, MD, NY, VA, TX. 
91
 AZ, CO, DE, FL, HI, ID, OH, MI, NV, NH, NC, OK, PA.  Notice that five of these thirteen states 
eventually passed their own restoration act.  Two had their supreme court interpret an increased religious 
freedom after their amici brief, and one had ruled the same before their amici brief.  Eight of the thirteen 
states supporting an overturning of RFRA are now considered more protective of religious freedom than 
not.  
  
56 
Table 7  Integrated, Scaled Protectiveness Variable 
Const‟l 
Amendment 
Level 
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Freedom 
More 
Increased 
Religious 
Freedom 
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Increased 
Religious 
Freedom 
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 RI MS   SD NV 
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 TX OK   WV  
 VT WA   WY  
 WI VA     
       
3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 
The last row represents the coded value in this scaled variable. 
 
Four states in the graph have been moved.  Colorado and Utah moved one column to 
the left because both states have passed laws which protect the religious use of land.
92
  
Michigan and Louisiana were moved one column to the right because they both 
considered restoration acts and did not pass them because of a lack of democratic 
support.
93
  One might question putting LA and MI in the last column because they did not 
pass a bill, but consider again that the federal law was passed unanimously in both the 
federal House and Senate.  The distance between those two states and an imagined mean 
then warrants at least a one column correction. 
The District of Columbia, not discussed above, is coded in the data as having a 
legislative attempt at increasing religious freedom in September of 2000 when the U.S. 
Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act (RLIUPA).  
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 Colo. Rev. Stat. 29-1-1201 (2005) effective date Aug. 2, 2000, and Utah Code Ann. § 63-90b-101 et seq 
(2006) effective date May 2, 2005.   
93
 Maryland and Louisiana considered acts in their legislatures and after some consideration, did not pass 
the act.  This differs from other states which passed restoration acts yet had them vetoed, as in California 
and Illinois.  Note that in the Illinois case the veto was overridden, and California‘s Supreme Court 
intimated that it would rule in a way consistent with the act Governor Gray Davis vetoed. See Runyon, 
Cheryl, Kelly Anders, and Susan Parnas Frederick.  December, 2000.  ―Religious Land Use—State and 
Federal Legislation.‖  NCSL State Legislative Report.  Analysis of State Actions on Important Issues. 25 
(14)   
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RLIUPA is a more constitutionally sound version of RFRA as its reach is clearly 
delineated and its jurisdiction over federal lands and statutory acts is without dispute.  
Further, it is recognized by federal courts as avoiding common pitfalls.
94
  Because of that 
delineation, though, DC resides with CA in the Less Protective Category and is coded 0 
after passage (and -3 before). 
Note that because of different criteria for the simple increased variable, the scaled 
institutional variable, and the integrated variable that states can be coded in what looks 
like contradictory categories.  NC is an example of that.  The scholars agreed that the NC 
courts are attempting to clarify a strict scrutiny standard, if barely.  The criterion for the 
scaled judicial variable, though, put NC outside of strict scrutiny and into a heightened 
scrutiny category.  And finally the integrated variable which considered NC‘s amicus 
brief for overturning RFRA moved it one column away from religious freedom, putting it 
in the unclear column.  The state court system is attempting to exert power, as is the 
executive branch.  VA is another example of a silent supreme court stopping it from 
being coded as increased in the simple variable, but a willing executive and lower court 
system place it in the ―more increased religious freedom‖ category.  All of these can 
coexist.  The coding hopes to capture the real interplay between the branches, and if the 
simple variable looks incongruous to the scaled variable, then it may be a sign of the 
messiness of the institutional situation. 
Unintentionally, table 7 is balanced with 25 states in the more increased columns, and 
25 states in the less increased columns.  But because states are coded as ―unclear‖ prior to 
                                                 
 
94
 Cutter v. Wilkenson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005)  RLIUPA does not violate the Establishment clause, but the 
Congressional ability to enact RLIUPA has not here been answered.  See Zietlow, Rebecca. 2006.  
Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Constitution, and the Protection of Individual Rights.  NYU Press.  p.5 
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passing a RFRA or issuing a precedent, the average context from which a vote was cast is 
-.15, and the histogram from this variable is severely bimodal. 
 
Set Three: Time-Series Variables 
  This third set of variables for the institutional attempts to increase religious freedom 
is the time-series set.
95
  They are created to get at some of the variance with more 
precision than the other two sets of variables.  The other two sets do not speak as directly 
to the research question as these variables can.  For example, we can see from them that 
judicially increased protection states are more protective than non-judicially increased 
protection states, but not whether those states that increased scrutiny judicially actually 
changed after they did.  As it turns out, if you focus solely on the judicially increased 
states and the states that were to join those judicial states, to keep the example going, that 
they did not get any more protective at all, if a simple comparison of vote-rates is to be 
the measure. 
That brings the question of why this time-series construction was not the primary 
construction for the study.  The answer is because these variables have too much missing 
data.  There are only 341 votes cast in states that will eventually pass a RFRA, and 370 
votes cast in states that will have strict scrutiny handed down by the state supreme court.  
Both forms of logit models in SPSS exclude missing data from the model ―listwise‖ or 
―modelwise‖ rather than ―pairwise‖96, which means a loss of too much information not to 
                                                 
 
95
 Note that ―time-series‖ here is used loosely and is not referring to the more sophisticated autoregressive 
models often associated with that term. Even the question of what causes the move to increase cannot be 
addressed here due to the size of the project.  This set will simply compare the before and after 
performances of increasing states. 
96
 This will be covered more in the last chapter of the dissertation. 
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have the broader versions above, even if they cloud the pre-increased picture.  To be sure, 
the other two variables do incorporate the pre- and post-increase effects in their analysis.  
But this specific signal is much weaker there, and this construction clears away some 
noise from that signal. 
All states which have at least one vote before and after their increase in scrutiny make 
up the pool of data.  There is a judicial specific, a legislative specific, and an overall 
variable with this construction.  Also created were time-series scaled variables, which are 
simply the scaled variables limited to those states which have at least one vote before and 
after increasing scrutiny.   
There are 678 votes from states before increasing scrutiny, and 723 votes after 
increasing.   
The judicial states included here are: AK, AR, CA, IN, MI, and OH.  There are 337 
votes before the precedent, and 243 after.  
The legislative states included here are: AL, AZ, FL, ID, IL, MI, NM, OK, SC, and 
TX.  CT and RI have no votes prior to their unique RFRAs.  There are 341 votes before 
passing the RFRA, and 569 after.   
 
Results of These Variables 
In a second important finding from the dissertation, neither the basic constructions 
nor the scaled single variable correlate with winning in a statistically significant way, or 
even in the predicted direction.  The time-series variables did show significance, and it 
was in the wrong direction.  And it bears repeating here that instead of a letdown, this is 
very interesting in the wider understanding of the topic:  states that try to increase 
  
60 
religious freedom find that judges rule in favor of religious actors no more than in states 
that are explicitly not trying.   
Performing as predicted is the scaled judicial variable with the unclear category coded 
as missing. 
The time-series variables show that pre-judicially increased protection states had a 
favorable vote-rate of 48% before, and 44% after.  The legislative states had a favorable 
vote-rate of 53% before, and 41% after passing a RFRA.  This puts the overall favorable 
vote-rate for states prior to increasing scrutiny at 50%, and after increasing scrutiny at 
42%.  And with 1,401 votes, the odds of this -.086 correlation score being random are 
.001.  The effect of changing from dummy to scaled variables does not mitigate the drop.   
On the most basic level, before controlling for socio-legal factors, the overall basic 
variable, the basic legislative variable, the overall scaled variable, and all the time series 
variables failed to show that they matter to religious actor success, at least in the way 
they had hoped. 
 
Focusing more on the single scaled variable, compare the two most protective and 
two least protective classifications and the results still hold true: a success rate of 45.2% 
in 976 votes in the most protective versus a success rate of 46% in 1,404 votes in the least 
protective. 
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Table 8  Crosstabulation of Voting and Scaled Protectiveness 
  
Religious Actor Case 
Outcome 
Total Lost Won 
Integrated, 
Scaled 
Variable 
-3 Count 168 69 237 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
70.9% 29.1% 100.0% 
-2 Count 592 575 1167 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
50.7% 49.3% 100.0% 
-1 Count 106 75 181 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
58.6% 41.4% 100.0% 
0 Count 44 32 76 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
57.9% 42.1% 100.0% 
1 Count 351 266 617 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
56.9% 43.1% 100.0% 
2 Count 464 355 819 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
56.7% 43.3% 100.0% 
3 Count 71 86 157 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
45.2% 54.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 1796 1458 3254 
% within Integrated, 
Scaled Variable 
55.2% 44.8% 100.0% 
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The predicted linear pattern does not show up, but the scaled variable is capturing 
some behavior that is not random.
97
  The -3 states show vote-rates significantly below 
average, and the 3 states show vote-rates significantly above, as predicted.
98
  -1, 0, 1, and 
2 states all show the steady climb in vote-rates predicted, even if they do not occur at 
significant rates.  And if in fact, when I control for the category which appears to buck 
the results, all directional signs are in the predicted direction.  That category, as in the 
judicial section above, is the -2 states.  
Discussion of the ―Unclear‖ Category 
The -2 category has 40% more votes than the second most populated category, and 
has a favorable vote-rate significantly higher than the average (.067***).  This is not as 
surprising as it may appear, as conceptually the category is better understood as the 
―unclear‖ states rather than the second-to-least protective states, although that distinction 
is lost in the coding. 
An analysis of the states in the category show that the states that go on to increase 
their scrutiny have an above average pro-religion vote-rate: 
                                                 
 
97
 Chi-square and Likelihood ratio tests show a significance of p<.001, supporting a nonparametric pattern 
to the data. 
98
 -.088***, and .045** correlation scores, respectively. 
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Table 9  Category -2 States and Their Pro-Religious Vote-Rates 
States Ranked by Vote-Rates,  
and States that will later increase their scrutiny are in bold face 
State's 2 letter 
abbreviation 
Religious 
Actor Case 
Outcome Votes 
ID 1.00 4 
OK .92 12 
MD .88 34 
NM .67 9 
TX .64 36 
IL .63 16 
MO .62 61 
CO .61 33 
ND .61 23 
WV .57 14 
GA .56 80 
NJ .54 99 
FL .53 15 
NC .53 60 
CA .52 166 
MI .52 21 
PA .51 152 
IN .49 35 
AL .42 12 
OH .40 99 
WY .36 11 
AK .33 12 
KS .32 31 
AZ .20 25 
NE .14 44 
TN .14 36 
SC .13 15 
SD .08 12 
Total .49 1167 
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894 of the 1,167 votes are cast by judges in states that will increase scrutiny before 
2005, and the win rate from those states in this category is 47%.  But it is also below the -
2 category average, which means the truly unclear states are more protective than the 
states that will later declare themselves more protective.  These states which have not 
signaled a more or less protective policy vote to protect religious actors 57% of the time 
in 273 votes.  That many votes would make this group of unclear states larger than four 
of the scaled categories, and the 57% favorable vote-rate would make it the most 
protective category. 
When these unclear states are controlled in the analysis, correlation scores for the 
simple variable gain the predicted direction (which they did not have before), and the 
scaled variable gains significance at the .05 level (with a correlation score of .035).  
These unclear states do not strengthen or weaken the predicted institutional 
performance as much as they add another dimension.  When states attempt to increase 
religious freedom, they protect more than the states which decide against increasing 
religious freedom.  But the institutionally clear states fare worse than the states which do 
not have a clear policy. 
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Even though it is somewhat post hoc, it is conceptually sound to code these 
institutionally ambiguous states as missing from a variable that hopes to capture the 
effects of institutional ability, as was done in the judicial variable.  As in there, the 
referent for this variable will not be harmed by bracketing off these unclear votes and 
allowing the votes from the states which have accepted the rational basis test to serve as 
the reference category for the institutionally increased state votes.  Therefore the scaled 
variable was altered to not include the 273 votes from the eight states without an 
institutionally clear direction. 
To summarize the scaled institutional variable: it takes into account 1) the legal 
language in judicial attempt states, 2) legislative expansions or limiters of protection in 
the RFRA states, and 3) no longer includes the states which have chosen not to act via 
their governmental institutions. 
This new variable is a significant predictor of a positive vote with a correlation score 
of .037*.  A comparison of means shows that the variable is performing more predictably 
as well:  
Table 10  Institutional Attempt States, Scaled by Degree of Attempt 
Does Not Include Institutionally Ambiguous States 
 
Religious 
Actor Case 
Outcome N 
Least Protective .29 237 
-2 .46 865 
-1 .45 210 
0 .42 76 
1 .43 617 
2 .43 819 
Most Protective .55 157 
Total .44 2981 
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 The -2 category is still a default category where states are placed before their 
institutional attempt.  Seeing the results of voting with these pre-institutional attempt 
votes taken out of the table is simply a matter of deleting the -2 category.   
Does this creation of a meaningful variable negate the simple outcome that 
institutional attempts appear to be ineffective?  Not realistically.  That a variable can be 
created with a predictable direction and modest significance and strength should not lead 
one to the conclusion that institutions matter.  The battle to get to this point may be more 
telling. 
The higher sophistication and controls in the model will be able to shed more light on 
whether the institutional move caused the higher success rates, or if the states in the 
higher categories were sociologically or politically predisposed to vote for more 
protection regardless of the category they were put in.  
 
A description of how this variable relates to the control variables will be handled in 
the next chapter as each control variable is discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4   
 
THE CONTROL VARIABLES:  JUDGE AND COMMUNITY, CLAIMANT, AND 
LEGAL VARIABLES 
 
This chapter details the construction and basic descriptive results from each control 
variable, as well as other information that was gathered. 
The following is a list of all the information collected for the dataset. 
Figure 2  All Variables in the Dataset 
 
Case Characteristics 
1. Name and citation 
2. Date 
3. Level of Court 
4. Whether it was an appeal 
5. Whether it was published 
6. Whether the entry was derived from 
another case 
7. If the religious actor won the vote 
Claimant Characteristics  
8. Claimant gender 
9. Number of Claimants 
10. Religious tradition of claimant 
11. Claimant-area religious tradition percentage 
agreement  
Issue Characteristics  
12. Drug related 
13. Sex related 
14. Private education 
15. Public education 
16. Tax 
17. Land use 
18. Cost of Claim 
19. Government employee 
20. Free speech raised 
21. Establishment clause raised 
22. Free exercise of religion clause raised 
Judge Characteristics 
23. Judge Name 
24. Judge Gender 
25. Judge Race 
26. Judge political party identification 
27. Judge ideology score 
28. Judge religious tradition 
29. Dissenting votes 
30. Size of the majority 
 
State 
31. State institutional response toward religious 
freedom 
32. Method of increased religious freedom, if 
appropriate 
33. Scaled value of institutional attempt to 
increase religious freedom 
Geographic Characteristics 
34. Region of the country  
35. (3 classifications) 
36. Metro-area 
37. Metro-area population 
38. Metro-area religious traditions totals 
39. Metro-area religious adherents totals 
40. Metro-area religious adherent-rate 
41. Metro-area religious homogeneity rate 
42. County population 
43. County Adherents totals 
44. County Adherent-rate 
45. County Homogeneity rate 
Political Characteristics 
46. County Vote totals for W. Bush, Gore and 
Kerry in 2000 and 2004 
47. County Rate of Vote for W. Bush in 2000 
and 2004 
48. Normalized Presidential Vote Rate 2000, 
2004 
49. County Political Majority – Judge 
Agreement 
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A Note On Multicollinearity 
Before beginning the description of each control variable, I will note that 
multicollinearity with the institutional variables appears in some of the control variables, 
and even seems to be embraced!  But that is not the case.  Significant results abound, 
which is in part due to having 3,254 iterations of a social phenomenon.  Sometimes the 
correlation values reach above .25, but generally they stay below .1, which seems 
acceptable.  But the transparency is an effort to get beyond the figures and to allow the 
simpler descriptions to create the impressions that the reader will take into the model 
analysis and away from the study. 
Table 11  Search for Multicollinearity between Increased Scrutiny  
and Judge & Community Variables 
 County 
Vote 
(Repub.) 
Judge 
Politics 
(Liberal) 
Metro-area 
Adherent-Rate  
Metro-Area 
Homogeneity 
Increased Scrutiny  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.147** .299** .039* .051** 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
RFRA Increased Scrutiny Pearson 
Correlation 
.097** -.093** .039* .054** 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
Judicially Increased 
Scrutiny 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.228** .373** .009 .010 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
Scaled RFRA Increased 
Scrutiny 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.174** -.159** .020 .051** 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
Scaled Judicially 
Increased Scrutiny 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.263** .304** -.041* -.004 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
Scaled Judicially 
Increased Scrutiny, w/o 
Unclear States 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.231** .238** .215** .162** 
N 1842 1447 1842 1842 
Integrated, Scaled 
Increased Scrutiny  
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.233** .299** .225** .262** 
N 3254 2387 3254 3254 
Integrated, Scaled 
Increased Scrutiny, No 
Institutionally Ambiguous 
States 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.233** .317** .297** .269** 
N 
2981 2195 2981 2981 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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In table 11 are the ―Judge and Community Variables‖, which are the most sensitive 
when it comes to collinearity with the institutional independent variables as these are the 
only variables that could be endogenous, or could generate those institutional variables.  
For example, liberal judges could be the reason state courts declare strict scrutiny, or 
many Republican counties could be driving the RFRAs.  The other control variables 
(types of cases, types of language used in cases, claimant characteristics) can not bear 
that explanatory weight.  So it is with these four that special consideration was given in 
the form of 1) diagnostics such as a) variance inflation factor tests, b) the use of 
Eigenvalues and condition indices, c) watching for low tolerances for each variable, and 
d) variance proportions.  2) A focus on whether the goodness-of-fit tests or other 
coefficients alter in inordinately large ways as these variables are added and dropped, 3) 
sensitivity to the significance or goodness-of-fit test scores with different models (scores 
which jump around with small changes can be a sign of more serious multicollinearity), 
4) consider altering the model to use a conditional stepwise method which will drop 
variables which are not adding enough to the explanation (and which will likely cure 
some of the redundancy), and 5) simply keeping track of the performance of variables in 
the descriptive chapters and making sure they have a similar effect within the model.
99
   
The best way to go about solving multicollinearity or endogeneity is by adding 
strategic cases or constructing external variables that would break the multicollinearity.  
That is a true statement, and it makes me think of a line from Jim Bouton‘s Ball Four: 
"Going over hitters is something you do before each series, and 
before we went against the mighty Angels, Sal Maglie had a great 
hint for one of their weak hitters Vic Davalillo. 'Knock him down, 
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then put the next three pitches knee-high on the outside corner, 
boom, boom, boom, and you've got him.'  
 
"Everybody laughed. If you could throw three pitches, boom, 
boom, boom, knee-high on the outside corner, you wouldn't have 
to knock anybody down. It's rather like telling somebody if he'd 
just slam home those ninety-foot puts he'd win the tournament 
easily."100 
 
Which is to take the scenic route to writing that the silver bullet cases or variables 
never materialized, and the fear of redundancy still exists.  So dealing with it is a function 
of performing the diagnostics above and swallowing that it will not be cured, but the 
irritating symptoms can likely be kept to a minimum. 
 
Judge and Community Variables 
County Party Vote for 2000, 2004 
Hypothesis 3:  County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less 
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level 
Democratic Presidential voting. 
 
Each county‘s distance from the average national vote is what this variable is 
capturing rather than each county‘s partisan tilt.  Since the national RFRA in 1993 was 
fully bipartisan, the variance here was originally posed as a center and periphery issue, or 
between the status quo and those on the extreme left and right.  So construction of that 
original variable was a matter of averaging the deviation from the national presidential 
votes in 2000 and 2004, and having that number be an absolute number by squaring it 
and then taking its own square root.
101
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 Bouton, Jim.  1970.  Ball Four: My Life and Hard Times Throwing the Knuckleball in the Big Leagues.  
New York: World Publishing Co. 
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 The construction of the variable for the model is the absolute number.  Some of the descriptive 
discussion still takes into account the variable before the negative or positive sign is taken away, thus 
allowing the study to explore the difference between Republican areas and Democratic areas. 
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Although that construction of the variable did perform in significant and largely 
predicted minoritarian ways (the exception was that legislative RFRAs are more 
majoritarian than even the states which did not attempt an increase) the variable which 
kept the partisan distinction performed better.  And coming to the partisan variable was 
not a matter of fishing for results or happening to see more significance there.  It instead 
was seeing the culminating evidence that left-leaning politics was the friendlier context 
for religious litigants.   
So the county Presidential vote variable was constructed by averaging the votes in 
2000 and 2004 and allowing the national average for the two years (51.5% Republican) 
and more Republican than average counties are coded as each point above that average, 
as well as less Republican than average (read Democratic) counties are coded as their 
point value below that average.  So for example, San Francisco county is coded -33, as 
their Presidential votes for both elections averaged out to be around 18.5% for the 
eventual President, or 33 points more Democratic.
102
  Utah county, UT, voted 37 points 
more Republican than the nation, and so is coded with a positive 37. 
Results 
The variable shows less than 10% of the counties in the nation are represented in this 
study:  282 of the 3,077.  Because of the disproportionate number of state capital counties 
counted due to state supreme (which are less Republican areas, although not more 
populated, interestingly), the variable has an average vote against President W. Bush 
rather than for him.  The values specifically are 58% of the vote against him in 2000 and 
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56% in 2004, compared to the popular vote total of 49% and 52%, respectively.  To be 
sure, it is the national popular vote that is used as a benchmark in the variable. 
Does county voting correlate with a judge‘s vote for religious freedom?  The answer 
is yes, and in the predicted direction.   
Table 12  County Voting and Religous Freedom 
County Vote Variable,  
cut into 20% Categories 
Successful 
Vote Rate N 
Most Democratic Quintile .53 677 
2nd Quintile .45 638 
3rd Quintile .42 640 
4th Quintile .46 692 
Most Republican Quintile .38 607 
Total .45 3254 
 
 Is county politics related to whether or not the state has attempted to increase 
religious freedom, and the method used?  Yes, and in line with the predicted Democratic-
friendly theory.  Increased Counties were 8 percentage points more Democratic than the 
average Presidential vote, and in the non-institutional increase contexts, the average was 
only 4 percentage points lower than average.  (Remember that the overall dataset has an 
average of 6% more Democratic.) 
The method of increasing actually matters more than the increase itself, though.  
Judicial attempt states are 10 percentage points more Democratic than the rest of the 
dataset (which means 16 percentage points more liberal than the national average), while 
Legislative states are more majoritarian at 3.6 percentage points more Democratic.   
The integrated scaled institutional variable also correlates significantly and negatively 
with majoritarian voting.  The two most protective categories are 11 and 19 points more 
Democratic, while the two least protective categories are 6 and 3 points more 
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Democratic.
103
  But these conclusions are not clearly supportive of the theory.  This is 
discussed further below under ―Conclusions‖. 
Republican voting also correlated positively with the time-series institutional 
variables, and this is most likely due to some heavily democratic states having both 
judicial and RFRA policies in place earlier . 
Did protective voting differ in these institutional contexts?  Yes, the data support the 
theory.  I compared the average county-vote in each institutional context (no institutional 
attempt, an attempt, legislative attempt, judicial attempt, seven scaled categories of 
protectiveness) broken up into both wins and losses.  That makes 12 opportunities to see 
if the more favorable context was also the more minoritarian.  All 12 supported the 
theory. 
Republican counties tend to be in states with judicial selection systems closer to the 
voter (partisan and nonpartisan elections) than Democratic counties, which tend to be in 
states with gubernatorial or legislative appointment systems and merit-based systems.
104
 
Population and Republican voting are negatively correlated.  This is true for metro-
areas:  -.41***, but also at the county level:  -.2***.  Against the conventional wisdom, 
the rate of religious adherents is negatively correlated with Republican voting: -.2***.  
This remains true even after controlling for the Northeast: -.08**. 
Conclusions 
Do the data solely support the notion that a pro-religious freedom attitude is therefore 
more Democratic and less Republican?  No.  Two points complicate an easy assessment.  
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 Correlation scores are .07* and .07* for the Republican, electoral judicial selection systems, and -.16*** 
and -.19*** for the Democratic, more insulated judicial selection systems. 
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One, the legislative attempt to increase religious freedom is occurring in more 
Republican areas than the areas that do not attempt an increase at all.  Two, the integrated 
scaled variable is showing the shape of the data: parabolic rather than linear.  The most 
protective category is more Democratic, but the least protective category is at the 
average.  The most Republican septile in this scale from -3 to 3 is at -1, or in the middle.  
Although the patterns do lean toward a left-leaning predilection toward religious 
freedom, the pattern is clearly not linear.   
 
Judge Politics 
Hypothesis 4:  More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than 
more conservative judges. 
 
This variable captures and controls for the judge‘s political leanings.  It does so by 
using a measure of judge ideology derived from judge preferences (past votes, party 
identification and media account) and state ideology at the time of the judge‘s ascension.  
This measure, referred to as PAJID for party adjusted ideological measure, is a scaled 
measure of the most conservative judges at 0 to the most liberal at 100.
105
  This measure 
was an easy choice over simple political party identification because a) it is much more 
informative, and b) because it standardizes what this study wants to capture across the 
fifty states.  A simple political party identification is a good measure of ideology within 
states: Democrats are vastly more liberal than Republicans in limited areas, but a Texas 
Democrat is not more liberal than a New England Republican.  PAJID nationalizes the 
measure.  
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An inconvenience and possible issue with using PAJID scores are that they are only 
available for court of last resort judges, and around two-thirds of the dataset are judges 
beneath that level.  So after a painstaking collection of party identification among the 
intermediate appellate and district level courts, the decision was made to extrapolate a 
PAJID based on the state and party ID.  When a judge party identification was known, his 
or her state‘s PAJID average for that party was assigned to the judge.  The average was 
taken from the whole PAJID database, which includes virtually all of the judge-years 
from each state‘s supreme court from 1970 to 2005, which has 12,785 cases. 
Collecting the Judge‘s Political Party 
Collection of this information was a large task and began in hard copy, continued to 
online sources when needed, then judicial selection systems were used if the previous two 
were not fruitful.  The sources were searched in this order:  Lists of state judge 
characteristics provided by Donald Songer and Rorie Spill Solberg.
106
  Serial sources 
included, in order: The American Bench, CQ Judicial Staff Directory
107
, LEXIS searches 
in both the specific state sources, as well as a legal news search.  If those sources did not 
turn up a judge‘s party identification, a search string was typed into Google with the full 
name of the judge (with and without the middle initial), the state name, ―judge AND 
(Democrat OR Republican)‖.108  If this search turned up more than a few pages of results, 
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which was often the case with common names, I cut off my search at the fourth full page 
of results.   
Political contributions of or to judges came next, from one of two sites:  The Center 
for Responsive Politics, or The Institute on Money in State Politics.
109
  If they had 
donated more than two hundred dollars to solely one of the political parties or solely to 
bellwether party organizations (Chambers‘ of Commerce were Republican and Unions 
were Democratic), I coded them as identifying with that party.   
Deriving a party identification from the judicial selection system of several states is 
possible, but is a much more complex undertaking than it sounds (and that it has been 
treated in the literature) not just because of the differences in selection systems, but 
perhaps mainly because of the differences among similar selection systems.  A lengthy 
discussion of these complexities and how party identification was taken from each 
individual state follows. 
 
Deriving an Ideological Tendency from State Judicial Selection Methods 
There are five different ways states can pick judges:  partisan election, nonpartisan 
election, gubernatorial appointment, legislative appointment, or via a Merit based system. 
The American Judicature Society counts half of the states and D.C. as having a merit 
based system, which, in effect, means having a judicial nominating commission which 
has some insulation from partisan patronage.  The amount of insulation differs widely.  
Some states allow the Governor to appoint the whole nominating commission, and even 
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then not having to choose the nominees it recommends.
110
  Other states mandate that their 
nominating commission have party balance, regional balance, gender and racial 
proportionality, and in Montana, even industry representation.   
Gubernatorial and Legislative Appointment systems are largely misnomers as four of 
the five states which employ it also allow another branch or commission a veto power 
over the choice.
111
  And the fifth, Virginia, has recently written senatorial courtesy into 
the senate rules, and is further beginning to include local citizen nominating 
commissions, and a newly created joint judicial advisory committee.
112
  So objectively, 
no states only allow their governor or legislature to pick judges.  But governors often 
make interim appointments, and that ability is taken into consideration below. 
Nonpartisan and Partisan elections are the methods for the twenty one remaining 
states –eight partisan elections, and thirteen nonpartisan.  The seeming clarity of those 
labels evaporates as one digs further into selection systems.  Alabama has partisan 
elections yet goes to some lengths to hide the parties of lower court judges.  And on the 
other side, Michigan and other nonpartisan states have their judges begin their campaigns 
at the party‘s state convention.113 
There seems to be a strange independence of being able to find a judge‘s party 
identification and the selection system of the state.  Data can be hard to find in partisan 
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 Idaho, Minnesota and Washington also have explicit partisan electioneering, and Mississippi continues 
to have clear issue advocacy in their judicial elections, all despite have a judicial selection system in place 
which tries to insulate the judges from partisanship. 
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election states (less than 20% of lower court judges are identifiable in Illinois and 
Michigan), and easy to find in states which, at least nominally, try to distance the 
judiciary from partisanship (more than half of the merit states had 3/4
ths
 of their judges 
identifiable, and seven of them had 90% or more identifiable.)  This could be a function 
of differences in reporters, or simply a lack of legal/political reporting, as well as a 
difference in the legal etiquette (or adherence to the etiquette) of a state.
114
  Nonetheless, 
it is noteworthy and hints to the larger findings of this study:  states which try to achieve 
a political goal may not be any more successful than the states which do not try, or even 
have the opposite goals. 
All of the above is written to introduce the chart below.  Judges with unknown party 
identifications selected in a system which allows ideological influence, be it merit based 
or not, will be coded as the ideology of the institution doing the choosing –governor, 
legislature, or nominating commission.  
 
Whether a selection system allows ideology enough influence is, as constructed here, 
simply a search for more than 50% of the decision making power.  For example, when 
governors can appoint a majority of the nominating commission, and there are no other 
checks on that power, that is considered as enough influence to allow the Governor‘s 
party to substitute for the judge‘s.  If there was legislative confirmation of that pick, in 
this example, then the state slips back into the category for which party identification is 
not implied, unless the Governor and legislature are of the same party. 
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Table 13  State Judicial Selection Systems and Coding Judge Party Identification 
State Selection Method Considerations 
Party Derived 
From Selection 
Method? 
Alaska Merit System 
Minority of nominating commission 
appointed by governor and legislature, 
and constitutional language forbids 
political considerations  
No 
Arizona Merit System 
Nominating Commission and nominees 
may not have more than 60% majority of 
one party 
No 
Colorado Merit System 
Nominating commission may not have 
more than a bare partisan majority 
No 
Connecticut Merit System 
Nominating commission has party 
equality and Senate confirmation 
No 
Delaware Merit System 
Constitutional Clause mandates partisan 
balance in state courts 
No 
District of 
Columbia 
Merit System 
U.S. President picks from nominating 
commission list of 3 names, with Senate 
confirmation 
No 
Hawaii Merit System 
Governor chooses from nominating 
commission list, with senate confirmation 
No 
Idaho Nonpartisan Election 
Governor fills vacancies with choice from 
partisan controlled nominating 
commission list (the de facto method of 
judicial selection) 
No 
Indiana Merit System 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission and is confined 
to their list.  Gubernatorial appointment 
for lower court. 
Appeals: No 
Trial:  Yes 
Iowa Merit System 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission and is confined 
to their list  
No 
Kansas Merit System
 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission and is confined 
to their list 
No 
Kentucky Nonpartisan Election 
Governor chooses from nominating 
commission list to fill vacancy 
No 
Mississippi Nonpartisan election  No 
Missouri Merit System 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission and is confined 
to their list.  Gubernatorial appointment 
fills vacancies at circuit level 
Appeals: No 
Trial:  Yes, 
appointment 
Nebraska Merit System 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission and is confined 
to their list  
No 
Nevada Nonpartisan elections  No 
New Jersey 
Gubernatorial 
Appointment 
Ideological balance and senatorial 
courtesy control, de facto 
No 
New Mexico Merit System 
Nominating commission may not have 
partisan majority 
No 
New York Merit System 
Governor appoints a minority of 
nominating commission, and needs 
senate confirmation 
No 
North Dakota Nonpartisan election  No 
Oklahoma Merit System 
Nominating commission may not have a 
partisan majority 
No 
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Rhode Island Merit System 
Governor chooses from nominating 
commission list.
115
 
No 
South Dakota Merit System 
Nominating commission must not have 
more than a bare majority among its 
partisan members 
No 
Tennessee Merit System 
Legislature appoints a nominating 
commission from lists provided by legal 
organizations and Bar 
No 
Utah Merit System 
Nominating commission is vastly 
appointed by governor, but cannot 
appoint more than a bare majority, and 
needs legislature confirmation 
No 
Vermont Merit System 
Nominating commission, with senate 
confirmation 
No 
Virginia 
Legislative 
Appointment 
Local party structure and state senators‟ 
appoint, legislature confirms with 
deference to senatorial courtesy. 
No 
Wyoming Merit System 
Governor chooses from nominating 
commission list 
No 
Alabama Partisan Election Governor fills vacancy without check. Yes, appointments 
Arkansas Nonpartisan election Governor fills vacancy without check Yes, appointments 
California 
Gubernatorial 
Appointment 
Governor, with three-member 
commission on judicial appointments 
confirmation 
Yes 
Florida Merit System 
Majority of nominating commission is 
chosen by governor, with no legislature 
confirmation 
Yes 
Georgia Nonpartisan Election 
Governor fills vacancies with advice from 
nominating commission (the de facto 
method of judicial selection) 
Yes, appointments 
Illinois Partisan election  Yes 
Louisiana Partisan election  Yes 
Maine 
Gubernatorial 
Appointment 
Governor appointment unless 2/3rds of 
senate vetos 
Yes 
Maryland Merit System 
Majority of nominating commission 
appointed by governor, with senate 
confirmation  
Yes, if agreement 
Massachusetts Merit System 
Governor may accept advice from 
nominating commission, Governor‟s 
Council confirms 
Yes 
Michigan Partisan election 
Governor fills vacancies with advice from 
nominating commission 
Yes, appointments 
Minnesota Nonpartisan election 
Governor fills vacancies with advice from 
nominating commission 
Yes, appointment 
Montana Nonpartisan election 
Governor appoints a majority of 
nominating commission, which fills 
vacancies with senate confirmation 
Yes, if agreement 
New 
Hampshire 
Merit System 
Governor nominates, and elected 
“Executive Council” appoints 
Yes 
North Carolina Nonpartisan election Governor fills vacancies without check Yes, appointment 
Ohio Partisan election Governor fills vacancies without check Yes, appointment 
Oregon Nonpartisan election Governor fills vacancies without check Yes, appointment 
Pennsylvania Partisan election  Yes 
South Carolina 
Legislative 
Appointment 
A legislatively composed Judicial Merit 
Selection Commission offers candidates 
Yes 
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for a voter before the whole legislature. 
Texas Partisan Election 
Governor fills vacancy with senate 
confirmation 
Yes, appointment, 
if agreement 
Washington Nonpartisan election Governor fills vacancies without check Yes, appointment 
West Virginia Partisan election Governor fills vacancies without check  Yes, appointment 
Wisconsin Nonpartisan election Governor fills vacancies without check Yes, appointment 
 
Gubernatorial And Legislative Appointing Systems 
Party identification for judges can be taken from the appointing governor or 
legislature in appropriate states:  California, Maine
116
, New Hampshire, South Carolina 
and Virginia.  New Jersey judges, although appointed by the governor, will not take his 
or her party for reasons spelled out below in state specific comments.  The earliest 
appointing Governor for the judge will be the one dictating the party assigned to the 
judge.  This is because that is where the most discretion exists for the governor, and when 
the closest correlation between the governor and judge ideology exists.  Later 
reappointments of already sitting judges has less discretion, or a certain inertia which 
limits the influence of the chooser. 
California has a gubernatorial appointive selection system tempered by a veto ability 
vested in a nominating committee.  That committee is composed of the state‘s chief 
justice, the attorney general, and the senior presiding justice of the court of appeal of the 
affected appellate district.
117
  Defenders of the California system might quibble with the 
descriptor ―gubernatorial appointive system‖ rather than ―merit system‖, but The Book of 
the States makes the same distinction.
118
  State Supreme Court Justices Joyce Kennard 
and Janice Brown are two examples of Justices logged as the party of the appointing 
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 Published by the Council of State Governments, volume 37, 2005. 
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governor (Governors George Deukmejian and Pete Wilson, in this case) because of the 
lack of official voter enrollment data. 
California voters amended the constitution to prohibit partisan labels in nonpartisan 
office holder elections (judgeships, mainly) but that provision was stricken by the federal 
Ninth circuit court four years after it was passed, in 1990.
119
  Since then, studies have 
shown that financing judicial elections in this state which attempts to limit political 
influence in those elections has sharply increased.  No campaign finance laws are in place 
for judicial elections.  That these elections in California are comparatively competitive, 
relying on a link between the appointing governor‘s party and judge‘s party is therefore 
sound. 
An empirical test of this method of assigning a political party shows that the 
appointing governor is a fine proxy for political self identification.  There are 40 
instances in the CQ Judicial Staff directory which list both a party identification and an 
appointing governor for the judges of the 2005 California Court of Appeals.  The party of 
the judge and appointing governor were in agreement 37 times, for a 92.5% agreement 
rate.  There are 105 judges on those appeals courts, yet information on either appointing 
governor or on party identification were available on only 88 of them.  The judges lean 
Republican by more than 2 to 1 at 67.8%, and when a party was given that tilt is stronger, 
at 78%  Only one self-identified Democrat was appointed by a Republican.  This leads to 
the conclusion that using the appointing governor, even with California‘s merit based 
controls in place, is a fine proxy.  
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New Hampshire has a partisan elected, yet independent executive council which has 
the ability to confirm appointments.
120
 
New Jersey‘s governor‘s choice goes through a senate confirmation, and further, is 
governed by state-senatorial courtesy, which is rare in states.
121
  New Jersey also has a 
custom of partisan or philosophical balance for all of the state courts, despite the party of 
the appointing governor.  So when the governor makes an appointment, instead of 
allowing his or her party to be the prime factor, the party or philosophy of the departing 
Justice seems to be the determining factor.
122
  The NJ supreme court has a balance of 
three liberals and three conservatives, along with a Chief Justice that aligns with the 
ideology of the appointing governor.
123
  For all of these reasons, appointing party will not 
be used in determining a judge‘s political tendency. 
Virginia is the last state which selects judges by the legislature without another 
branch‘s check.  Party members at the local levels vet candidates and make 
recommendations to a joint committee of the state house and senate.  The legislature 
allows candidates to pass through from there without much deliberation (―locality 
courtesy‖).  For this reason, the legislative majority cannot be used to infer which 
direction a judge tilts.   
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 http://www.ajs.org/js/NH_methods.htm, and information for a majority of the executive council:  
http://www.nh.gov/council/, and http://www.nh.gov/council/councilors.html.  Luckily, the one judge from 
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If the legislature is not in session, the governor appoints to fill vacancies, which are 
then subject to a vote at the next legislative session.
124
  This ability to reject gubernatorial 
appointments is a large enough check so that the governor‘s party will not be used as a 
proxy for the unknown judge‘s party.  But if there is party agreement in both houses of 
the legislature, majority party will proxy for judge party identification when it is 
otherwise not known. 
Merit Selection Systems 
Party Identification Not Taken From Selection System 
Twenty-one of twenty-five states with merit systems select judges in such a way that 
party cannot be taken from the appointment.   
 States 
Alaska, like many or most merit selection states, tries to keep a judge‘s political 
leaning insulated.  So, for example, Alaska has an online site for the judicial council 
which makes selections.  Ideology and political leaning are, not surprisingly, missing 
from the information available on each judge.   
Alaska‘s system goes further than simply making it difficult to find a judge‘s political 
party.  For the judge to be retained from one six-year cycle to the next, he or she must fill 
out a questionnaire with questions such as ―during your most recent term as a judge, have 
you: … c) held office in any political party? … e) held any other local state or federal 
office?‖  Although Alaska does not explicitly prohibit political activity (seventeen states 
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do
125
), a likely and intended result of this line of questioning is to dampen judges‘ 
partisan activity.   
Arizona statutorily forbids a judicial nominating committee from nominating more 
than 60% judges from the same political party.
126
 
Colorado judicial selection consists of the governor‘s choice from among the 
candidates selected by a nominating committee, which is limited to having a majority of 
no larger than one on the 14 member committee, plus the chief justice.  Colorado has 
passed statutes which limit a judge‘s use of campaign language, campaign activity, and 
even knowledge of where their funding came from.
127
   
The Connecticut judicial selection system has a nominating committee, which is 
limited to an equal number of Democrats and Republicans, provides the governor a list 
from which s/he chooses a nominee, and the legislature confirms.   
The District of Columbia has its judges appointed by the President of the United 
States from a list of three given by the nominating commission, which bears little direct 
relationship to that President as s/he appoints only one member of the seven.  The senate 
also confirms the choice. 
Missouri‘s commission, the original merit system, has controls for geographical 
dispersion, lawyer and non-lawyer status, and political minority and majority controls 
built into its membership.
128
  But circuit court judges are appointed by the governor 
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 AL, CT, HI, IN, KS, KY, MD, MN, MO, NE, NV, NM, NY, ND, OK, TN, and WY. 
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 This comes from the American Judicature Society‘s site on the judicial selection method of Arizona:   
http://www.ajs.org/js/AZ_methods.htm.   
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without check (except in four counties
129
), so lower court judges, if appointed, and if no 
other source identifies a judge party, the governor‘s party will substitute. 
Nebraska‘s thirty-three nominating commissions (one for each district in the state) 
limit the ability of the governor in the number of appointees to each commission, the 
party makeup of those members, and in forcing a decision from the list of at least two 
names they submit to him or her.
130
 
New Mexico‘s nominating commission must equally represent the two major parties 
of the state, and the governor appoints only a minority of the commission.  But at the next 
general election after appointment, the judge must win reelection via a partisan election, 
and after that, all elections are nonpartisan.  If the judge is unopposed, he or she must win 
at least 57% of the vote.
131
   
New York has one of the more insulated merit systems, as there are party controls, 
geographic controls, and membership appointed by the executive, judiciary and 
legislature.  Judges go through the process again at the end of their terms rather than a 
retention election.  But to be considered by the nominating commission, judges must win 
seats in lower level courts, which means partisan elections.
132
   
Rhode Island‘s is the most recent merit-based judicial selection system, passed after 
some judicial scandals in the early 1990s.  The governor now appoints a minority of the 
nominating commission, and has the pick confirmed by both the state House and Senate.  
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 Clay, Jackson, Platte and St. Louis counties use judicial nominating commissions unique to each county, 
with enough controls to prohibit using the governor‘s party as a proxy. 
130
 http://www.ajs.org/js/NE_methods.htm  
131
 http://www.ajs.org/js/NM_methods.htm  
132
 http://www.ajs.org/js/NY_methods.htm  
  
87 
Unless the legislature and governor appointed before the change to a merit selection 
system in 1994, and have party agreement, party will not be taken.   
Utah‘s governor appoints 7 of the 8 members on the judicial nominating commission, 
but s/he is restricted from appointing more than 4 from the same party.  And further, the 
senate confirms the governor‘s choice from the nominating commission‘s list.  So no 
substitution is used for a missing judge‘s party identification.133 
Vermont‘s merit selection system disperses partisan sway in a number of ways, one 
of which is allowing all the attorneys licensed to practice in Vermont a vote on the 
membership of the judicial nominating commission.  The governor only picks two of the 
eleven members, and the senate confirms the choice.
134
   
 
Merit Selection Systems 
Party ID Taken from Appointing Gov. or Legislature 
There are four states which have selection systems in place that do control for purely 
partisan based appointments, but appointing governor or legislature have enough 
influence over judicial appointments to make use of the information when searching for 
judge‘s party identification. 
 States 
Florida chooses to have a nominating commission for each jurisdiction.  One state-
wide committee for the Florida Supreme Court, a commission for each of the five 
appellate districts, and a commission for each of the twenty judicial districts, making 26 
nominating commissions in all.  But all nine members of each of those commissions are 
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determined by the governor.  That power is limited by the Florida Bar offering a list from 
which four of the members of each commission are drawn, but there are no further 
restrictions.  The governor chooses the judge from the list provided by the nominating 
commission.
135
 
Florida passed a diversity requirement in 1991, requiring these commissions to have 
at least a one-third make up of gender, ethnic or racial minorities.  A federal district court 
struck the law as an equal protection violation in 1995.
136
 
Although Florida tried to limit the campaigning of judges for their retention elections, 
the federal courts struck rules which governed a limit on the time spent raising and 
spending, airing views on disputed legal and political issues, and direct public 
associations with the political parties.
137
 
Massachusetts has a selection system which is considered a merit system, but the 
governor is not bound to choose from the list provided by the nominating commission, 
and the whole membership of that commission is appointed by him or her, and serves 
solely at his or her pleasure.  The Governor‘s Council, a geographically disbursed elected 
board has a confirmation power once the governor has made a choice, but this limitation 
is not strong enough to alter the likelihood that judges will generally align with the 
governor‘s political preferences.138  
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 Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F.Supp. 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1995). 
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 American Civil Liberties Union v. The Florida Bar, 744 F.Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990), Zeller v. The 
Florida Bar and the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, 909 F.Supp. 1518 (N.D. Fla. 1995), and 
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 http://www.ajs.org/js/MA_methods.htm  See also the official website of the Governor‘s Council found 
on the mass.gov website. 
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Maryland‘s merit based system includes a nominating commission of thirteen, nine of 
which are selected by the incoming governor, although that pick is subject to senate 
confirmation.   
Whether South Carolina has a merit selection system or not is a matter of some 
disagreement as the state would claim that it does, but most experts disagree.
 139
  The 
legislature votes on the three or fewer candidates offered by a Judicial Merit Selection 
Commission.  The ten member commission has its members chosen by the Speaker of the 
House (5 members appointed), President Pro Tempore of the senate (3) and the chair of 
the senate judiciary committee (2 appointed.)  Six of the ten must be from the current 
legislature. 
Nonpartisan Elections 
Thirteen states overall use nonpartisan elections.  Six of them do not allow any 
information to be drawn regarding judge party ID, but seven fill vacancies in such a way 
which does allow party ID to be substituted. 
Georgia fills all judicial vacancies via a gubernatorial choice from a nominating 
commission list.  But a) that commission is populated by the governor with no 
restrictions on its membership, b) there is no limit or quota for the quantity of names on 
the list, and c) the governor is not bound to pick from this list.
140
  Because there are no 
controls in place regarding partisan influence, judges chosen by this method will be 
coded as the party of the appointing governor.  But having written that, denoting judges 
chosen by Zell Miller and Roy Barnes as Democrats over a recent twelve year span is 
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likely to be a poor indicator of ideology when compared with other states.  This is an 
example where the power of PAJID over party identification is clear. 
Kentucky uses nonpartisan elections as its judicial selection system, but when a 
vacancy arises, the governor picks a replacement from a list of three names provided by a 
nominating commission.  The nominating commission is made up of seven members, 
four of whom are appointed by the governor, and the remaining three being the Chief 
Justice and two lawyers picked by the state bar.
141
   
Although Michigan judicial elections are nonpartisan at each level, supreme court 
nominees come from the party conventions.
142
  The State Bar of Michigan offers a ranked 
list of candidates for vacancies, but the governor is not limited in choosing from the list 
in filling the vacancy.   
Minnesota fills vacancies by gubernatorial appointment.  Although a commission on 
judicial selection offers a list of three to five names, the governor is not bound by this list.  
And the commission is solely for the district courts, rather than appellate or supreme 
court, although some governors have asked for advice on those two levels as well.
143
  But 
because the governor appears to have limitless institutional power when filling vacancies, 
the party of the appointing governor will substitute for the judge when other not 
available.  Reform Party Governor Jesse Ventura will not be a basis for any classification.   
Mississippi changed from partisan elections of judicial candidates in 1994 to 
nonpartisan elections.  The change did little to alter one of the most competitive states for 
judicial seats.  Laws prohibiting the parties from donating to or endorsing a judicial 
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candidate were overturned in 2002, but campaign financing laws governing judicial 
elections remains largely intact. 
Montana fills vacancies with a gubernatorial pick from a list of three to five names 
provided by a nominating commission, and then confirmed by the senate.  The governor 
names a simple majority of the seven member commission, but because of other 
limitations
144
, party will serve as a proxy only when the party of the governor controls the 
legislature. 
North Dakota fills vacancies via a nominating commission appointed in equal parts 
by the Chief Judge, Governor, and President of the state bar.  The governor‘s choice is 
constrained to picking from the list, calling a special election, or reconvening the 
commission for another list.  Therefore the governor‘s party will not substitute for judge 
party identification in appointments.
145
 
Ohio allows the parties to nominate, support and fund judicial candidates before the 
nonpartisan elections.  Filling vacancies is solely left to the Governor, without check.  
Though past governors have picked from a small list provided by the leadership of both 
parties from the court‘s locality.146  This presumably ensures smoother transitions from 
appointment to election. 
Oregon has nonpartisan elections, but they also allow the governor to fill vacancies 
without any checks, so likeminded judges have an incentive to retire after an election, 
allowing the governor to appoint their replacement, which is in fact common. 
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Washington‘s nonpartisan elections often look no different than partisan elections 
with issue advocacy and financing coming from ideologically predictable sources.  When 
vacancies arise, the governor appoints a judge to sit until the next general election.  Since 
there are no controls on that choice, gubernatorial party will substitute for appointed 
judges. 
Wisconsin‘s governor fills vacancies with the help of a nominating commission s/he 
populates, but by which s/he‘s not bound.  Appointments also stay in office until the next 
retention election without another justice running.
147
  So appointing governor party will 
substitute for unknown judge party identification. 
Partisan Selection System 
Eight states use partisan elections, and interestingly, these states have more protective 
procedures in place to limit the influence of voters when filling vacancies.  For example, 
Pennsylvania has two-thirds senate confirmation, Louisiana calls a special election, 
Illinois has their Supreme Court fill the vacancy, and Texas has a simple majority senate 
confirmation. 
North Carolina was a partisan election state until recently:  1996 for limited 
jurisdictions, 2001 for general jurisdictional courts, 2002 for intermediate appellate 
courts.  The state is the first to move to voluntary public financed judicial elections.  
Because the governor can fill vacancies without a check, appointed judges whose party 
cannot otherwise be determined will be coded with the party of the governor. 
                                                 
 
147
 http://www.ajs.org/js/WI_methods.htm  
  
93 
Pennsylvania fills vacancies with a gubernatorial-chosen nominee whose 
confirmation requires a super majority of two-thirds of the Senate, thus gubernatorial 
appointing party will not count as a proxy for judge party identification.
148
 
Texas fills vacancies by gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.
149
  
When the party of the governor and that which controls the senate is the same, it will be 
used to substitute for the party of the judge if it is unknown. 
 
When the CQ Judicial Staff Directory mentions a judge‘s ―service beginning‖ in 
November or January of a given year, and there is no other information to go on, it will 
be assumed the judge was elected.  Both dates are offered in the directory for judges who 
were elected, when crosschecked against The American Bench.  This is a helpful 
assumption because if service begins in others months, and no other relevant information 
is available, it will be assumed the judge was appointed to a vacancy, and party can thus 
be determined if no other information is available. 
Missing Information  
The missing data do have a relationship to political culture and selection system.  In 
states that take the judicial insulation from politics seriously, as in Missouri, the press 
releases from the state, the reporting on cases and judges themselves are shorn of any 
reference to their politics.  This means that party identification could be coded for judges 
responsible for only 13 of the 86 votes cast by Missouri judges.  Yet other states with 
merit systems do not have the same political culture, and so party ID is easier to come by 
(e.g. New York with 87% party known).  Some states with partisan elections, strikingly, 
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have a Missouri like hesitancy to talk about the direct connection between the party and 
the judges (New Jersey with just over a third known), while other states with partisan-
controls in place still flaunt it (Mississippi with almost three-quarters known). 
In the model, missing data in the Judge Politics variable appears to be slightly 
correlated with the more insulated selection system, as is expected.  See table 14 below.  
But with the average deviation being 0.6 percentage points for the five categories, the 
difference appears to be one that will not bias inferences drawn from the data with Judge 
Politics coded. 
Table 14  Analysis of Missing & Available Judge Party ID Data for Possible Bias 
Type of Judicial Selection 
System 
N for 
the 
Dataset 
Overall 
% of 
Overall 
N 
N where 
Judge 
Ideology 
is 
Collected 
% of 
Collected 
N 
N where 
Judge 
Ideology is 
Not 
Collected 
% of 
Missing 
N 
% of 
National 
Population 
Partisan election 760 23.4% 568 23.8% 192 22.8% 27.6% 
Gov or Leg Appointment 515 15.8% 403 16.9% 112 13.3% 22.3% 
Nonpartisan election 642 19.7% 459 19.2% 183 21.7% 14.5% 
Combined Merit 813 25.0% 592 24.8% 221 26.2% 22.9% 
Merit 524 16.1% 365 15.3% 135 16.0% 12.8% 
Total 3254 100.0% 2387 100.0% 843 100.0% 100.0% 
 
The last column is an interesting for comparing how many people live under each 
judicial selection system and how many judge votes are cast.  Since the collection of state 
cases here is putatively claimed to be the population rather than a sample of a population, 
that there is a large difference between the last column and proportions in the study does 
not question the integrity of the dataset.   
Analysis 
After all that, the end result is that just under three-quarters of the votes cast in this 
model can be coded.  2,381 votes from 1,380 judges were associated with a party, leaving 
873 votes from 506 judges without a reliable association.   
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56% of the judges self identify as Democrats
150
, and the average PAJID score for the 
overall model is 50.05.
151
  The average PAJID scores for district courts at 51.5, for 
intermediate appellate courts at 50.3, and for courts of last resort the average PAJID is 
49.5.  But since Democratic party identification is significantly higher at the COLR 
(59%) than at the intermediate or district level (53% and 54%), the PAJID differences are 
likely sullied by the derived numbers assigned to lower court judges based on their party 
identification. 
Justifying the amount of energy spent on the construction of this variable, it captures 
more of the variance in religious freedom than the simple judge party identification does.  
Judge politics has a .05 correlation score in the liberal direction, significant at the .001 
level.  
Judge Politics and the state‘s attempt to increase religious freedom are positively and 
significantly correlated as well.  The average PAJID score in states which attempt the 
increase is 54.6, and in the states which do not attempt an increase, the average PAJID is 
43.5.
152
  Eleven PAJID points is larger than the middle quintile of the spread.     
States which attempt to increase via the judicial branch have significantly more 
liberal judges (PAJID score of 58), and states which go through RFRAs have 
significantly more conservative judges (46).  States which do not attempt to increase 
religious freedom at all have the most conservative judges (43).  And the scalar version of 
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96 
institutional protectiveness continues to corroborate the positive relationship between 
judge liberalness and institutional response to religious freedom: .299***.   
The clarity of direction in those results may lead to an oversimplified interpretation, 
though.  Is conservatism at home in the no-attempt states, while liberalism at home in the 
increased scrutiny states, with RFRA states as the middle?  A linear interpretation of the 
interplay between Judge Politics and states increasing scrutiny may yield a cleaner 
relationship where one likely does not exist. 
The overall time-series institutional variable which correlated with conservative 
counties also shows a tilt toward more conservative judges by 2 PAJID points, and with a 
date range of the last 1990s to the mid-2000s, an era where Republican voting was high; 
this is not surprising.   
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Table 15  Judge PAJID Score Characteristics 
0 (Most Conservative) to 100 (Most Liberal) 
 Mean Judge PAJID N 
Winning Votes 51.3 1058 
Losing Votes 49.0 1329 
No Institutional Increase 43.6 993 
Institutional Attempt to Increase Religious Freedom 54.7 1394 
Legislatively Increased 46.4 427 
Judicially Increased 58.3 967 
Rational Basis States 46.4 178 
Prior to Institutional Decrease or Increase 44.1 574 
Least Protective Increased States 46.9 157 
Level 0 Protection States 51.3 43 
Level 1 Protection States 45.8 449 
Level 2 Protection States 56.2 669 
Most Protective States 73.0 125 
Total 50.3 2195 
Male 49.4 1819 
Female 52.2 564 
Conservative Non-Traditional Judges 10.1 21 
Evangelical Protestant Judges 37.7 56 
Mainline Protestant Judges 45.2 186 
Black Protestant Judges 35.1 13 
Catholic Judges 56.5 210 
Jewish Judges 65.6 60 
West Coast 56.5 352 
Mississippi Valley 33.3 375 
Interior 45.2 670 
South Atlantic 37.6 303 
Northeast 66.1 687 
   
Total 50.0 2387 
 
Other interesting findings here include a very strong pattern of judge religious 
tradition and PAJID scores in expected directions.  Conservative non-traditionals (mainly 
Mormons here) showed the strongest tendency to be more conservative with a correlation 
score of -.46, followed by Evangelical Protestants at -.27, and Mainline Protestants 
following at -.219.  Black Protestant judges, perhaps surprisingly because of a strong 
tendency of African Americans to identify as Democrats, show a conservative correlation 
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with PAJID at -.13.  Catholics and Jewish judges, again surprisingly, have the same 
strength and liberal direction of correlation with PAJID at .324 and .329, respectively.  
All of these relationships are significant at the p<.001 level except Black Protestants who 
are significant at the p<.01 level.
153
 
 
Metro-Area Religious Adherence Rate 
Hypothesis 5:  Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support 
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence 
areas. 
 
The objective of this variable is to understand the effect, if any, a metropolitan area‘s 
church attendance and membership has on religious freedom, and to control that effect in 
the model.  No research has been done on the relationship of religious freedom to 
religious adherence rates prior to now.   
The variable is a simple ratio of each metropolitan area‘s religious adherents and the 
population of that metro area.
154
   
The number of adherents comes from the Glenmary Research Center‘s publication, 
Religious Congregations & Membership in the United States 2000.  The Glenmary data 
come from a ―report containing statistics for 149 religious bodies, providing information 
on the number of their congregations within each region, state, and county of the United 
States.  Where available, also included are actual membership figures (as defined by the 
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 There are 68 Evangelical Protestant judges, 198 Mainline Protestant judges, 13 Black Protestant judges, 
210 Catholic judges, 60 Jewish judges, and 21 Conservative Non-Traditional judges. 
154
 Information on metropolitan areas comes from both the Glenmary data as well as the U.S. Census 
website, found at www.census.gov.   
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religious body), total adherents, and average attendance.‖155  It is a questionnaire based 
data collection with statistical extrapolations for select religious traditions.
156
   
Adherent is defined by Glenmary as ―all members, including their children and the 
estimated number of other participants who are not considered members; for example, the 
‗baptized,‘ ‗those not confirmed,‘ ‗those not eligible for communion,‘ ‗those regularly 
attending services,‘ and the like.‖157  Adherent is a better unit of analysis than church 
membership because membership is not a standardized concept.  Baptism, for example, 
can be symbolic or it can be the definition of membership itself.  Asking denominations 
to report back on total adherents standardizes the concept.  Glenmary extrapolates from 
information on the questionnaire.  So for example when a denomination reports only 
membership, and it is a denomination which only counts adults, Glenmary takes a county 
based child-rate and extrapolates how many adherents the church has. 
What I refer to here as a ―metro area‖ is formally the metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) derived from the 1990 census, to better fit the Glenmary data, defined as an 
urbanized area with 50,000 or more inhabitants.  Metropolitan Divisions, or nested 
metropolitan areas within metropolitan areas, are not analyzed in this study.
158
  There 
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 Glenmary 2002, vii. 
156
 The Glenmary data note a bias in their collection which is likely to undercount historically African 
American denominations.  Those five denominations, along with 136 other identifiable denominations did 
not participate in the study.  These 141 denominations total an estimated population of 31,040,360, or more 
than 10.2% of the population in 1990.  
157
 Glenmary 2002, xv. 
158
 Standard definitions of metropolitan areas were first issued in 1949 by the then Bureau of the Budget 
(predecessor of OMB), under the designation "standard metropolitan area" (SMA). The term was changed 
to "standard metropolitan statistical area" (SMSA) in 1959, and to "metropolitan statistical area" (MSA) in 
1983. The term "metropolitan area" (MA) was adopted in 1990 and referred collectively to metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs), consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs), and primary metropolitan 
statistical areas (PMSAs). The term "core based statistical area" (CBSA) became effective in 2000 and 
refers collectively to metropolitan and micropolitan statistical areas.  This is taken from the U.S. Census 
website‘s ―About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas‖, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/aboutmetro.html  
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were 361 metro areas in the 1990 census.  The units of analysis for Glenmary, and the 
smallest geographic units for metro areas, are counties.  
For areas that do not fall in metro-areas, which occurs around 8% of the time, the 
ratio for the county will be used. 
Since much of this data was transcribed by hand, reliability tests were needed to catch 
errors.  That test is a comparison of the variable to each metro area‘s constituting 
counties‘ adherence rates.  So for example, the Chicago metro area‘s adherence rate (the 
constructed variable with possible errors) was compared to the sixteen counties which 
comprise this metro area, as defined by the census.  By creating a repeating formula for 
subtracting the SMA rate from the county rate for each case, I could then sort by that 
difference, and analyze the top and bottom 100 cases or so to make sure they were 
transcribed correctly and are diverse counties rather than mistakes.   
Results 
The results of this collection show that adherence rates around the nation range from 
a low of 22.5% to a high of 93% and have a mean of 49.6%.  When the vote occurs in an 
area which is not a metro area (247 votes in 115 cases) the county‘s adherent rate is used 
in lieu of the metro area.  The county adherence rate looks very much like the metro rate 
in range, but is 2 percentage points higher in average.  The adherent rate for the nation as 
a whole is 56.8%, so the metro areas and counties involved in this study tend to fall in the 
areas with fewer adherents.  That is related to the locations of supreme (and oftentimes 
intermediate appellate) courts in state capitols, and those state capitols having unique 
demographics that correlate with lower adherence rates.  The data appear to support this 
explanation as adherent rates decrease for courts located at the capital. 
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The relationship of adherent rates to religious freedom is positive and significant: 
.055 and p<.01.  The relationship of adherent rates to states‘ attempts to increase religious 
freedom is also positive and significant (.04*).   
The interaction between the institutional attempts and winning votes is also positive 
and significant.  Adherent rates are higher than average in 1) legislatively and 2) 
judicially increased winning contexts, and 3) in 10 of 14 possible contexts in the scaled 
institutional variable.   
In short, the more religious an area is, the more favorable the courts tend to be. 
Table 16  Metro Adherent-Rate Characteristics, from Lowest to Highest 
Metro Adherent-Rate, cut 
into 20% Categories 
  
Favorable 
Vote Rate 
Percentage 
of Votes 
from All 
Increased 
Scrutiny 
Contexts 
Percentage 
of Votes 
from 
Legislative 
Attempt 
Contexts 
Percentage 
of Votes 
from 
Judicial 
Attempt 
Contexts 
Judge 
PAJID  
0 
(Conserv.) 
-100 
(Liberal) 
Percentage 
of County 
Voting for 
George W. 
Bush in '04 
Lowest Adh-Rate Mean .43 .52 .13 .39 49.9 .42 
  N 690 690 690 690 551 690 
2nd Quintile Mean .44 .53 .20 .32 49.5 .43 
  N 614 614 614 614 472 614 
3rd Quintile Mean .39 .39 .14 .24 40.5 .49 
  N 665 665 665 665 426 665 
4th Quintile Mean .47 .75 .24 .52 52.8 .43 
  N 662 662 662 662 489 662 
Highest Adh-Rate Mean .50 .55 .16 .39 56.9 .41 
  N 623 623 623 623 449 623 
Total Mean .45 .55 .17 .37 50.0 .44 
  N 3254 3254 3254 3254 2387 3254 
 
Judge Politics shows a significant relationship that appears to be parametric.  The 
positive correlation score (.09) means that it tilts toward higher adherence rates with more 
liberal judge vote on a religious actor, but moderate adherence rates are better seen as the 
pole for conservative judges, rather than the lowest adherence rates. 
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And county presidential party also shows a parabolic shape.  It has a negative 
relationship to Republican voting, but support for Candidate W. Bush was lowest in the 
metro areas with the least and most adherents, and rose as those rates moderated. 
It does bear repeating that Republican voting does not have a linear, or even positive 
relationship with the rate of adherents in an area.  This is not contradictory to one of the 
more referred to statistics in Presidential elections over the last few elections –that 
church-going correlates strongly with Republican voting; but it certainly seems contrary 
to it.   
The same pattern occurs at the county level with adherent rates: very significant and 
comparatively strong Democratic correlations with the more religious areas.  The most 
likely explanation for this relationship is the evidence correcting a stereotype that the 
South or Southwest is the most religious areas of the country.  In fact the Catholic 
Northeast has the highest adherent-rate if you parcel the nation into the South, the North 
and the West.  Further, if you categorize the nation into the more political geographic 
mix, you find the Catholic Northeast still is quite a bit higher than the rest of the nation. 
Table 17  Metro-Area Religious Adherent Rate by Geography 
Political Geography 
Metro-
Adherent-
Rate N 
West Coast .385 442 
Mississippi Valley .521 500 
Interior .496 1014 
South Atlantic .414 346 
Northeast .562 952 
Total .496 3254 
 
It is worth noting here that the Glenmary data do make statistical adjustments for 
nominal and/or non-practicing Catholics, so that they are not considered adherents in 
their data. 
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Metro-Area Religious Homogeneity Index 
 
Hypothesis 6:  The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater 
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim. 
 
Similar to the last variable in that it predicts that an area‘s religious make-up will 
have an effect on religious freedom, this variable will capture how religiously diverse an 
area is.  The prediction for that relationship is for religious freedom to find more friendly 
treatment in more diverse areas.  But to be clear, the research here is fairly exploratory, 
and the study holds that religious diversity in an area will matter, more than it holds that 
it will matter in a negative and linear way. 
The method I used to construct the variable was to take the population of each 
religion (or ―religious tradition‖, explained in the next variable) and calculate the odds of 
two random people being from the same tradition.  That calculation is called a Herfindahl 
Index, and it was first used in business research measuring area industries for 
monopolies.  Herfindahl indexes range from perfect homogeneity at 1, to perfect 
heterogeneity at 0.  The index is a sum of the squared adherent-rates of the religious 
traditions.  More specifically it is Hj = ∑S
2
ij where S is the specific religious tradition 
divided by area j‘s adherent population (i is the index of summation.)   
The reference category, or the denominator, is the population of adherents rather than 
the whole population.  So in other words, the interpretation of the index will be the odds 
of two random people chosen from the area‘s adherents, not the area as a whole.  This is 
done with the attempt to control for the multicollinearity that could exist between this 
measure and the adherent rate without this control in place. 
Results 
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In the most diverse counties and metropolitan areas, the odds of randomly selecting 
two people that are either Mainline or Evangelical Protestants, Catholic, Orthodox or 
Other are about 1 in 4.  Compare that against Provo, Utah where those odds are 96%.  
Provo has 325,000 Mormons and only 7,000 other adherents from all other faiths.  Provo 
is so homogeneous that if you counted their 37,000 non-adherents as a religious 
grouping, the area would still be in the top five most homogeneous areas. 
The variable has a positive skew, and a mean of .417. 
Table 18  Religious Homogeneous to Heterogeneous Areas 
 
Metro area or County Herfindahl Score 
Metro Provo, UT .96 
Franklin County, LA .87 
Lawrence County, MS .84 
Clinton County, NY .78 
Metro Salt Lake City, UT .75 
mean .42 
Metro Missoula, MT .27 
Whitman County, WA .27 
Coconino County, AZ .27 
Metro Anchorage, AK .26 
Ravalli County, MT .25 
Washakie County, WY .25 
 
How does religious homogeneity relate to religious freedom?  The answer is 
positively and significantly, with a correlation score of .06 and the pattern unmistakable 
with p<.001.  Winning contexts had around 1¼ percentage point more homogeneity than 
losing context. 
State institutional response sees a similar relationship, positive and significant (.01 
level), and increased states show around a percentage point more homogeneity than states 
that do not attempt an increase.  The institution used mattered, as legislatively increased 
states were 1.8 percentage points above the no-attempt states, which is significant, and 
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judicially increased states were .7 of a point above the no-attempt states, which was not 
significant.   
The scaled increased scrutiny variables are significant, but do not appear to be linear.  
Only the integrated, scaled single variable shows a progression toward more homogeneity 
as the protection from the state increases.
159
  The Herfindahl score of the 157 votes cast 
in the most protective category of states is .56, and that average is higher than the 90
th
 
percentile in the spread of Herfindahl scores. 
Increased scrutiny contexts saw voting stay with the positive pattern.  Judicially 
increased contexts looked the simplest, with lower success rates jump rise sharply in the 
last quintile which gave it its positive correlation.  Legislative context voting rates varied 
by homogeneity quintile, but without much reason.  Put the two together and the parabola 
shows up again.  Higher success rates at the most heterogeneous and homogeneous 
religious contexts, and average-to-low scores in the middle. 
Table 19  Religious Homogeneity and Increased Scrutiny Voting Results 
Metro Religious Herfindahl Index 
Non-
Increased 
States 
Increased 
Scrutiny 
States 
Judicially 
Increased 
States 
Legislatively 
Increased 
States 
Most Heterogeneous Quintile  
Vote-Rate .43 .45 .44 .49 
N 378 293 213 80 
2nd Quintile 
Vote-Rate .39 .40 .44 .27 
N 283 383 300 83 
3rd Quintile 
Vote-Rate .52 .44 .45 .44 
N 281 386 208 178 
4th Quintile 
Vote-Rate .45 .41 .42 .38 
N 293 334 215 119 
Most Homogeneous Quintile 
Vote-Rate .45 .53 .52 .56 
N 283 385 276 109 
Total 
Vote-Rate .45 .45 .465 .43 
N 1473 1781 1212 569 
 
                                                 
 
159
 .262 correlation score, and p<.001. 
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Like in the adherent-rate, table 19 shows a parabolic pattern with the least and most 
homogeneous areas having more votes occur in increased contexts.  The most 
homogeneous areas have the most increased scrutiny contexts.  There are negative 
patterns between homogeneity and majoritarian (or Republican) voting, which likely has 
something to do with the effect of the Catholic Northeast‘s most homogeneous rate in the 
nation outweighing the other areas. 
 
Table 20  Metro-Area Homogeneity Index by Geography 
 
Political Geography Herfindahl Rate N 
West Coast .36 442 
Mississippi Valley .38 500 
Interior .40 1014 
South Atlantic .37 346 
Northeast .48 952 
Total .417 3254 
 
Both the strength and significance of the patterns for favorable voting in the 
integrated institutional variable decrease when the effect of the Northeast is controlled in 
a partial correlation, but they are still a significant -.06*.  
Although it is speculative and this study is not the place to answer the question fully, 
another possible answer as to why homogeneity correlates positively with religious 
freedom rather than religious diversity could be the feeling of security religious traditions 
would feel as they make up larger proportions of an area.  If that security did in fact exist, 
offering religious exemptions to policy would be less threatening to the religious order 
than in more heterogeneous or competitive environments.  
Note that a correlation score between this homogeneity index and the metro adherent 
rate shows that multicollinearity is likely going to be an issue in the model.  There is no 
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conceptual reason that the rate of adherents and the religious diversity of an area should 
be so strongly correlated: .485***. 
 
Conclusions for the Judge and Community Variables 
The predictions held true as county politics and left leaning judges were more 
protective of religious actors.  Religious adherence supported the prediction here as 
higher rates led to more protectiveness.  And religious homogeneity defied the prediction 
as it was the context for more protectiveness, not heterogeneity.   
 
Claimant Variables 
Popularity of the Religion Seeking Protection 
 
Hypothesis 7:  Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less 
success than those from majority religions. 
 
This variable will control for the effect on religious freedom due to the religion of the 
litigant and the religious tradition of the surrounding area.  The actual coding and 
construction of this variable comes after a lengthy discussion. 
This variable was originally conceived as simply a coding for the claimant‘s 
denomination or maybe a dummy variable for whether the claimant was in a minority (on 
the national level) religion or not.  The dummy variable gives away too much 
information, and the denominational variable is beholden to American denominations 
which have evolved enough as to make the quantity and diversity of that variable too 
great for it to convey enough meaning. 
Constructing a middle way between the dizzying array of Protestant denominations 
and a way of understanding their proximity to and from the status quo has been an area of 
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interest in sociology for years.  But since the field has yet to crown one classification as 
the standard, this study chooses an ordering laid out by Steensland in 1999
160
 and referred 
to as ―religious traditions.‖  The Steensland classification lays out eight large groupings 
of similar believers, with denomination being only one of several indicators of who is 
going into which group.  So a Baptist that is evangelical and reads the Bible with a 
literalist understand is grouped with likeminded Lutherans, and Lutherans and Baptists 
that are neither evangelical nor fundamentalist are grouped elsewhere as well.  The eight 
religious traditions are:  Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Black Protestant, 
Catholic, Jewish, Conservative Non-Traditional (CNT, and Mormons are an example), 
Liberal Non-Traditional (LNT, and Unitarians are an example) and an Other category, 
which includes Buddhists, Native Americans, Muslims, and others.   
The benefits of this type of ordering, to be sure, are bringing the quantity of 
categories into a manageable number, and having a sophisticated method for classifying 
believers.   
                                                 
 
160
 Steensland and et al., (2000) has the list of all the denominations and how they are classified, 
reproduced here in Appendix B. 
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Figure 3  Largest Denominations Within Each Religious Tradition, 2000 
Mainline Protestant Evangelical Protestant 
United Methodist  Southern Baptist 
Evangelical Lutheran Assembly of God  
Presbyterian Church, USA Lutheran Church –Missouri Synod 
Episcopal Church  Churches of Christ  
American Baptist Churches in the US Christian Churches  
United Church of Christ  Independent, Non-Charismatic  
  
Black Protestant Other 
Church of God in Christ Jewish 
National Baptist Convention, USA  Muslim 
National Baptist Convention of America Baha‟i  
African Methodist Episcopal Church Native American 
Progressive National Baptist Convention Pagan 
  
Liberal Non-Traditional Conservative Non-Traditional 
Unitarian,  Universalist  Church of Latter Day Saints 
United Church, Unity Church Jehovah‟s Witnesses 
New Birth Christianity Christian Scientists  
National Spiritualist Assoc. of Churches Christadelphians  
New age Spirituality LDS –Reorganized  
 
This construction of the variable had some exceptions.  More than one coding of 
religious traditions was possible in eleven cases.  In nine of those cases, a parent of a 
religious tradition is asking the state to stop the other parent from teaching or educating 
the children in a different religious tradition.   The parent asking the state or city to stay 
out of the matter gets coded as the party seeking religious freedom.  Or to be more clear, 
the coding in these cases is of the litigant seeking to teach or raise a child in a religious 
way, rather than the litigant asking the state to stop that religious behavior.   
The description of this construction of the variable follows.  Evangelicals were the 
most litigious religious tradition with almost a third of all the known religious litigants.
161
  
Catholics were the subjects of almost a quarter of the votes, followed by the Other 
category with 13%, Conservative Non-Traditional with 8%, Mainline Protestants with 
                                                 
 
161
 Most unclassified traditions were simply not mentioned in the case, but some were left blank because 
more than one tradition was asking for protection, as in a case where multiple churches were fighting the 
placement of a landfill. Robertson v. City of High Point, 129 N.C. App. 88 (1996) 
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7.6%, Jewish with 4.2%, Black Protestants with 3.3%, and Liberal Non-Traditionals with 
only 16 votes cast in their cases were the fewest, and .5% of the database.   
Table 21  Characteristics of the Religious Tradition of Claimant 
 
Judge 
Votes
 
Percentage of 
the dataset‟s 
known 
religious 
traditions 
Proportion of 
the Nation‟s 
Religious 
Adherents
a 
Religious 
Freedom 
Success Rate 
CNT 265  10.0   3.4% 43% 
EP 849  32.0 23.0% 41%*** 
MP 247    9.3 18.6% 64%*** 
BP
‡
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   4.1 12.0% 49% 
Catholic 620  23.4 35.0% 57%*** 
Jewish 137    5.2   2.3% 57% 
LNT
‡ 
  16      .6   1.0% 75%** 
Other 412  15.5   1.3% 23%*** 
Total 2654 100.0  45.6% 
Total, with missing 3254    44.8% 
** Significant at the p<.01 level. 
*** Significant at the p<.001 level. 
a
 (Finke and Scheitle 2005)  Glenmary puts the number of uncounted or non-adherents at around 50% of the 
nation, so a column showing a simple percentage of the nation of each religious tradition would not be 
comparable to the other columns. 
‡
 Inferences suffer from a small sample size for both LNT and BP.  Specifically, determining whether a 
claimant was from a historically black protestant denomination was difficult and largely relied on the 
denominational name mentioned in the opinion, which did not occur with enough regularity to make this 
estimate less reliable.  So the accuracy of the Black Protestant votes is such that inferences should only be 
drawn with care. 
Changing the unit of analysis from votes to cases shows only a nominal difference.  Each tradition‟s ratio of 
cases at the highest, middle and lowest levels of court appears similar.  The cases missing a claimant‟s 
religious tradition, though, appear to be moderately overrepresented in the courts of last resort.  A fact that is 
explained by the selection method of inferring cases.  If the COLR case mentioned the tradition, the inferred 
cases inherited that tradition.  If the COLR case does not mention the tradition, and the root cases are not 
published, they also missed the information.  
 
Notice the traditions that are over- and under-represented.  Mainline Protestants are 
litigants only about half of the time their national proportion suggests.  Catholics and 
Liberal non-traditional denominations also appear in court at lower rates than their 
population suggest.  On the other hand, Evangelicals appear in court about 50% more 
often than their population suggests, Jewish litigants 100+% more, Conservative non-
traditionals about 300% more often, and Other Religious actors appear in court 15 times 
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more often than their proportion of the nation, and all four of those rates are significant 
increases. 
Recent research on lower federal court decisions sheds some surprising light on this 
dynamic by showing that Catholics and Baptists succeed at lower rates than minor 
faiths.
162
  That is worth repeating: minority faiths won more often than the popular faiths 
in the Sisk sample.  The authors surmised that judges ―may be more fearful of the 
cumulative effects of accommodating claims for accommodation by mainstream or near-
mainstream religionists‖ rather than fearing the social effect from a minority religion.  
This is an interesting finding, and should be untangled from the general drift of research 
which supports the conventional understanding that minorities do not fare as well.
163
 
For the population of state cases shown in Table 23 (second below), the success rate 
column does not support these findings as Catholics and Mainline Protestants fare much 
better than average.  Perhaps more tellingly, the Other Religious category fares vastly 
worse than others.  If the Muslims are disaggregated from the Other category, they show 
a 30% successful vote-rate, leaving the remaining Buddhists, pagans, Native Americans, 
and other believers with a 21% favorable vote-rate. 
But in line with the Sisk findings, Evangelicals do fare worse than average.  And 
generally the more conservative faiths on the spectrum fare worse.  If you order the 
religious traditions in the following ad hoc ranking from conservative to liberal: CNT, 
EP, MP, BP, Catholic, Jewish, LNT, then the favorable vote-rate is negatively correlated 
with a score of .132, and significant at the .001 level.  If Black Protestants mark the 
center, the three more conservative traditions win 45% of their votes, and the three 
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 Sisk, 2005. 
163
 See Brent (1999) and Lupu (1998) 
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traditions to the left of it win 58% of their votes.  Even more supportive of the argument 
is the fact that the win rate on the right is heavily bolstered by Mainline Protestants, 
which is largely not understood as a conservative group. 
Geography matters in this question of whether majority/minority status affects the 
initial step of bringing the case.  To be clear, do the religious traditions bring more cases 
when they are a minority in an area or when they are in the majority?  Evangelicals find 
their two highest favorable vote-rates in the two regions where they are the most 
prevalent:  the South and Midwest; while the Northwest is both their least populated area 
and area of least success.
164
   
Catholics have more than a third of their votes come from the Northeast, their most 
populated region, and also find their success rate above their (and its) average.  Their 
lowest success-rate comes in the South, where there is also a dearth of Catholics. 
Jewish actors are vastly centered in the Northeast, and that is where they find their 
highest success rate (61%).  In their three least populated regions, they find their three 
smallest success-rates.
165
 
Mainline Protestants, on the other hand, do not see these same regional patterns, and 
instead actually show something like the opposite.  They show a higher success rate 
among their three lowest populated regions than they do in their most populated 
region.
166
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 40% of Evangelicals reside in the South, 24% in the Midwest, and the proportion of favorable votes are 
47% and 49%, respectively.  Only 4% of Evangelicals are in the Northwest, and they win 29% of the time 
there. 
165
 40% success rate, albeit with only 35 votes. 
166
 A third of MPs reside in the Midwest, yet receive less than 50% favorable votes there, while only 20% 
of MPs live scattered throughout California, the Northwest and Southwest, and their favorable vote-rate 
among those regions is 69%.  The most noteworthy region for Mainline Protestants is the Northeast, where 
they won 96% of 76 votes cast in 25 cases.  These results are significant at the .001 level. 
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But this majoritarian-favored pattern does seem stronger than not.  When the religious 
traditions are summed, the Northwest has the fewest adherents of these six regions, and 
also has the lowest success rate.  The Northeast has the most adherents, and also has the 
highest success rate.
167
  True to the pattern, the Midwest is second in both adherents and 
success rate, and the Southwest represents both the middle point for adherents and 
success rate of religious actors. 
All of which leads to a more rigorous testing of the question of whether more popular 
religions get better treatment.  A variable was created for the percentage agreement 
between the claimant and metro area, or county if not in a metro area.  This new variable 
is constructed by collapsing CNT and EP, MP and BP, LNT Jewish and Other, to make 
them comparable to the religious tradition data available for metro areas and counties, 
which are limited to only four religious traditions:  EP, MP, Catholic and Other.
168
  The 
created variable has a mean of 28.7% agreement, but is skewed toward less agreement 
with a median of 24% agreement and with a full quarter of the votes on claimants with 
less than 10% agreement. 
This variable supports the assertion that popular religions do indeed receive more 
favorable treatment.  The correlation between agreement and favorable vote-rate is 
positive, .12 and clearly a pattern (p<.001).  A comparison of vote outcomes shows that 
protective votes occur in contexts with an average of 32% agreement between claimant 
                                                 
 
167
 Of the 952 votes cast in the Northeast, 51% were for the religious actor.  Of the 2,302 votes cast 
elsewhere, 42% were for the religious actor.  That 9 percentage point difference represents an increase of 
more than 20% over the non-Northeast areas.  Also supportive of the point, the two religious traditions that 
do not find a higher success rate in the Northeast are Evangelicals and Conservative Non-Traditionals –two 
traditions that are not very well represented in the region.   
168
 Although the Glenmary data explicitly accept the Steensland classification of religious traditions 
(http://www.thearda.com/mapsReports/RCMS_Notes.asp) on a metro- and county-level, the full eight 
families of religions are not available. 
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and area, while votes against the religious actor occur in contexts of 26% agreement.  
This variable then is the control variable for capturing the effect of claimant‘s faith in the 
study.  Table 25 below reports this significant finding. 
Table 22  Claimant-Area Religious Agreement Success Rates, 
in Ten Equally Sized Groups 
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement 
Favorable 
Vote Rate N 
Least Claimant-Area Agreement .24 270 
2nd Least Claimant-Area Agreement  .34 266 
3rd decile .51 278 
4th decile .47 318 
5th decile .42 211 
6th decile .54 263 
7th decile .41 288 
8th decile .52 235 
9th Most Agreement decile .53 265 
Most Claimant-Area Agreement .57 265 
Total .45 2659 
 
Factoring in whether the state attempted to increase religious freedom shows 
claimant-area agreement was highest when states made a legislative attempt (or 
majoritarian), less agreement when there was no attempt, and the least amount of 
agreement when the attempt was judicial (or minoritarian), 34% to 29.7% to 25% 
respectively.  The inverse of that phrasing may be more telling:  a lower rate of minority 
religious actors are showing up in court in the states which have increased religious 
freedom through the statehouse than in the judicially increased states, and that is even 
less than the states which attempt no increase at all.   
Winning in the institutionally grouped states follows the same pattern: winning 
contexts have higher agreement than losing ones. 
Factoring in level of court shows that lower courts are more likely to have agreement-
favoring votes, and this is not surprising as lower courts have less insulation from public 
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pressure and less accomplished judges.  All three levels of courts show more favorable 
votes when agreement is higher, and less agreement when the vote is lost. 
Factoring in geography, all regions show the same pattern, with the Pacific Rim 
showing the least favorability for popular faiths (2.4 points difference between agreement 
in votes won versus lost) and the South showing the most (10 points difference).***  
Although interestingly, the state of California does not show the pattern among wins and 
losses, but has a higher overall agreement than every region at 35%. 
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Table 23  Claimant-Area Religious Agreement 
Context of Judge Vote 
  
Claimant-Area 
Religious 
Agreement 
Claimant-Area 
Religious 
Agreement  
in Winning 
Contexts 
Claimant-Area 
Religious 
Agreement  
in Losing 
Contexts 
Legislative Attempt Mean 34% 40% 29% 
  N 478 221 257 
Neither Attempt Mean 30% 34% 26% 
  N 1161 509 652 
Judicial Attempt Mean 25% 26% 24% 
  N 1020 479 541 
        
Supreme Court Mean 29% 32% 26% 
  N 878 385 493 
Intermediate Appellate Mean 28% 32% 25% 
  N 1304 587 717 
District or Trial Mean 30% 34% 26% 
  N 477 237 240 
        
CA Mean 35% 34% 36% 
  N 115 49 66 
Northwest Mean 30% 34% 28% 
  N 350 121 229 
Southwest Mean 32% 37% 28% 
  N 255 111 144 
South w/o TX Mean 31% 37% 28% 
  N 432 170 262 
Midwest Mean 27% 31% 24% 
  N 700 332 368 
Northeast Mean 26% 29% 23% 
  N 807 426 381 
        
Total Mean 29% 32% 26% 
 N 2659 1209 1450 
 
The pattern does not hold at the national level, though, where the simple religious 
traditions are the unit of analysis.  Catholics were the tradition with the most agreement 
with their area by far at 50.2%, and not surprisingly, LNT at 6%, along with both Jewish 
and Other Religious at 10.5% had the least agreement.  Yet Jewish and LNT claimants 
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won at higher rates than Catholics.  Mainline Protestants won almost two-thirds of their 
votes, yet had only average agreement with their area.   
But the Other Religious category‘s least agreement and lowest success rate should not 
be overlooked, and drives most of the patterned variance in this variable. 
Judge‘s religious tradition, comfortingly, does not show any overt favoritism or bias 
with claimant religious tradition.  
In conclusion, claimant religious tradition is much less explanatory when the 
claimant‘s context is not considered.  The level of agreement between the two appears to 
explain a large amount of the variance in the data.  It positively correlates with appearing 
in the court as well as receiving the favorable vote.  This is true in each level of court and 
in each geographic region, and in all three institutional contexts: legislative, judicial, and 
the no attempt states. 
 
Deviant Behavior 
Hypothesis 8:  Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less 
likely to be supported than those that are not. 
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the predicted 
dampening affect on the likelihood of winning the vote when asking the court to protect 
something that is against societal mores.  Deviancy is limited to sexual or drug related 
acts.  It is logical that someone asking for protection of an already celebrated right, like 
the freedom to express one‘s beliefs, will get a friendlier treatment in court than, for 
example, someone asking for protection of hallucinatory or polygamous rites. 
The method of constructing this variable involves further defining deviancy as the use 
of schedule 1 controlled substances, or sexual acts which are either illegal or largely seen 
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as immoral in public opinion polling.  The variable is a dummy variable where a deviant 
act is coded 1 and its absence is coded 0. 
Clarifying examples of deviant behavior include: 
All claims of sexual abuse.  
Sexual relationships occurring with one‘s counselor, even if consenting. 
Gay and lesbian relationships which are the subject of a case.  Although I note 
here that while acceptance of gays is increasing, a majority of Americans still 
see it as deviance.
169
   
Sex outside of an existing marriage.  Claims of adultery satisfy what this variable 
hopes to capture, which again is an act society deems unacceptable.  While the 
frequency of broken marriage vows is clearly an issue, 90.7% of the nation 
classifies extramarital sex as ―always‖ or ―almost always wrong‖.170 
Cohabitation or sex between unmarried people (of legal age) is not coded as 
deviant here because attitudes about it are such that a majority (62.4%) 
believe it is ―sometimes wrong‖ or ―not wrong at all‖.171  
Alcohol was not considered deviant here. 
Results 
Deviancy was coded in 852 votes in the dataset, or 26%, which is much higher than 
was expected.  The higher than expected number of votes is not explained by a large 
proportion of these cases occurring at Supreme Court levels with larger panels of judging 
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 In the 2004 General Social Survey, 60.3% of respondents answered that same sex sexual relations are 
―always‖ or ―almost always wrong‖, compared to 29.7% answering ―not at all wrong‖.  This variable is a 
simple inference from public opinion and should not be construed as anything more.  
170
 Ibid. 
171
 Ibid. 
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and hence more votes.  In fact, the cases were decided significantly more at the lower 
levels.
172
   
That more than a quarter of the votes are deviant instead appears to be inflated by the 
large number of sex abuse claims brought against the Catholic Church over this time 
span.  Indeed, 92.5% of the deviant cases were coded that way because of sexual reasons, 
versus the 7.5% which are drug related.
173
 
It bears repeating.  Almost a quarter of the votes (24.2%) in this dataset on religious 
freedom involve cases concerning actors accused of a deviant sexual act. 
The cases for this variable are populated by males mostly, as they received 85% of 
the deviant case votes, which is significantly higher level than the overall rate of males in 
the dataset which is 81%*. 
Even more surprising than the large number of deviancy cases may be the outcome:   
deviancy was correlated with an increased success rate, not a depressed success rate.  
Religious actors in these cases enjoyed a 53% favorable vote-rate versus non-deviants‘ 
43% success rate, a pattern significant at the .001 level.  This boost in win-rate is not true 
of the drug related deviancy, as they received favorable votes only 22% of the time, 
which is half of the non-drug related case rate.  So it is the 55.5% favorable vote-rate of 
the sexually deviant cases that buoys the high deviancy rate.   
One explanation for this is that during the increased number of cases brought against 
churches regarding sexual abuse, litigants‘ and the publics‘ sense of outrage may have 
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 24% of votes are at supreme courts, 27% at the Intermediate Appellate, and 30% of deviant cases at the 
district court.  This linear pattern is significant at the .05 level. 
173
 And in those drug related cases, only four of the 64 votes came from religious traditions that were not 
from the Other category.  Those four votes came in one case on a medicinal marijuana plea brought by a 
Messianic Jew.  Minnesota v. Pederson, 679 N.W.2d 368, 5/18/04 
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fostered an overreach on their legal claims.  But the application of law in a court and the 
direct effect public outrage can have legislatively are two different things.  That outrage 
can motivate actors to spend the money to initiate cases with excellent social or political 
arguments, but without a good legal argument.  Regardless of the explanation, this is the 
description of the state cases regarding religious actors. 
The two institutional variables are significantly correlated with deviancy in the 
predicted direction:  states which have attempted to increase religious freedom find more 
deviancy cases being brought.
174
  But this is deceiving, as the sexual cases are inflated 
enough to raise the overall rate to significance in the positive direction even though the 
drug related cases are slightly depressed in the increased states, if not significantly.   
The success rate in the increased states was another ambivalent point of comparison: 
higher win-rates in these states for the sexual cases, and significantly lower rates for the 
drug cases even in these increased states.  Sexual cases had a successful vote-rate of 57% 
in institutional states, and 53% in the no-attempt states.  Drug related cases had an 11% 
success rate in 38 votes in the increased states, and a more-than-tripled successful vote-
rate in the no-attempt states (38%, albeit in 26 votes.)  In the sexual cases, judicial states 
were most protective, legislative around average protection, and no attempt states had the 
lowest success rate.  The drug cases did not have enough iterations to support a comment 
on these classifications. 
The actors in both types of deviant cases were patterned.  Only Liberal Non-
Traditionals were not significantly correlated with deviant cases.  Jewish, Black 
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 The correlation score is .07, which is significant at the .001 level.  But this is wholly driven by the 
sexual deviant cases (21% of no-attempt state votes, and 27% of increased attempt votes), as the drug 
deviancy cases are not brought significantly more or less. 
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Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, CNTs, and Other religious all were negatively 
correlated with sexual deviancy.
175
  Mainline Protestants had a positive correlation score 
of .147 and Catholics a positive score of .325, one of the highest scores of any 
relationship in the model.  Other religious actors were the only tradition positively related 
to drug deviancy. 
Catholics were the actor subject to a deviance vote 44% of the time, and those actors 
received protective votes 61%* of the time.  Mainline Protestants were the most protected 
religious tradition with a protective vote-rate of 68.5%** in 127 votes.  The Other 
category was again the least protected, and by a significant margin, winning only 25% of 
the votes cast in their cases.  But this pattern has more to do with the Other religious 
category being effectively the only category for the drug use cases, which made up more 
than two-thirds of their votes in this deviant category.   
Liberal judges vote to protect the subjects of these deviant cases more than 
conservative judges.  The average Judge Politics score for a winning vote is 53, and the 
average score for a vote against is 45.  Eight PAJID points is enough to cover the middle 
20% of the dispersion of the variable, to give the reader an idea of that gap.     
Judge gender, judge religious tradition and area partisanship all show no significant 
relationships with deviancy  
The geography variables show that where there were more deviant cases, the win-rate 
was higher.  The Midwest and West and the nation‘s interior all show higher rates of 
deviant cases than their population suggests, along with a higher win-rate.  The South 
shows depressed numbers of cases and an overall depressed success-rate.  The Northeast, 
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 All but CNTs had their negative correlation score over 1, and the significance for all of them was at the 
.001 level. 
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with its large population of Catholics, the largest plurality of these cases, shows a 
strangely depressed number of cases but a higher win-rate. 
Deviant cases tended to win in areas with higher adherent rates and with a more 
homogenous religious makeup, which was the general pattern for those two variables, but 
counter-intuitive for this morally loaded variable.  This would seem to be the Catholic 
effect, but strangely, controlling for Catholic claimants does not support that theory –it is 
still positive and significant, and in fact grows more positive and significant.   
Instead, the only significant denominational explanation that can be supported by the 
data is that evangelical areas had negative correlations for both cases heard and success-
rates, which serves to bolster the adherent rate and Herfindahl effects elsewhere.  But 
even that is not enough for a full explanation. 
 
An important conclusion for this variable is that deviancy here is really two forces at 
work, each very unique and not easily coupled together.  One version of deviancy had 
inflated appearances in the increased religious freedom states, and higher success rates.  
The other was the mirror image of that.  Both effects should be held constant for the 
model. 
But the larger conclusion as to why sexual deviancy performed the way it did is left 
with the speculation that began the description of these results:  sensational aspects of 
clergy sex cases do not make for good legal arguments, and in fact can make a not-guilty 
verdict more likely. 
Claimant religious tradition, judge characteristics, and the religious contours of the 
immediate area all showed significant patterns as well. 
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Prisoner Cases 
Hypothesis 9:  Religious freedom claims of prisoners are less likely to be supported than 
claims from non-prisoners. 
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect that being a 
prisoner has on the chance of winning a religious freedom issue.  The variable is a simple 
dummy variable where being incarcerated is coded 1 and not being incarcerated is coded 
0.  Here are the clarifying disclaimers:  Those on probation are not considered prisoners, 
nor are those who are being prosecuted for an act committed while they were free, even if 
they are now in prison.
176
  The trial for the crime that put the claimant in jail is not 
considered a prisoner case, as they were free when they committed it.  If convicted at the 
trial phase, the appeal is not considered a prisoner case, minus two exceptions.  The first 
exception is if a new and reasonably independent issue arises in the appeal
177
, and a 
second exception is for separate sentencing trials that occur in capital cases.
178
 
Research done in 1999 found that although federal prisoner cases increased with the 
passing of the federal RFRA, they did not keep up with the rise of overall civil liberties 
cases from the same period.
179
 
Results 
291 votes, or 9% of the dataset, are prisoner cases.  As expected and as supported in 
other research showing that prisoners win at lower rates, their favorable vote-rate here is 
16%.  That is around a third of the overall favorable vote-rate for the dataset. 
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 Hawai’i v. Adler, 2005 Haw. LEXIS 425, while incarcerated, the claimant made the case that his 
cannabis usage prior to being arrested was religious is not here considered a prisoner case. 
177
 An example is Williams v. State of Mississippi, 2000 Miss. App. LEXIS 236, where a drug possession 
conviction appeal has the prosecutor ask the accused if he is Muslim, perhaps to introduce bias.  The appeal 
of that stricken question was considered a prisoner case.   
178
 New Mexico v. Clark, 128 N.M. 119  
179
 Berg, 1999. 
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The prisoners are vastly (96.5%) men, even more so than the 81.4% rate the database 
has, and the difference is significant at the .001 level.  The rate of women incarcerated in 
the states is around 5%, so these numbers are not over representative.
180
  
Prisoner cases appear in increased scrutiny states almost 2 to 1 over non-increased 
states, and the increased state proportion is driven by the judicial states with more than 
70% of the increase state cases. 
Do higher success rates follow the more hospitable judicial states?  Yes, judicially 
increased states protect the religious petitioners 24% of the time, legislative states protect 
them 18% of the time, and no-attempt states protect them 5.6% of the time. 
The difference between the increased and not-increased scrutiny states is highly 
significant, and possibly even understated.  Not only are prisoners quadrupling their odds 
when moving to an increased state court, but it stands to reason that the not-increased 
state cases are the theoretically stronger cases since fewer are being brought to court.
181
 
The integrated increased religious freedom variable clarifies the correlation.  In the 
four categories of least protective states, prisoners won 8% of their votes.  In the 3 most 
protective categories, they won 22% of their votes.  All of these relationships are 
significant at the highest levels. 
Of the known religious traditions, the Other religious category was overrepresented 
by close to a factor of four, with 59% of the prisoner cases, despite having only 15% of 
the overall votes.  Every other religious tradition was underrepresented, due to inflation 
of the Other Religious category.  But interestingly, and against the prediction, the Other 
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 Statistical Abstract of the United States.  116
th
 Edition.  ―No. 351. State Prison Inmates –Selected 
Characteristics: 1986 and 1991‖, p. 219 
181
 This comment makes a number of assumptions, such as religious prisoners are normally distributed and 
there is a winnowing factor to cases brought.  Both of which are logical assumptions. 
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religious actors received higher than the average favorable votes:  21%.  Evangelicals, the 
second most likely religious tradition for claimants in the prisoner cases had the highest 
success rate at 26%.  Between those two traditions, 40 of the 45 overall pro-prisoner 
votes occurred. 
Judge gender, race, and religious tradition all do not show any significant patterns 
with prisoner cases, but judge politics does correlate with vote outcome on prisoner cases 
with a correlation score of .261, which is significant at the .001 level. 
Geography also showed significant correlations with the prisoner votes.  Using a 
North, South, West scheme, the South voted 40% more than their dataset 
votes/population would suggest, and have favorable vote-rate less than half of the 
average: 7%.  Or if one uses a geographical classification with more categories, the 
Southwest, South and Midwest grab 57% of the votes, and vote to protect the prisoners at 
8%.  Those are all significant at the .001 level.   
The conclusions of these results are that prisoners receive substantially less protection 
for their religious behavior, but that a) liberal judges, b) states which have attempted to 
increase religious freedom judicially and c) the Atlantic coast and Pacific Northwest have 
higher rates of favorable votes than judges not in these categories. 
 
Economic Order Cases 
Hypothesis 10: Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money 
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do. 
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of cases 
which ask the courts to award either money or land to the religious actor.  The argument 
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is that awarding a religious actor a symbolic win, without any financial impact on the 
state or city, is more likely to occur than the financially costly court case.   
The money based decisions exclusively concerned the property tax exemption given 
to houses of worship.  The land decisions were more difficult, as there are several types 
of land use cases which are rightly seen as having no cost to the state.  The coding rule is 
then 1 for land use cases which bear cost to the state, all others 0.  Examples of cases 
coded as these economic impact cases include:  all tax exemptions, all zoning regulations, 
suits brought against churches for material and specific damages (i.e. not punitive) 
stemming from their ownership of land, adverse possession (squatter‘s rights) cases, and 
two cases about the safety codes of churches (fire sprinklers) were considered.
182
 
Examples of cases not included in this variable are:  questions of variances on 
steeples, variances to historic preservation ordinances, cemeteries (if no damages are 
sought), sign regulations, codes regulating proselytizing and free speech areas, and 
landlords‘ rights. 
Results 
The variable has 606 economic impact votes, which make up 19% of the dataset, and 
fall in 233 cases.  547 of the votes come in land use cases, and 322 come in tax cases, 
which leave 263 votes overlapping.   
The effect on the dependent variable of these cases was not to decrease it, as 
predicted.  Religious actors did not receive significantly different favorable votes in the 
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 In Peace Lutheran Church and Academy v. Village of Sussex, 2001 WI App 139 (2001) the Village 
pressed for fire sprinklers in a new parochial school for the safety of the inhabitants, but also to reduce the 
Village‘s vulnerability to suits if a catastrophe were to occur. 
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overall economic impact cases (44%), or in land use cases (46%).
183
  But in tax cases, the 
success rate actually rose to 50%, which was significant at the .05 level.  That effect 
though evaporates when instead of looking at votes, the unit of analysis is cases won and 
lost: 49% of cases won in tax contexts in 123 cases.   
When the actual cost of the case was mentioned in the opinion (which occurred in 
only 102 votes cast in 41 cases
184
) there was a non-linear pattern of the lower and higher 
priced cases winning at around 50% and cases seeking a middle value between $5,000 
and $40,000 winning at lower rates.
185
 
The Institutional variables do show that these economic impact cases are brought 
more in the states which attempt to raise religious freedom, but the effect is driven solely 
by the land use cases in legislatively increased states, which also show a negative 
correlation on protective voting.  Judicially increased states and tax cases show no 
significant patterns in appearance or success of votes cast.   
Votes in more expensive cases correlated with the states attempting an increase in 
religious freedom with the moderately strong .234 score.  But that relationship, like 
others here, is driven wholly by the method: judicially attempted states heard the more 
expensive claims and voted at higher favorable rates for those claims.
186
  
Men, who already make up more than 80% of the claimants with a known gender, 
tend to make up even more litigants in these economic impact cases.  But the more 
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 When economic impact and specifically land use votes are aggregated back to whole cases, the results 
do not change:  44% and 46% cases won, respectively. 
184
 The cost variable is a categorical variable where <$5000 is coded 1, $5,000-$40,000 is coded 2 and 
>$40,000 is coded 3. 
185
 A parametric correlation of .208, significant at the .05 level is also supported by an Eta
2
 which is five 
times higher than the R
2
, .129 to .025. 
186
 And even though this is with only 102 votes, it is enough for the pattern to emerge and be corroborated 
with significance at the .01 level. 
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interesting conclusion that has been mentioned above can be drawn here as well: when 
the religious actors are a small group of three or less, the win rate is much lower than 
when the gender could not be collected because of a larger size of the group.  This 
claimant size effect is discussed in the last section of this chapter.  But here, single or 
smaller groups receive protective votes 14.5% of the time in these economic impact 
cases, and religious groups without a coded gender (generally because the litigant was a 
church or large group) succeeded more than three times better at 48%. 
Claimant religious tradition was significantly patterned as Mainline and Evangelical 
Protestants were positively correlated, and the rest of the religious traditions (minus 
Jewish claimants) negatively correlated, all at the .001 level.  Evangelicals also distinctly 
brought the lower cost cases and Jewish claimants brought the higher priced claims.  But 
no significant difference in favorable vote-rate showed up among the traditions. 
Judge race, gender, and religious tradition all failed to show an effect when 
considered in these economic votes.  Judge Politics, as is clearly becoming a pattern, did 
show the pattern of more liberal judges hearing more and voting more protectively for the 
religious claimant.
187
  The liberal judges here appear to be more classically liberal 
(valuing private property over regulation) than liberal in a contemporary sense.   
Geography also had a patterned look: there is a strong Northeast-ward tilt to the 
hearing and pro-religious voting in economic impact cases.  Simplifying the nation into a 
South, North, West scheme, the North has correlation scores over .1 for the economic 
impact variables, as well as cost.  The West has scores lower than -.1 for all of the same 
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 Correlation score of .09, p<.001, for Judge Politics and Economic Impact votes.  That correlation is 
driven almost wholly by the 208 votes at the state supreme court level, as their correlation is .179, p<.001 
and lower level judges show no significant correlation. 
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variables, and both the West and North are significant at the .001 level.  The South has 
moderated, but still negative correlations for the same.  The North‘s favorable vote-rate is 
52%, the South is 33% and the West is 26%. 
The population based variables show that these cases tend to occur in the less 
populated, less religious, but more religiously homogeneous areas, which vote more 
Republican. 
The conclusions drawn from an analysis of the variable are a) the prediction was not 
true as there was little to no difference in success even though these cases impose a clear 
material cost on the polity.  B) These cases were brought more and won more by the 
religious traditions which are closer to a nationwide status quo and which tilt rightward 
when compared to other religious traditions.  C) Politically left leaning judges at the 
higher levels of courts ruled more favorably, and since the cases arose more in the 
Northern states, and in the increased religious freedom states (both of which positively 
and strongly correlate with liberal judges), they had the opportunity to hear more.  
Although that opportunity is tempered by d) the tendency for these cases to be brought 
outside of more populated and Democratic areas. 
 
Conclusions Drawn from Analyzing the Claimant Variables 
All four of the variables have significant patterns that would likely have a dulling or 
distorting effect in the model if not controlled.  Specifically, controlling the Prisoner and 
Claimant-Area Agreement effects allows the more protective votes in judicial states to be 
seen.  Controlling the economic impact votes makes sure the lack of protection in 
legislative states is known.  Deviancy controls help make interpretations of claimant 
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religious tradition easier to read as these strange Catholic and Mainline Protestant effects 
will be bracketed off to the side. 
So to briefly sum up those larger effects, the patterns for minority religious traditions 
largely were as predicted once the variable was tied to local context.  The deviancy 
variable appears to be driven by the sexual scandals that have wracked the Catholic and 
other churches for the last decade or more.  The drug related votes performed very 
differently from the sexually related votes, and make for an uneasy fit.  The prisoner 
variable largely performed as predicted:  lower success rates overall, and the Other 
religious actors are the subject of more than half the votes, yet those actors win more than 
average.  And the economic impact cases show regional, judge and claimant size patterns 
to land use and tax cases, but no overall tendency to vote for religious actors less even 
when they ask for tangible public resources. 
For all four variables, 1) the institutional attempts of the states were significantly 
correlated with the judicial more protective than the legislative states, 2) more liberal 
judges were more protective, 3) geographic region of the country was very significant, if 
in idiosyncratic ways, 4) claimant religious tradition was patterned, and judge religious 
tradition was not. 
 
Legal Reasoning Variables 
The legal reasoning variables are an attempt to capture the possible judge bias behind 
the study‘s case-selection method.  When judges mention the separation of church and 
state, are they priming the reader for a denial of a free exercise issue?  Does a judge‘s 
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mentioning of free speech correlate with civil libertarian rights versus governmental 
license?  These three variables will answer those questions. 
Unfortunately, coding these variables with the precision that would differentiate a 
free speech decision, for example, from decisions which are not formally considered a 
free speech case proved unworkable.  The two ways of attempting the legal 
differentiation of what law controls the decision were a) reading and citing the judge‘s 
logic, or b) using the fact patterns to determine the type of religious liberty case.   
The fact pattern path meant looking for civil liberties groups as litigants and then 
coding that case as a likely establishment issue, or looking for governments as parties 
without civil liberties groups and coding these cases as likely Free Exercise cases.  The 
issue with this was that the Alabama ACLU was the only civil liberties group in the data, 
leaving too little variance to continue using this method.  
Taking it straight from the opinion proved too difficult because of the number of 
cases and lack of clarity in state decisions.  The vast majority of state opinions do not 
clarify in headnotes which laws are controlling, and divining how important the several 
legal points made were to the case was simply outside of my abilities.  And since this is a 
large N study with more than 500 cases individually read and coded, a second attempt is 
unrealistic.  So although this study would be more valuable if these legal variables had 
been more accurately coded, with the limitations inherent in reading a trial opinion from 
an Iowa judge, for example, the variables as constructed must suffice. 
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Free Exercise Clause  
Hypothesis 11: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to 
concentrate free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than 
if it is not. 
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge 
using state or U.S. Free Exercise Clause language in the case.  If the judge recognizes a 
religious freedom question in the case, and that the Free Exercise clause has some power 
in answering that question, it is predicted to be more likely that the religious actor is 
going to be protected than if the religious liberty was not brought up at all.  The framing 
of the foundations for the opinion foreshadow the outcome. 
In a dataset of actors in court seeking protection for their religious act, you expect to 
see plenty of cases where the free exercise clause is brought up.  And that holds true here 
as 1,212 votes (in 26% of opinions) were on cases where that clause, or an equivalent 
concept, was mentioned.
188
  But in more opinions (1,340 votes, 30.4% of opinions), it 
was not explicit.  The missing data account for 702 votes, which makes up 44% of the 
cases. 
The prediction for the variable does not hold true, and in fact, the opposite does.  
Once constitutionally based religious freedom is explicit in a case, the likelihood of a 
negative vote approaches two times higher than the favorable vote.  The favorable vote-
rate for cases with religious freedom explicitly mentioned is 35%, versus a 58% win rate 
for cases without mention of a constitutionally protected civil liberty.   
                                                 
 
188
 The phrasings that were coded as mentionings are ―First Amendment rights to Freedom of Religion‖, 
―The First Amendment rights of the‖ actor, or a ―Constitutional Right of Religious Freedom‖.  Phrasings 
that were coded as both Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion are ―Freedom of Religion‖, ―First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution‖, ―Religion Clauses of the Constitution‖, ―Religious Liberty‖, or 
―Ecclesiastical Abstention‖.  Capitalization was not a consideration.    
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One possible explanation for this is that the states, like the federal courts, tend to vote 
down claims that rely on the Free Exercise clause rather than more current statutes or 
laws.  Imagine the amount of comfort judges would feel with legal arguments resting on 
current statutes and codes, versus the comfort most judges would feel upholding a legal 
argument made with only a less popular clause in a hundred-plus year old state civil 
liberty clause.  It is not too much of a stretch to imagine that the pure Free Exercise 
arguments are legal arguments that judges rarely deal with, seem archaic and anti-
democratic, and therefore tilt toward the legal arguments that are less grandiose.  The 
Free Speech clause strategy itself is based on exactly this:  the notion that the Free 
Exercise clause is not protective, so aim legal arguments toward areas that are more 
respected or controlling.  Or in other words, because judges are less likely to grant 
religious exemptions, phrase the argument as one of viewpoint discrimination.  Judges 
probably feel more comfortable striking laws which regulate expression rather than 
striking regulations which incidentally infringe one‘s supposed religious behavior.  
States which institutionally attempt to increase religious freedom bring up the free 
exercise rights more often, as is expected.  And that is wholly driven by the judicial 
attempt states rather than the legislative attempt states.
189
  Success is also higher in 
institutional states, and more specifically so within the judicially attempted states.
190
   
The occurrence pattern is pronounced in the time-series sets of variables, but the 
success does not follow.  RFRA states bring up this language 15 percentage points more 
after passage, and precedent states 16 percentage points more after the case is handed 
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 23% of Free Exercise mentionings occur in Judicial states, 20% occurs in no-attempt states, and at half 
that rate, 10% of Free Exercise mentionings occur in the legislative states.  P<.001 
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 37% win rate in judicially attempted states, 35% in legislatively attempted states, and 32% in no attempt 
states.  That pattern is significant at the .001 level. 
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down, to 55% and 58%, respectively.  But in the judicial states the success rate drops 
from 40% to 32%.  And worse, the RFRA time-series sees the rate go from 61% in 89 
votes to 36% in 216 votes.  The smaller number of votes in this analysis makes the 
outcomes less precise, but the significance of the direction and strength is clear at the 
.001 level. 
The claimants tilt toward being in the Other religious tradition, which prompts 
attention toward the possible spurious drag on the success rate that can cause.  Free 
Exercise was mentioned in a startling 89% of the votes when the subject was an Other 
religious tradition actor.  The next highest rate came with Mainline Protestants at 48%, 
while Evangelicals and Conservative Non Traditional were also in the 40s.  Catholics had 
the lowest mention rate at 28%. 
And further, Other religious actors won 24% of these votes, which is the lowest rate 
among the religious traditions.  See table 24 below, for details. 
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Table 24  Free Exercise of Religion Reference, Selected Characteristics 
 
Rates at 
which Free 
Exercise 
Issue was 
Raised 
Protective 
Vote-
Rates in 
these 
cases N 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Score 
No Attempt State .47 .31 506  
Increased Scrutiny .57 .37 834  .100*** 
Legislative Attempt .54 .35 255  
Judicial Attempt .58 .37 579  .092*** 
Pre-RFRA .40 .52 89  
Post-RFRA .55 .33 216  
Pre-Precedent .42 .30 94  
Post-Precedent .58 .35 121  
     
Male Litigants .58 .23 634  
Female Litigants .46 .30 99 -.09** 
     
Conservative Non-Traditional .49 .37 94  
Evangelical Protestant .53 .35 347  
Mainline Protestant .45 .70 83 -.050* 
Black Protestant .28 .60 25 -.103*** 
Catholic .39 .41 182 -.156*** 
Jewish .42 .47 45 -.050* 
Other Religious Category .89 .24 300  .321*** 
     
Not Tax Related .56 .35 1298  
Tax Related .17 .24 42 -.238*** 
Not Related to Land Use .55 .35 1180  
Land Use Related .39 .34 160 -.118*** 
     
West Coast .61 .26 205  .064** 
MS Valley .60 .27 247  .067** 
Interior .55 .37 423  
South Atlantic .40 .26 106 -.088*** 
Metroliner .47 .45 359 -.074*** 
     
SMA Adherent Rate   1340 -.039* 
Claimant-Area  
Religious Agreement 
  1084 -.104*** 
     
TOTAL .53  2552  
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). 
***  Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). 
Insignificant correlation results not shown, nor are the redundant correlation scores of both sides of 
a dummy variable. 
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These votes correlate positively with drug related issues (.09***), and negatively with 
tax issues (-.24***) and land use (-.12***) issues. 
Liberal judges did not vote in more free exercise cases, but did vote for them more.   
There is a positive correlation between these free exercise cases and the judge‘s vote 
being a dissent.  That may be because a dissenting vote is a safe time for a judge to favor 
a civil liberty.  In other words, the civil liberty can be cherished without actually allowing 
the religious actor to trump a policy. 
The votes in these cases are occurring more in the West and Midwest, and less so in 
the South and Northeast.  Yet the votes are more favorable toward religious actors in the 
Northeast, and less favorable in the West, and all four of those correlations are significant 
at the .01 level. 
Free exercise cases also find more favorable votes in more populated areas* and areas 
with higher adherent rates*** and more religious homogeneity***.  And there is a clear 
Democratic county tilt toward being more protective of religious actors with positive 
correlations with votes for Gore in 2000, Kerry in 2004, and negative correlations with 
votes for W. Bush in 2000, 2004, and rates of Republican voting in 2000 and 2004, all 
significant at the .001 level.   
After seeing the heightened amount of more significant and stronger than usual 
correlations in the free exercise variable, I decided to run a logistic regression with it as 
the dependent variable for some direction in seeing which of the predictors were stronger 
once the effects were all considered at once.  It was run as a forward, conditional, 
stepwise logit model which essentially picks the strongest predictor from the list of 
variables one at a time until the variables left are no longer adding explanatory power.  
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And the result of that analysis showed similar results: 1) the poor results of the Other 
religious actors, 2) the poor showing of female claimants,
191
 3) the poor showing of tax 
related votes, 4) the smaller but clearer boost from metro adherent rate, 5) the tendency 
for these votes to be against religious actors,
192
 and others.   
These findings tend to support the impressionistic reason offered for why protective 
constitutional language would lead to dismal results for religious actors.  When a judge is 
faced with a case regarding the payment of taxes, and one side relies more heavily on 
common tax code language and notions of individual responsibility while the other side 
uses ―Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion nor the free 
exercise thereof,‖ the results do seem more logical. 
In conclusion, special consideration is warranted with this variable as there appears to 
be many more relationships with the controls and main independent variables than with 
other independent variables.  Since the appearance of free exercise language predicts less 
protection rather than more, the appearance of it with the lesser protected single claimants 
and Other Religious actors makes sense.  As does its lack of appearing in the more 
protective Northeast and with liberal judges, even though those liberal judges still vote 
more protectively when they do use it in the opinion.  Although judges in the increased 
religious freedom states do hear more of these cases and may vote more favorably for 
these religious actors, they still vote significantly less in favor of religious freedom 
claims compared to the overall dataset average.     
 
                                                 
 
191
 Not specifically detailed here.  The analysis of claimant gender did not strike me as powerful as the 
model found. 
192
 The dependent variable Religious Freedom was used as a predictor variable, that is. 
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Establishment Clause  
Hypothesis 12: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern 
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is 
less likely to be supported by the judge than if the separation of church 
and state is not involved. 
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge 
using the state or U.S. [Dis]establishment Clause in the case.  Citing the clause which 
separates church and state
193
 was predicted to be a bad omen for the religious actor.  The 
prediction was based on the logic of a judge choosing a clause to justify a case; if the 
clause is the one which limits religions‘ range instead of the one which protects religious 
acts, the judge was more likely to be establishing why the religious actor did not get his 
or her vote.  Yet as in the Free Exercise variable, the prediction was wrong. 
Establishment issues are raised in more than a quarter (26.7%, 868 votes) of the 
dataset, and 52% of the time the case does not raise an establishment issue, while the 
remaining 21% are missing due to being derived, and inaccessible.  This is as one would 
expect from a dataset of votes from cases where actors seek protection for a religious act:  
6% free expression related, around half free exercise related, and around a quarter 
establishment clause related. 
And to complete the consistent pattern on these legal reasoning variables, it also does 
not behave as the prediction suggests, correlating with, not against, religious actor 
success, and clearly so as the pattern is significant at the .001 level.  When an 
                                                 
 
193
 Phrases which were coded for this variable include ―establishment of religion‖, ―separation of church 
and state‖, and phrases that I found clearly alluded to the inability of governments to intrude in religious 
spheres: ―Excessive entanglement‖, ―ecclesiastical question‖, and ―ministerial exception‖ or synonymous 
phrases.  And the phrasings which were coded both, again are: ―Freedom of Religion‖, ―First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution‖, ―Religion Clauses of the Constitution‖, ―Religious Liberty‖, and ―Ecclesiastical 
Abstention‖. 
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establishment issue is raised, the religious actor gets the favorable vote 56% of the time, 
and all other votes in the dataset with these removed come out at a 40% success-rate.  
That means a religious actor seeing that the establishment clause was used in their 
opinion can expect their probability for success to increase by 40%. 
One large reason that the prediction did not hold here is because this language was 
vastly used in the sexual abuse cases, which were weaker legal cases than average.  
When states attempt to increase religious freedom, establishment language is less 
likely to be used, and this is as the prediction suggests (states supporting the individual 
religious act are less likely to bring up a constraint on their ability to affect regulation.)  
Once establishment language is mentioned, the institutional states show the following 
familiar pattern:  Judicially increased states are significantly more likely to protect the 
actor (61%* favorable vote-rate), legislatively increased states are significantly less likely 
to protect the actor (47%**), and no attempt states show no significant difference. 
The same pattern appears in the time-series variable: establishment language used 
less after increase, and voting less protective in legislative states after, yet more 
protective in judicial states after. 
Claimants again tend to be more male than usual, and be Mainline Protestant, and 
tend not to be Evangelicals or from the Other religious category (but when it was an actor 
from the Other category, the vote correlated with less protection: -.107**).   
Establishment issues arose more in 1) the sexually deviant cases, which makes 
substantive sense as the questions there often involve when and how a government can go 
about the case.  They arose more 2) when there was a dissent in the case, and a same 
logic from above is used here: there is an incentive to use constitutional language in 
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dissents since a dissent is not affecting public policy.  It is a safe place to use the 
grandiose legal reasoning that judges rarely get to use.  Establishment language arose 
more 3) in opinions written by judges from more conservative religious traditions
194
, and 
this makes indirect sense as conservative judges vote with less libertarian sympathies, 
and this language was predicted to be an escape for exactly those situations.  And 
establishment language arose in 4) more populated areas, higher religious adherent rate 
areas,* religiously homogenous areas*, more Democratic areas**, and favorable votes 
followed*. 
Establishment issues also arose more when the free exercise language was used.  It is 
worth pausing here.  How is it that two variables performing strongly in the opposite 
direction from the predictions, and performing in opposite directions, can positively 
correlate with one another?  The factual answer to that is easy: when the clauses appear 
alone, their effect is more intense than when they appear together.  Even though they 
appear together more often. 
Table 25  Comparison and Relationship of Favorable Vote Rates in Opinions 
Mentioning the Establishment and Free Exercise of Religion 
 
Favorable 
Vote Rate N 
Not Establishment Not Free Exercise .54 914 
  Free Exercise .24 773 
  Total .40 1687 
Establishment Not Free Exercise .70 298 
  Free Exercise .49 567 
  Total .56 865 
Total Not Free Exercise .58 1212 
  Free Exercise .35 1340 
  Total .46 2552 
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 Conservative Non-Traditional, Evangelical and Black Protestant judges used Establishment language 
more than the average of 34% of the time for opinions when the judge‘s religious tradition was known.  
73% of CNT opinions, 42% of Evangelical Protestant opinions, and 53% of Black Protestant opinions 
contained separation language, 22, 67, and 17 votes, respectively.     
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The substantive answer to the question is more elusive.  And since this variable is 
both semi-exploratory, as well as simply a control variable for the states-increasing-
scrutiny study variables, the separate study that this interaction effect demands cannot be 
performed here.   
Establishment language tended not to be raised in the economic impact cases (and 
unfavorable votes followed when it did) which is unexpected as the tax abatements and 
zoning claims have separatist notions at their core. 
As in the other legal language variables, judges in the Northeast used this language 
less, but still voted protectively when it was used.** 
Similar to the other legal variables, winning positively correlated with the 
demographic variables the Northeast, religious homogeneity, county population and 
religious adherent rates, but less so than with the other two legal reasoning variables.   
And like most variables, larger claimant groups, and metro-area religious agreement 
were winning contexts here as well.  These cases were more likely to be protective in 
sexual deviance votes (and this makes sense as it is mainly the separation of church and 
state which the Catholic cases relied upon) and with liberal judges casting the vote.  
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Table 26  Establishment Issue Raised Votes, Selected Characteristics 
 
Rate at which 
Establishment 
Issue is 
Raised 
Establishment 
Issue Vote-
Rate N 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Score 
No Attempt .37 .56 406  
Attempt to Increase Religious Freedom  .31 .56 462  
Legislative Attempt .29 .47 139  
Judicial Attempt .32 .61 323  
Not Tax Related .36 .58 831  
Tax Related .15 .30 37  
Not Related to Land Use .39 .58 829  
Land Use Related .10 .31 39  
Not Sexual .31 .53 615  
Sexual .42 .64 253  
Not Drug Related .34 .57 845  
Drug Related .46 .22 23  
CNT .41 .49 78  
EP .22 .57 146  
MP .52 .73 97  
Catholic .35 .54 163  
Other .24 .42 81  
Judge Politics   2052  
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement   2054  
SMA Herfindahl Index   2558 .048* 
County Politics   2558 -.089*** 
TOTAL .34 .56 868  
N 2558    
 
Thus as with the other legal reasoning variables, the basis for constructing the 
variable proved to be questionable as it did not behave in the predicted way.  When 
bringing up the separation of church and state, religious actors found more protection 
than when the opinion brought up the very right of citizens to behave religiously.  But the 
prediction may have had some traction as establishment language was more likely to be 
used in states that did not attempt to increase religious freedom.  And once it was used, 
the judicially increased states again showed the protective tendencies and the legislative 
states again showed a lack of protection.   
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Free Speech Clause  
Hypothesis 13: When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it is 
more likely to be supported than if it is not.  
 
The objective of this variable is to control for and understand the effect of the judge 
using the state or U.S. Free Speech Clause in the case.  As mentioned in the introduction, 
a weakened Free Exercise clause has meant religious actors are searching for successes 
with different civil rights claims that courts continue to uphold with rigor.  So if the judge 
cites a free speech clause as controlling some aspect of the case, a more protective ruling 
is hypothesized.   
The variable was constructed by coding the case 1 if any reference to free speech 
rights (not just the religious actor‘s) were mentioned in the case.  A substantial number, if 
not most of the cases here, had expression rights mentioned in the many precedential 
decisions which are used to support the legal opinion.  These can be binding cases within 
the opinion, or can also simply hope to be persuasive on other points but not binding, also 
called obiter dicta. 
The almost 700 derived cases were not coded either way because the information was 
inaccessible.   
Free speech rights were coded as present or not present in more than ¾ of the votes, 
and were coded as an affirmative mention in only 6% of those instances (151 votes).  For 
those seeking support for the Christian interest group strategy of using the free speech 
clause more, once prisoners and the tangible economic cases are set aside (because those 
were not considered in the theory), that six percent grows to eight.   
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The outcome of these free speech cases does not support or contradict the prediction, 
as they show no significant pattern, but they are negatively correlated with winning the 
vote. 
Within states that attempt to increase religious freedom, free speech is brought up less 
than in no-attempt states, and this decrease is significant at the highest level.  Breaking 
the increased attempt states down to legislative and judicial components finds that both 
retain the pattern, and significantly.
 195
  Vote rates within this categorization of states, 
though, do not show any significant differences. 
Free speech tends to be mentioned in cases with single claimants rather than groups, 
but as is the pattern uncovered here, groups tend to win votes at a much higher rate in 
these cases than single claimants: 59% to 37%.  And that difference is significant at the 
.001 level. 
Evidence of a free speech based Christian legal strategy does find some support in the 
fact that evangelicals make up 48 of the 86 votes when free speech in mentioned and 
when the claimant religion is known.  And further, the favorable vote for the evangelicals 
is 50% .  That makes a pattern which is significant at the .001 level. 
Free speech was significantly more likely to be the subject of a more conservative 
judge‘s vote,196 but it is the more liberal judge that votes more favorably in these free 
speech cases, although not to a significant degree.   
                                                 
 
195
 -.117 correlation score between Free Speech and State Attempt, p<.001, in 2,555 votes.  The scores drop 
to -.07 for the legislative variable and the judicial variable, and the scaled versions also show a negative 
and significant relationship with a -.08 score, all significant at the p<.001 level. 
196
 This effect is limited to the original PAJID scores, which are at the supreme court level.  The score is -
.08, and is significant at the .01 level. 
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The regional pattern, which is closely related to those judge patterns, adds to the 
explanation by showing the use of free speech language as a very significant negative 
correlation with the Northeast.  Or in the simple North-South-West scheme, free speech 
language is related to the regions in this way:  the North is -.05***, the West is .08**, 
and the South is negative, but not significantly.  
And also like the above pattern, the Northeast is significantly more likely to vote for 
the religious actors in those cases: 68% of the time they did, versus 37% for all the other 
regions.
197
 
The broader conclusion of the Free Speech Raised variable is that it is not likely to 
capture any significant pattern of religious actors relying on this aforementioned more-
respected civil liberty post Smith-Boerne rather than using the more immediate Free 
Exercise clause.  There is not a large number of (judge recognized) attempts, nor is the 
surface level success rate any better than normal, and it is brought up more in single 
claimant cases rather than larger claimant groups, which is contrary to what one would 
expect from an interest group strategy.  So at this point there is no support for the 
hypothesis here that when the freedom of expression is mentioned in the opinion, the 
religious actor‘s claim is more likely to be supported than if it were not brought up. 
 
Conclusion of the Legal Reasoning Variables 
The predictions on all three legal opinion-based variables were unsupported.  Or 
better, the simple predictions failed all three times to capture the complex effect that 
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 This pattern was significant at the .01 level.  Although with only 17 successes in 25 votes in the 
Northeast, small sample size disclaimers apply here. 
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occurred when free speech, free exercise and establishment issues were written into the 
opinion. 
Speculating once again on why all three variables did not behave according to the 
logic laid out, it often appeared that the language in these cases was used when describing 
other cases that were used for support of the case at hand.  And one would be tempted to 
write off the variables as so indirect and filled with noise as to be useless.   
But if that is true, what about the amount of significant patterns found throughout the 
variables?  What about the fact that liberal judges and judges from the Northeast hear 
significantly fewer of these cases laden with civil liberties rhetoric, and then vote 
significantly more protective?  What about larger claimant groups appearing in 
significantly fewer, and winning the vote in significantly more?  What about these votes 
significantly occurring more in Democratic areas, or (for two of the three) in more 
populated, religious and religiously homogenous areas? 
It appears that these three variables are capturing a tendency for judges to speak to the 
grander issues raised by a religiously motivated act.  This is supported by judicially 
increased state judges using the language more, and voting most protectively.  Along 
with that, there is a tendency for some to stay away from that grander speech, like larger 
(and perhaps by extension, better funded and more legally strategic) claimant groups, and 
the litigants who simply want to keep a tax exemption or zoning variance.
198
  And 
further, the advantage gained from higher metro-claimant religious tradition agreement is 
not apparent in these cases.  All of this is support for the theory that the judge is voting 
with a keener sense of holding biases in check. 
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 There are negative relationships between all three legal variables and both economic impact variables, 
for six iterations in all, and all are significant at the .001 level. 
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Collected Variables Not Included In The Model 
Judge Gender  
Gender was drawn generally from the first name of the judge.  When the first name 
was not clear or available, further searching was done via the same sources used in the 
party identification variable:  Songer and Spill Solberg lists, CQ Judicial Staff Directory, 
American Bench, Lexis search in the state source, and a Google search.   
78% of judges in the data were male, and only 2% of judges were missing a gender 
coding.  Women do not significantly differ from men in a simple voting comparison.
199
   
Women judges do appear significantly more in the institutionally increased states 
compared to the no-attempt states, 25% to 19% respectively.
200
  Probing that difference 
further finds that it is the judicially increased states that drives the pattern, as women 
make up 26% of the judges there versus the insignificantly different 23% in Legislative 
states.  And even further, the scaled version of the institutionally increased states 
introduced above further supports this pattern, showing the lowest protection category to 
have the lowest rate of female judges, the second lowest protective category to have the 
second lowest rate, and the highest protective category to have the highest rate of women 
judges (minus the category with only 28 votes cast). 
                                                 
 
199
 The literature on female judge voting is not in accord.  Some of the latest work is finding that when 
controlled for party and region, women judges may vote slightly to the left in obscenity and death penalty 
cases.  See Songer, Donald R. and Kelley A. Crews-Meye. 2000. ―Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision 
Making in State Supreme Courts.‖  Social Science Quarterly.  81 (3): 750-762  
200
 Correlation score of .07, p<.001 
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Women tend to adjudicate at the higher appellate levels of the court systems,
201
 and 
tend to self-identify with the Democratic party, and be more liberal.
202
  And again, the 
voting patterns that emerge in this simple description are not significantly different from 
male judge voting patterns.   
Regions are quite patterned as 31% of the judges on the West Coast are female, and 
the lowest rate in the Midwest at 17.6%, both significant at the .001 level. 
Table 27  Characteristics of Female Judges 
 Proportion of 
Female 
Judges 
N 
In States Which Have Not Increased Religious Freedom 19% 1447 
 In Increased Religious Freedom States 25% 1730 
In Judicially Increased States 26% 1182 
In Legislatively Increased States 23% 548 
In First Scaled Category “Most Protective” 32% 155 
In “More Protective” 22% 839 
In Unclear States 20% 1129 
In Last Scaled Category “Rational Basis States” 16% 236 
In Courts of Last Resort 26% 1179 
In Intermediate Appellate Court 20% 1523 
In Trial or District Court 17% 475 
Republican 20% 1023 
Democrat 27% 1324 
In California 31% 191 
In the Northwest 25% 371 
In the Southwest 25% 288 
In the South 19% 573 
In the Midwest 18% 823 
In the Northeast 24% 931 
Overall 22% 3177 
 
                                                 
 
201
 -.08 correlation score with court level (1 highest, 3 lowest), p<.001. 
202
 .07 and .06 correlation scores, p<.001.  Female judges have 3 more PAJID points, on average, which is 
significant at the .01 level. 
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Judge Religious Tradition 
Judge religious tradition was originally to be a control in the model.  Although 
collection of this information is more difficult than it used to be,
203
 712 identifications 
were coded. 
The information that was collected was done so through the same avenues as the 
judge‘s political identification.  When a religious identification was found, a 1 was coded 
in that religious tradition, and a zero was coded in the 7 other traditions.
204
   
456 of the 712 positive identifications come from the second level of courts, 96 from 
the lowest level, and 160 from the highest state court.   
The most interesting finding from this variable is just how much a judge‘s religion 
appears not to differentiate him or her from other judges.  When the judges are lined up in 
the ad hoc conservative to liberal faith system ordering mentioned in the judge politics 
section above (CNT, EP, MP, BP, Catholic, Jewish, LNT, Other), the correlation with 
protective voting is not significant, and not even pointed in the predictable direction (-
.056, .134 sig.). 
When judges vote on a member of their own religious tradition, the outcome was a 
49.6% success rate in 123 votes, which is not significant.  When specific issue areas are 
                                                 
 
203
 A librarian at the National Center for State Courts attributed the decreasing availability of that 
information to a general reluctance to publicize one‘s religion after September 11, 2001.  Speculating 
further, it also seems likely that the declining social or public benefits of belonging to a denomination since 
the middle of the 20
th
 century could contribute to the decrease.  Not only was atheism more shunned then 
than now, but publicizing one‘s religious affiliation served as a social networking tool in more ways than 
commonly seen today.  See Robert Wuthnow‘s The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith 
Since World War II  New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1988. 
204
 An exception to the rule is when Liberal Non-Traditional judges were coded as 0 in CNT and 
Evangelical categories, but left missing in all others.  This is because more liberal belief systems are more 
likely to have believers who claim multiple systems. 
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correlated with this lineup, favorable voting is positively correlated with a known 
religious identification, but not significantly so. 
Table 28  Judge Religious Tradition Characteristics 
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Judge‟s Pro-Vote-Rate Mean .64 .45 .43 .67 .43 .32 .50 .50 
  N 22 84 255 18 247 74 4 8 
          
No Attempt Mean .20 .50 .03 .18 .08 .07 .00 .02 
  N 315 315 316 315 315 315 315 316 
Increased Scrutiny States Mean .10 .30 .02 .48 .13 .00 .01 .01 
  N 396 392 392 392 392 396 396 392 
Legislative Attempt Mean .16 .31 .03 .38 .18 .01 .01 .00 
  N 121 120 120 120 120 121 121 120 
Judicial Attempt Mean .07 .29 .01 .53 .10 .00 .01 .01 
  N 275 272 272 272 272 275 275 272 
          
TOTAL Mean .14 .38 .03 .35 .10 .03 .01 .01 
  N 711 707 708 707 707 711 711 708 
The N of “Judge‟s Pro-Vote-Rate” is limited to only that religious tradition, while the N of the other rows is the 
number of all judges with a religious identification.  The TOTAL rows are not uniform because coding for 
Liberal Non-Traditional was not exclusive.  See footnote 204 above. 
 
The judges are roughly evenly split between the increased scrutiny states and others, 
56% to 44%, which fits almost perfectly the amount of votes cast that occur in the 
increased scrutiny states versus the others, 55% to 45%. 
The religious judges in the increased contexts do not vote inordinately more or less 
protective than the non-religious identified judges. 
It should be noted that when judge religious traditions are singled out and examined, 
significant differences can be found.  But since those differences appear to regress to the 
mean with more votes, this analysis of all of the judges‘ religious traditions ends up 
showing similarities more than differences.   
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Claimant Gender 
The gender of the religious actor was collected and coded 1 for females, males 0.  
When the religious actor(s) was a church or organization or too numerous, no gender was 
coded.  Since coding multiple actors presents statistical difficulties, and since there were 
only 19 vote contexts that fit this description, those cases were discarded for this variable. 
Only 17% of the known gender votes were cast with women as claimants, and with 
around half of the data unknown on the gender variable, only 8% of the database is a 
known vote on a woman claimant. 
Women claimants tended to not be the subject of a vote on a deviancy case, prisoner 
case, or any of the three legal language cases.  Women tended to win more often than 
men, and tended to show up in the increased scrutiny states more often.  Women 
claimants had a negative correlation with the West Coast, and a positive correlation with 
the Northeast.  And women claimants saw no bump in the successful vote-rate from 
women judges. 
 
Claimant Size 
During the data collection, claimant size actually was not coded.  But during the 
analysis, it appeared to be a meaningful way of understanding some of the patterns that 
were emerging.  Since claimant gender was collected only when there were three or 
fewer claimants, a claimant size variable which codes larger than three claimants 1, and 
smaller numbers of claimants 0 was constructed. 
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Claimant groups conveniently come close to halving the data, with 53% of votes on 
groups with less than three claimants, and 47% on groups with more than three.  The vast 
majority of larger groups were churches. 
One of the most interesting findings of the study is that groups with more than three 
claimants won 58% of their votes, while groups of three or fewer won 33% (p<.001).   
This phenomenon occurs slightly more in the increased scrutiny states, but is wholly 
driven by the legislative states rather than the judicial, as the judicial states see less of the 
phenomenon than average.  And further, the scaled judicial variable sees a negative 
correlation at a significant level. 
Institutional context does not make a significant difference to voting here: 57%, 57%, 
58% for no-increase contexts, legislative, and judicial contexts, respectively.  But the 
smaller claimant size does show a significant pattern to voting and context.  34%, 26%, 
35% are the rates from no-increase, legislative and judicially increased contexts, 
respectively.  Which makes a recurring difference (a less protective scenario in the 
legislatively increased states) that is significant at the .05 level.  
Also related to claimant size is the amount of metro-claimant religious agreement.  
Larger claimant groups are the subject of votes in contexts of more agreement (32%) than 
smaller groups (26%).  This relationship, though, might be slightly tautological though as 
claimant size is directly tied to a church being the claimant, and area agreement is also a 
function of churches.  And significant relationships between a claimant religious tradition 
and claimant size have this same tautological possibility.  Yet the results show what 
would likely be predicted: Catholics, Mainliners and LNT tend to go to court in larger 
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groups, and tend to win more.  CNTs and Other religious believers tend to go singly, and 
to lose the vote more often, and the correlations for these are very strong.
205
   
There are strong correlations between liberal judges and claimant size,
206
 but the 
related regional correlations are significant as well, and likely covary here.  Weaker 
patterns of correlating with Democratic areas show up at the .05 level. 
 
Judicial Selection System 
Research on judicial selection systems has shown that they are realistically not very 
meaningful to case outcomes.
207
  But the data here present an opportunity to see if on 
religious matters the theoretical, if not supported, differences among the systems show 
some variance.  The five general methods for choosing judges in the states, ordered from 
most democratic to least are: partisan elections, gubernatorial or legislative appointment, 
nonpartisan elections, combined appointment with merit selection, and a solely merit 
selection system.   
To briefly describe the variable, votes appear to be close to normally distributed 
among the selection systems with Combined Merit systems owning the highest 
percentage of votes with 25%, and the formalized Gubernatorial and/or Legislative 
Appointment systems with the smallest amount at 16%. 
In this model, judicial selection systems could be expected to allow more majoritarian 
outcomes in states with the more democratic selection systems.  Majoritarian outcomes 
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 CNT: -.146, Other Religious Tradition: -.340, Mainline Protestant: .137, Catholic: .285.  All significant 
at the .001 level.  LNT: .066, p<.01. 
206
 .133, p<.001 correlation with Judge Politics.  And the regional score are .09, p<.001 for the North, -.07, 
p<.001 for the South, and -.05, p<.01 for the West. 
207
 See Harry Stumpf‘s excellent judicial selection system literature review in chapter five in his American 
Judicial Politics.  2
nd
 Ed.  1998.  NJ: Prentice Hall. 
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can look either like the vote upholding local policy against a religious exemption, or it 
could be higher levels of area-claimant religious agreement in winning votes versus 
losing votes. 
The first hypothesis regarding majoritarian outcomes gets some support here as the 
only two selection systems which show a significant (p<.05) pattern are partisan and 
nonpartisan elections, and both of them are negatively correlated with pro-religious 
freedom voting. 
The second hypothesis regarding more area-claimant religious agreement in the 
systems more open to democratic pressure finds support as well.  The most majoritarian 
system has the highest level of agreement, the second-most majoritarian has the second 
highest agreement, and two of the following three systems show the same pattern with 
only the most insulated system (Merit) breaking the pattern by having around an average 
amount of agreement.  This overall pattern is significant at the .001 level. 
Another way of corroborating this hypothesis of judicial selection system allowing 
more or less local control is by looking at the judges themselves in their systems.  If the 
judge‘s religious tradition looks more like the area religious tradition in the more 
democratic system, then that is considered support for this hypothesis.   
Expected patterns here do not emerge.  As table 29 below shows, there are significant 
patterns, but the three relationships are in the opposite direction than the prediction:  less 
agreement among the political appointment and more agreement among the merit 
systems. 
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Table 29  Judicial Selection System, Select Correlations 
Type of Judicial 
Selection System 
Protective 
Vote Rate 
State Institutional Attempt To Restore 
Religious Freedom  Claimant- 
Area 
Religious 
Tradition 
Agreement 
% of County 
Agreeing 
with Judge 
Party ID 
Attempted 
Religious 
Freedom 
Restoration 
Legislative 
Attempt 
Judicial 
Attempt 
Partisan election .47* .52*** .32*** .20*** .32* .52 
Gubernatorial or 
Legislative 
Appointment 
.46 .21*** .03*** .18*** .32** .45*** 
Nonpartisan election .41* .72*** .00*** .72*** .27* .52 
Combined Merit .43 .68*** .24*** .44*** .25*** .54** 
Merit .48 .50* .22** .28*** .29 .56*** 
Total .45 .55 .17 .37 .29 .52 
***  Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
States 
Do the institutional responses of states correlate with each state‘s favorable voting 
records?  The answer is no.  If you look at all the votes in the states prior to their 
institutional attempt to increase, and compare those votes to the votes that come after the 
state hopes to increase religious freedom, not only is there is not an increase in 
protection, there is a decrease.  And further, the decrease is significant at the .01 level.   
This information is largely covered in the time-series version of the institutional 
variables. 
States that will eventually try to increase religious freedom have a 50% winning 
percentage in 678 votes before the institutional attempt, and a 42% vote-rate in the 723 
votes after the attempt.   
A closer look shows that most of that variance is due to the legislative states rather 
than the judicially increased ones.  Before passing a state RFRA, those states (and DC) 
voted for religious actors 53% of the time, and after passage, 41% of the time.  Judicially 
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increased states had a 48% winning vote percentage before the more protective landmark 
case was handed down, and a 44% vote-rate after. 
One possible emerging reason for the legislative decrease which is three times larger 
may be an antagonism that exists between the judicial and legislative branches like that 
which existed at the federal level.  The language used in the national RFRA in 1993 was 
unwisely harsh toward the Smith decision, and the judicial response to that harsh 
language in Boerne was itself overreaching.
208
   
A second possibility is that the state RFRAs are covered in the local media not as 
increases in civil liberties, but instead as opportunities for sensationalism.  Stories about 
religious minorities trumping democratic policy are likely to sell more newspapers and 
stop more channel surfers than will stories about a strengthened religious liberty.  And if 
this is so, state courts, with less insulation from democratic majorities, are more likely to 
see a negative effect due to that reporting which makes the law unpopular. 
This second possibility can get support by looking at the states with a judicial 
selection system that is more democratic, and seeing if that is where the effect came 
from.  When legislative state success rates were compared to the judicial state success 
rates within each selection system, the result is no support for the hypothesis.  Legislative 
states find most of their variance in the states with merit selection systems rather than 
partisan elections or gubernatorial/legislative systems.
209
  RFRA states with the more 
democratic judicial selection system, prior to passage, protected religious actors 49% of 
                                                 
 
208
 As evidenced by the effective nullification of the separation of powers language in the decision.  The 
remaining effect of Boerne is solely in the relationship between states and federal government. 
209
 To be sure, this assumption here is not that merit systems are immune to democratic pressure, but that 
they are more immune to the pressure that would come from a grassroots unease that this media tendency 
would provoke.  
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the time.  After passage, those same states protected religious actors 42% of the time.  
But the RFRA states with merit systems saw a larger decrease in protection: from a 57% 
protective vote-rate to 44%, and in 154 and 311 votes, respectively, the difference is 
significant. 
Judicial states vote without any significant effect from the selection system in this 
matter. 
 
Region 
The fifty political geographical variables will be used where appropriate, but 
understanding geographical patterns through larger regions can highlight tendencies that 
might be lost with 50 units.  So creation of several variables based on regions of the 
country was done for exploratory purposes.  Three sets of regional variables were 
created.  The first is a simple North, South, West classification.  The North and South are 
separated in the same way they were during the Civil War but with Oklahoma added, and 
the line separating them from the West goes North on the West side of Texas and Kansas, 
and the East side of Nebraska, North and South Dakota.  See the map below. 
 
A second set of geographical variables separates the nation into six regions: the 
Northeast, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest, the Northwest which includes Alaska 
and Hawaii, and California. 
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The third set of geographical variables attempts to capture the political differences 
better than the two previous.  The five regions created here by Michael Barone in an 
introduction for the 1998 Almanac of American Politics
210
 are the Metroliner Northeast 
(Barone‘s creative term to add Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland to the Northeast), 
the South Atlantic, the Mississippi Valley stretching from Louisiana and Alabama to 
Minnesota to Ohio, the Interior which stretches from Texas to Idaho and includes Alaska, 
and the Pacific Rim which also includes Hawaii.  Each region encompasses around a 
sixth of the population except the Mississippi Valley which has around a third of the 
nation‘s population, and each region also has a political underpinning which justifies the 
grouping.  Metroliners are the base of the Democratic party, and the South Atlantic is 
deeply religious, anti-union, and growing.   The Mississippi Valley is largely the ballast 
of the nation with a populist flavor in both Democratic and Republican voters.  The 
interior is driven by ―local interests over federal control‖.  The Pacific Rim is ―the 
homeland of America‘s computer creativity and its connection with the surging East 
Asian economies‖, and also a less tradition-laden view of Republicanism embodied by 
Ronald Reagan. 
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 Barone 1997, which was adapted from Barone‘s and Grant Ujifusa‘s introduction to the 1998 Almanac 
of American Politics.  I reference the National Journal version.  Barone puts ―up-state New York‖ into the 
Mississippi Valley region, but separating states was not done in this study. 
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Population is not well represented, as the Interior and Northeast each have around 
30% of the votes in this dataset.  The Northeast has a population 275% higher than 
California, for a specific example.  But with those differences in mind, the rates statistics 
from these more socially and politically congruous groupings can perhaps capture more 
of the tendencies sought after in the analysis. 
  
160 
Table 30  Characteristics of Geography 
 
Favorable 
Vote Rate 
Judge 
PAJID,  
0 (Cons.) 
-100 
(Liberal) 
Chances a Vote 
Occurs Under 
an Institutional 
Attempt To 
Increase 
Religious 
Freedom 
Scaled 
Institutional 
Protective 
Rate  
-3 (Least)  
to 3 (Most 
Protective) 
Average 
Context 
Religious 
Adherent-
Rate 
Average 
Context 
Religious 
Homogeneity 
Rate  
0 (hetero.) – 
100 
(homogeneity) 
Pacific Rim .40 56.4** .40** -1.04** 0.39** 0.06** 
MS Valley .37** 33.3** .40** -.83** 0.52** 0.12** 
Interior .45 45.1** .52   .00** 0.50** 0.10** 
South Atlantic .43 37.6** .62** -.43** 0.41** 0.06** 
Metroliner .51** 66.0** .68** .61** 0.56** 0.16** 
Average .45 50.0 .54 -.13 0.50 0.11 
       
South .43 35.5** .45** -.48** 0.48** 0.10** 
West .40** 47.6** .37** -1.17** 0.44** 0.09** 
North .48** 58.7** .67** .51** 0.53** 0.13** 
Average .45 50.0 .54 -.13 0.50 0.11 
       
California .47 53.4* .15** -1.70** 0.43** 0.09** 
Northwest .34** 51.5 .60* -.79** 0.42** 0.07** 
Southwest .45 31.2** .43** -.26 0.52** 0.14** 
South .42 36.1** .39** -.72** 0.46** 0.10** 
Midwest .44 47.2** .59** .11** 0.49** 0.09** 
Northeast .51** 66.0** .68** .61** 0.56** 0.16** 
Average .45 50.0 .54 -.13 0.50 0.11 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
It would be difficult to overestimate the importance or explanatory power of 
geography in this dataset (and that goes for social research in general, as well.) 
 
Levels of Courts 
The three levels of courts recognized here are the court of last resort, the intermediate 
appellate court, and the trial or district court, coded 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
The votes are not distributed normally, with 36% in the supreme courts, 47% in the 
intermediate appellate courts, and 17% in the lowest court.  Within the lowest level, 87% 
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of the votes were derived from parent cases, leaving 70 votes (and 70 cases, since each 
case had one judge) that were original. 
The lowest level voted for the religious actor more, with a 48% success rate versus 
the 43% at level two, and 46% at level one, but the difference is not significant. 
The institutional variables show a significant and strange pattern with the level of 
court: the intermediate appellate level is the more institutionally protective level.  48% of 
supreme court votes and 49% of lower court votes occur in institutionally increased 
contexts, but the intermediate appellate votes occur in these contexts significantly more 
often at 61% of the time.
211
  This likely has to do with the dates of the intermediate 
appellate courts being a bit later than the COLR, and much later than the district court 
votes.  And with time comes more adoptions of increased scrutiny. 
It is the legislatively increased states that account for most of the difference as it is 
their appellate courts which have a doubled increased-scrutiny rate compared to the other 
levels of courts.  Judicial states also show an increase in level 2 cases over levels 3 and 1, 
but not significantly.   
And yet the voting in those intermediate appellate contexts is less protective with a 
43% vote-rate, for a difference that is significant at the .05 level.  And again it is the 
legislatively increased states that drive the outcome.  Their favorable vote-rate at the 
intermediate appellate level of 39% drags down the overall, as the judicial states vote at 
45% which leaves the average at 43%.   
Claimant characteristics show several significant correlations with level of court.  
There is a negative relationship between claimant size and level of court, with 
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 That 25% increase is significant at the .001 level, one-tailed test. 
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significance at both the lowest level and highest.
212
  This is likely a function of the higher 
success rate of larger claimant groups.  Once a claimant is satisfied with the decision, 
they do not pursue it further, and if they are a larger group with presumably better 
counsel, they are not taken further by the opposing side as much.   
Votes on prisoners and sexual deviancy are resolved at lower levels and votes on 
taxes, higher priced issues, and establishment issues appear significantly more at the 
highest level. 
It is counter-intuitive that supreme court decisions occur in less populated contexts 
than both intermediate appellate and trial court decisions, and by a factor larger than two.  
This is due to Albany being the capital of New York, and Springfield of Illinois, and 
Sacramento of California, among others.  And since more populated areas are also the 
areas with higher adherent-rates, supreme court decisions occur in less religious areas as 
well.  And yet supreme court decisions still occur in Democratic leaning areas.
213
  
 
Education, Public and Private 
The dataset includes a variable on whether the vote was education related, and if so, 
whether it was a public or private education question.  These data were collected because 
many of the U.S. Supreme Court religious liberty (if establishment clause specific) cases 
have been at this intersection of private faith and public institution.   
Around half of the education cases coded here were of a) non-custodial parents 
adjudicating their responsibility for private school bills, b) school responsibility for 
sexual abuse cases, or c) teacher free exercise rights and other individually based cases.  
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 The correlation between claimant size and trial/district courts is .05**, and between claimant size and 
the supreme court is -.07***. 
213
 -.10*** correlation with County W. Bush Vote Rate 2000, as well as 2004. 
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The other half does capture the church state nexus that was expected: financial 
responsibility for shared resource programs between city and religious body, ability to 
regulate school inoculation, unemployment and labor law policies, and more. 
338 of the 3,254 votes were education related, and 82% of them concerned a private 
school, 38% involved public schools, leaving 69 votes regarding both. 
The votes tilting positive for overall education cases, negative for public education 
cases and positive for private education cases, yet neither are significant. 
The states in which these occurred were not significantly patterned overall, but some 
pattern exists in the interaction.  Private education cases occur more in states which 
attempt to increase religious freedom,
214
 and voting is consistently more protective in 
these same states, even after considering the method of increase.
215
   
Government Employee 
Because there seemed to be plenty of cases of governmental employees seeking 
protection for an act, I created a variable and began coding for it.  In the end, 377 votes 
were cast on questions regarding public employees.  The employees in question were 
primarily jurors and prosecutors, and other actors were judges, teachers, and police 
officers, a fireman and a city councilor.  The prosecutor and juror cases were mainly 
about the propriety of a Biblical reading or preemptory strikes for religious reasons.  
Teachers were kept solely in the public education variable. 
The favorable vote-rate in these cases was 53%, which is significantly higher than 
average.  These cases, like the education cases, also strongly tended to occur in the states 
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 Correlation scores of .05**, -.05** and .04*, respectively. 
215
 Success rate of private education related religious actor in Legislative states: 34%, in Judicial states: 
43% and in No attempt states; 62%.  The three of these are significant at the .05 level with 56, 102 and 116 
votes, respectively. 
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which have not attempted to increase religious freedom.  And also like the education 
cases, the protective vote-rates were higher in those non-increase states.
216
 
Judges who voted on these cases tended to be more conservative, and more 
conservative judges offered more protection to these actors.
217
 
The cases occur more in higher population areas and Democratic areas, and in the 
South and in California.
218
  And California and the South were significantly more 
protective (59% and 68% successful vote-rates, respectively), but the Northeast, where 
the cases appeared at significantly lower rates, also receive significantly lower protection 
(41% vote-rate, versus their average 51%, and the overall average of 45%.) 
 
Conclusions On The Control Variables 
The Judge and Community variables are clearly the strongest and clearest of the 
control variables.  Their effect is straight-forward: left-leaning counties, liberal judges, 
more adherents and more religious homogeneity all provide a more hospitable context for 
a religious litigant.  However, left-leaning politics does have an ambiguous relationship 
with the attempt to increase religious freedom (legislatively increased states tend to be 
more Republican.) 
The Claimant and Case Characteristic variables should be handled individually.  The 
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement variable appears strong, and has a curvilinear shape 
of being highest and lowest in the increased states (legislatively and judicially increased, 
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 The favorable vote-rate for the ―rational basis‖ and ―static state‖ categories was 61% in 243 votes, 
versus the vote-rate for the two most protective categories at 26.5% in 64 votes. 
217
 PAJID average for these votes is 6.5 points more conservative than overall average in these 328 votes, 
and winning PAJID average is 2+ points more conservative than the PAJID average votes against the 
religious actor.  Both significant at the .001 level. 
218
 All four contexts have increased appearances, significant at the .001 level. 
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respectively), and average in the no-attempt states.  The Prisoner variable is predictably a 
low winner, but very responsive to the increased states.   
The Deviancy variable, though, is ambivalent.  Sexual issues appear to be difficult 
convictions to get, and drug related deviancy are tough winners (but getting outside of 
pro-religious freedom states can more-than-triple your chances.)  And the Economic 
Impact variable simply does not appear to have the effect one might reason it would. 
The Legal Reasoning variables all performed against expectations.  Separation of 
church and state was generally not used as a rationale in votes against, and free exercise 
and speech were not used as a rationale in votes for religious actors.  Instead, the clear 
patterns appear to be pointing to a seriousness or gravity of the issue lessening the effect 
of other predictors.  When judges use constitutional language and lines of precedent, 
other usual sociological explanatory factors lose much of their strength. 
In the next chapter, the model laid out in the preceding pages is run and analyzed. 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
MODEL ANALYSIS 
 
To clarify a common issue in modeling, a logit model differs from a logistic 
regression only very slightly (if at all, actually.
219
)  The difference, to be exact, is in the 
two ways of expressing the outcome.  If in interpreting the model one refers to the logit 
coefficient, then it is a logit model.  If instead the coefficients are transformed into 
probabilities, then it is thought of as a logistic regression.
220
  This slight difference is 
inflated by different perceptions of the models among researchers
221
, and a difference in 
the software.  SPSS, for instance, has two different places for the two models.  Logistic 
regressions are located under the Regressions menu option, and Logit is located under the 
Loglinear option.  And the different limitations and outputs of each tend to play to the 
differences in perceptions.
222
  And all of this occurs while statisticians wonder what all 
the hullabaloo is about.
223
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics 
The software package used for this study (SPSS) has multicollinearity diagnostics, 
although for regressions that were located only in the linear regression menu option.  So 
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 The two Wikipedia entries on logit and logistic regression are, as of this writing, being questioned as 
redundant.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Logistic_regression 
220
 Liao, Tim Futing.  Interpreting Probability Models: Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear 
Models.  Sage Publishing.  Number 101. 1994  p.11-12 
221
 Pampel 2000.  The difference between researchers who are drawn to the certainty offered by crosstab 
and ANOVA based models versus the realism offered by continuous outcomes of linear regressions. 
222
 SPSS limits the number of independent variables to 10 in logit models, but is unlimited in logistic 
models.  And further, in logit models continuous variables have to be entered in a different way and are 
handled differently than in the logistic regression. 
223
 Liao (1994) goes on to couple the terms together and refer to them both as logit for the rest of the book.  
P.12 
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although these come from that option, the statistics closely approximate the same 
tolerance and value inflation factor test scores that would result in the logistic regression. 
Multicollinearity here is going to be multicollinearity there, in other words. 
Table 31  Collinearity Diagnostics for Judge & Community Variables 
 
  
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement .917 1.091 
 Judge Politics .979 1.022 
 Metro-Area Adherent Rate .987 1.013 
 Metro-Area Herfindhal Index .986 1.014 
 County Voting .982 1.019 
a  Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Religious Actor Vote Outcome, Land Use, Deviant Drug, Prisoner, 
Free Exercise Issue Raised, Deviant Sexual, Establishment Issue Raised, Taxes 
b  Dependent Variable: Integrated, Scaled Variable with Amici Adjustment 
 
The values all look good, here.  Claimant-Area Religious Agreement has the lowest 
tolerance, yet is still offering more than 90% of a new explanation.   
The Eigenvalues and corresponding Condition Index do show that there is 
redundancy on two variables entered into the model once all 14 are entered.  And as the 
model is run as the appropriate logistical regression, a stepwise method of regressing that 
will address these redundancies will be chosen as a way of insulating the model from the 
ill-effects.
224
 
 
The Results 
The Loglinear Logit Model 
The logit model shows that the model is indeed explaining enough of the variance to 
be considered a ―well-fitting‖ model, as the Pearson Chi-square and Likelihood Ratios 
are insignificant. 
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 Looking ahead to the model that will eventually be the fruit of the study, the Eigenvalues and Condition 
Index and Variance Proportions all indicate low/acceptable levels of collinearity. 
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The two measures of association, entropy and concentration, show that the model 
accounts for .164 and .190 of the dispersion, respectively.  These measures are similar to 
a linear regression‘s R2 statistic. 
The parameters in the model which are significant at the .05 level listed below. 
Table 32  Loglinear Logit Model Results 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Parameter 
Estimate 
or logit 
Std. 
Error Z Sig. 
[ReligProtected = 1] * ClaimantReligAgreement -1.394 .685 -2.036 .042 
[ReligProtected = 1] * CountyVoteRepublican -3.418 1.486 -2.300 .021 
[ReligProtected = 0] * [EstablishmentClMentioned = 0] .976 .174 5.624 .000 
[ReligProtected = 0] * [FreeExerciseMentioned = 0] -1.450 .156 -9.286 .000 
[ReligProtected = 0] * MetroAdherentRate 9.459 2.942 3.215 .001 
[ReligProtected = 1] * MetroAdherentRate 9.003 1.996 4.512 .000 
[ReligProtected = 0] * [JudicialScaled = -1] 1.426 .437 3.259 .001 
[ReligProtected = 0] * [JudicialScaled = 1] .908 .327 2.774 .006 
[ReligProtected = 0] * [LegisIncrease = 0] .426 .181 2.346 .019 
[ReligProtected = 0] * MetroHerfindahlIndex -13.429 4.246 -3.162 .002 
[ReligProtected = 0] 2.117 1.306 1.621 .105 
Model: Multinomial Logit 
Design: Constant + ReligProtected + ReligProtected * ClaimantReligAgreement + ReligProtected * 
CountyVoteRepublican + ReligProtected * Deviantbehavior + ReligProtected * EstablishmentClMentioned + 
ReligProtected * FreeExerciseMentioned + ReligProtected * Prisoner + ReligProtected * MetroAdherentRate 
+ ReligProtected * MetroHerfindahlIndex + ReligProtected * JudgePolitics + ReligProtected * JudicialScaled 
+ ReligProtected * LegisIncrease 
Note: There were four variables with values that were percentages which had to be transformed into whole 
numbers for the more intuitive coefficient to be interpretable in the model.  Those four variables were 
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement, Metro-Area Adherent-Rate, Metro-Area Herfindahl Index (homogeneity 
measure), and County Majortarianness (effectively the Republican vote-rate).  The transformation was 
simply multiplying each by 100 to turn the percentage into a whole number. 
 
Writing directly on the research question, two of the 12 possible parameters for the 
Scaled Judicial Variable do have a significant effect even after controlling for all the 
other influences.  Specifically, when a vote is cast in the least protective judicial context, 
the odds of an unprotective vote increase by log odds ratio of 1.43, or better, by a factor 
of 4.26.  So the win-rate, as was detailed in the descriptive chapters, drops from 55% 
generally to 19% in the judicially declared rational basis category, all things being 
equal.
225
  Likewise, the ―least protective judicial increase‖ category increases the odds of 
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 19% is transformation of the 4.26 odds to a probability. 
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an unprotective vote by the log odds ratio of .908, which puts the odds at 2.48, which 
lowers the probability of a win to 28.5%, all things equal.  And lastly, no legislative 
increased scrutiny means an increase in the odds of an unprotective vote of 1.53. 
The parameter with the largest effect on the model occurs when Free Exercise is not 
mentioned in unprotective cases, as measured by the Z-score.  An interpretation of that 
parameter is when Free Exercise is not mentioned, the odds of an unprotective vote 
decrease by a factor of 1.45.  Despite the double negative and suggestion of a lack of an 
effect, the model shows this vacuum-like effect to be the strongest in the model.  The lack 
of establishment language in the vote‘s opinion increases the odds of an unprotective 
vote, and is the second most influential parameter in the model.  See Table 25 for a 
simpler visual of this effect. 
When both languages appear in a decision, the effect is somewhat.  It is only when 
they occur separately that the strong positive and negative effects occur. 
In the logit model, five of the seven significant parameters occur with covariates 
(continuous variables) rather than factors (discrete variables.)  Covariate interpretation is 
at a disadvantage in loglinear logit models as the specific values of each cell are a) 
arithmetic means calculated by the software, which b) means that the shape or variance of 
the variable is altered, and c) is not transparent in the results, so the distortions are not 
open to analysis.  Thus, the parameters for covariates are better used as controls on the 
main factor variables studied rather than as independent variables in their own rights.
226
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 Help on this interpretation was received from G. David Garson‘s excellent ―Quantitative Research in 
Public Administration‖ class website, http://www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logit.htm. 
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The Partial Correlation 
A partial correlation is the second method for seeing the direction and strength of 
relationship between two variables (religious freedom and state attempt to increase that) 
after controlling for the effect of other variables (all of the control variables.)
227
   
The following tables 33 and 34 are the results of the correlations, in a truncated form, 
which shows columns only for the dependent variable, state attempt to increase, 
legislative attempt, and judicial attempt. 
The first table below is the controlled correlation with missing information excluded 
only from each pair of variables being correlated.  The three correlation scores in bold 
type, centered at the bottom of the table, are answers to the research question.  When all 
of the variables discussed in this dissertation are controlled, the legislative, judicial and 
integrated, scaled version of the attempt to increase scrutiny all failed to reach 
significance. 
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 The control method is by determining which variance is predicted by the control variable on each 
correlated variables, and extracting those predicted values.  Hays 1994, 675. 
  
171 
Table 33  Partial Correlation Version of Model 
Missing Cases Excluded Pairwise 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
 
D.V. 
Favorable 
Vote 
Outcome 
Legislative 
Attempt at 
Increasing 
Religious 
Freedom 
Judicial 
Attempt at 
Increasing 
Religious 
Freedom 
n
o
n
e
     
    
DEP. VARIABLE Favorable Vote Outcome 1.000 -.016 .013 
Legislative Attempt at Increasing Rel. Freedom -.016 1.000 -.355(**) 
Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom .013 -.355(**) 1.000 
Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny  .035 .343(**) .518(**) 
Claimant-Metro Religious Agreement  .142(**) .109(**) -.128(**) 
  Deviant Act was Sexual .121(**) .025 .051(**) 
  Deviant Act was Drug Related -.065(**) .011 .005 
  Claimant is a Prisoner -.181(**) .012 .048(**) 
  Case is Related to Taxes .037(*) .026 .000 
  Case is Related to Land Use .006 .059(**) .002 
  Free Speech Mentioned -.019 -.069(**) -.067(**) 
  Establishment Issue Raised .156(**) -.048(*) -.024 
  Free Exercise Issue Raised -.233(**) .012 .092(**) 
  Judge Politics (Liberal) .062(**) -.093(**) .373(**) 
  Metro-Area Adherent Rate .055(**) .039(*) .009 
  Metro-Area Homogeneity Index .060(**) .054(**) .010 
  County Vote (Republican) -.087(**) .097(**) -.228(**) 
Control Variables     
Claimant-Area Religious 
Agreement & Act was 
Sexually Deviant & Act was 
Drug Related Deviant & 
Claimant was Prisoner & 
Taxes were Sought & Land 
Use was Issue & Free Speech 
Language Raised & 
Establishment Language 
Raised & Free Exercise 
Language Raised & Judge 
Politics & Metro-Area 
Adherent Rate & Metro-Area 
Homogeneity Index & County 
Vote Normalized, Rep+ and 
Dem- 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Favorable Vote Outcome 
1.000 -.006 .023 
Legislative Attempt at 
Increasing Religious 
Freedom 
-.006 1.000 -.346(**) 
Judicial Attempt at 
Increasing Religious 
Freedom 
.023 -.346(**) 1.000 
Integrated, Scaled 
Increased Scrutiny 
Variable with Amici 
Adjustment 
.041 .413(**) .469(**) 
**  Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
*  Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Table 33, though, treated missing data differently than the two logit models do.  
Missing information in the above model excluded the immediate pair if one of the cells of 
information was missing, but did not exclude the whole case, as the logit models do.  The 
two ways of dealing with missing data are referred to here as pairwise and casewise 
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exclusions.  And in SPSS, the only model of the three that offers a choice on how to deal 
with missing data is the correlation.  So table 34 below shows the partial correlation with 
the other way of excluding data. 
 
Table 34  Partial Correlation Version of the Model 
Missing Cases Excluded Listwise 
Control Variables   
Favorable 
Vote 
Outcome 
Claimant-Area Religious Agreement 
& Act was Sexually Deviant & Act 
was Drug Related Deviant & Claimant 
was Prisoner & Taxes were Sought & 
Land Use was Issue & Free Speech 
Language Raised & Establishment 
Language Raised & Free Exercise 
Language Raised & Judge Politics & 
Metro-Area Adherent Rate & Metro-
Area Homogeneity Index & County 
Vote Normalized, Rep+ and Dem-  
  
Legislative Attempt at Increasing 
Religious Freedom .058(*) 
Judicial Attempt at Increasing 
Religious Freedom .086(**) 
Integrated, Scaled Increased 
Scrutiny Variable with Amici 
Adjustment .155(***) 
***  Correlation is significant at 0.001 level 
**  Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
*  Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Prior to accounting for the effects of judges and contexts and case types (the 
―pairwise‖ table 33), there is no significant pattern to religious freedom and states that try 
to increase it, even when categorized into judicial and legislative states, and even after 
accounting for lesser attempts at increasing.  After accounting for the effects of judges, 
contexts, case types, legal language and all other variables, three of the four correlations 
are significant and in the predicted direction.  Legislative is weaker than judicially 
attempted states, as the descriptive parts of the study clearly showed.  The scaled version 
of the institutional attempt is strongest. 
Why the large difference between the two?  The very conclusion of the study hangs 
on the answer to that question.   
The ―complete information‖ partial correlation did not consider information unless 
each variable is coded for every variable chosen, so only half of the dataset was 
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considered.  If a simple correlation is run with only the 1,612 votes that the partial 
correlation considered for the control variables, the correlations show the same strength 
and direction. 
 
Table 35  Correlations for Only the Cases Considered In the Model 
  
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Favorable Vote 
Outcome 
Increased Scrutiny .076(**) 
Legislative Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom .021 
Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom .057(*) 
Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny Variable with 
Amici Adjustment 
.110(**) 
N = 1,612 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
To make the data more clear, here are the correlations for the same variables from 
inside the missing data. 
 
Table 36  Correlation Scores for Cases Excluded from the Final Model 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Favorable Vote 
Outcome 
Increased Scrutiny -.071(**) 
Legislative Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom -.056(*) 
Judicial Attempt at Increasing Religious Freedom -.033 
Integrated, Scaled Increased Scrutiny Variable with 
Amici Adjustment 
-.092(**) 
N = 1,638 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
It was something of a mystery as to why this very clear pattern occurs when the data 
are spliced in a seemingly unrelated way.  Seeking the answer began with an analysis of 
the missing data. 
The missing data were largely drawn from the inability to collect from three areas:  
claimant‘s religious tradition, the legal variables in derived cases, and judge politics.  
Where do the derived cases and harder to find judge politics logically reside?  The 
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answer is in the lower levels of courts.  The missing data included 95% of the district and 
trial court votes.   
Why would rows of data with some missing cells that are more heavily drawn from 
lower courts show states attempting to increase religious freedom negatively correlated 
when compared to the overall dataset?  The answer is time.  Date was not controlled in 
the model.  Therefore the rise in states increasing scrutiny is not captured in the missing 
data because the missing data occur earlier. 
For evidence of that, see table 37 below showing the characteristics of votes in a 
variable which splits the dates of the data into ten roughly equal segments. 
But also see the second part of the mystery in the column for pro-religious freedom 
vote-rate. 
Table 37  Comparison of Means for Selected Variables 
Date assigned to 
the case (Banded) 
Increased 
Scrutiny 
Integrated, 
Scaled 
Increased 
scrutiny 
Variable w/ 
Amici Adj. 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
 
Favorable Vote 
Rate N 
Prior to 1998 .30 -1.04 .47 298 
to July 1998 .30 -1.32 .46 296 
latter half 1998 .34 -.77 .50 296 
most of 1999 .55 -.03 .46 294 
1999-2000 .47 -.19 .40 296 
latter half 2000 .63 .02 .45 297 
2001 .54 .12 .46 294 
2002 .63 .30 .42 297 
2003 .74 .42 .48 299 
2004 .77 .51 .41 292 
2005 .74 .29 .42 295 
Total .55 -.15 .45 3254 
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The number of votes occurring in protective states clearly goes up with time, as does 
the average scaled level of protection.  But the vote-rate does not increase.  It does not 
even stay the same:  it decreases over time.
228
 
And it is specifically that dynamic which characterizes the strange difference between 
the complete data used in the model and the data with a missing judge party ID or legal 
reasoning coding – the difference between the pairwise and listwise tables 33 and 34, in 
other words.  See Figure 4 for a visual representation of this dynamic. 
Figure 4  Comparison of  Increased Religious Freedom  
and Actual Protective Voting 
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To be sure, further analysis was done on the missing data and it only confirmed this 
conclusion.  The regional categorizations do not show any over or under representation in 
the missing data, nor do the judicial selection systems, surprisingly, since judge party 
identification was one of the three largest missing data variables.  Other variables that are 
significantly correlated with the missing data include a positive correlation with 
population and number of claimants.  But in both of those the reason behind their 
                                                 
 
228
 To be sure, the correlation score is -.03, with a significance of .104. 
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correlation is the bent toward the lower courts, as lower courts have twice the average 
population as the Supreme Court, and larger claimant groups tend to end cases on a lower 
level. 
And to be clear, this piece of evidence is one of the most probative in the search for 
whether state institutional attempts at increasing religious freedom actually work: 
 
Does a partial correlation on the time-series variables support or question this?  This 
model supports those findings of futility, but in a way that will relieve state government 
officials.  Remember that when we look solely at RFRA contexts with votes before and 
after passage, we found -.120** correlation with protective voting.  And indeed, for all 
pre-increased contexts through the increase and end of the data, we found a -.086** 
correlation with protective voting.  All six possibilities (three dummy and three scaled 
variables) for an increase to correlate positively with voting failed, and three of them 
failed significantly.  Increasing scrutiny saw voting get worse. 
With all the described controls in place in the partial correlation, all of the negative 
significance evaporates, and only the pre- and post-legislative contexts are negative 
(discounting the -.003, that is). 
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Table 38  Partial Correlation of Time-Series Institutional Variables 
Control 
Variables   
DV Vote 
Outcome 
-none-(a) DV Vote Outcome Corr. 1.000 
  Pre- and Only Post-Increase Corr. -.086(**) 
  Pre- and Only Post-Legislative Increase Corr. -.120(**) 
  Pre- and Only Post-Judicial Increase Corr. -.036 
  Pre- and Only Post-Increased Contexts, Scaled Corr. -.045 
  Pre- and Only Post-Legislative Increase, Scaled Corr. -.132(**) 
  Pre- and Only Post-Judicial Increase, Scaled Corr. -.019 
Control Variables    
Claimant-Area 
Religious Agreement & 
Claimant was Prisoner 
& Act was Sex or Drug 
Related & Taxes were 
Sought & Land Use was 
Issue & Free Speech 
Language Raised & 
Establishment 
Language Raised & 
Free Exercise 
Language Raised & 
Judge Politics & Metro-
Area Adherent Rate & 
Metro-Area 
Homogeneity Index & 
County Vote 
Normalized, Rep+ and 
Dem- 
DV Vote Outcome Corr. 1.000 
Pre- and Post-Increase Corr. -.003 
Pre- and Post-Legislative Increase Corr. -.040 
Pre- and Post-Judicial Increase Corr. .039 
Pre- and Post-Increased Contexts, 
Scaled 
Corr. .020 
Pre- and Post-Legislative Increase, 
Scaled 
Corr. -.045 
Pre- and Post-Judicial Increase, 
Scaled 
Corr. .075 
**  Correlation is significant at 0.01 level 
*  Correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
a  Cells contain zero-order (Pearson) correlations. 
Missing data is excluded pairwise. 
 
 
The Logistic Regression 
A third way of searching for a controlled measure of the relationship between 
religious freedom and the state attempt to attain it is via a logistic regression.  Logistic 
regressions can determine effects on a binomial or categorical variable with predictor 
variables that are categorical, or if not as precisely, continuous.  The difference between 
this model and the loglinear logit model is not great, but is helpful.  This regression will 
display coefficients which are more directly related to the effect on the dependent 
variable than the parameter interpretation.   
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Or better, it would display those coefficients if it was an adequately fit model.  But 
this model fails the goodness-of-fit test by not explaining enough of the dispersion to beat 
a variable-less model.
229
   
It is telling that when the judicial and legislative increase attempt variables are 
removed from the model altogether, the goodness-of-fit test grows closer to significance, 
from .002 to .041, when .05 is considered a model which explains enough to be 
considered adequate. 
Instead of entering all the variables as a whole block, a model was attempted where 
the variables are entered stepwise, or by picking the most explanatory variables (as 
determined by the Wald statistic) one at a time until the pool of variables left contains 
only insignificant ones.  With this method, the variables left out are: Deviancy, Economic 
Impact, County Politics, Free Speech Issue, Metro Adherent Rate and Metro Religious 
Homogeneity.  The model does then show an adequate goodness-of-fit (.110 where 
avoiding .05 is success).  The pseudo R
2
 measures show 15% and 20% of the dispersion 
explained by the model.
230
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 The -2 Log likelihood score is not lower than the predicted score, and the Hosmer & Lemeshow test is 
significant, which rejects the hypothesis that randomness does not explain more.  
230
 The two measure are Cox & Snell and Nagelkerke R Square, respectively. 
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Table 39  Logistic Regression of Model, Stepwise Method 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Claimant Area Religious Agreement .010 .003 16.865 1 .000 1.010 
 Prisoner(1) -.823 .217 14.421 1 .000 .439 
 Establishment Issue Raised (1) .995 .131 57.980 1 .000 2.706 
 Free Exercise Issue Raised (1) -1.298 .124 110.265 1 .000 .273 
 Judge Politics .014 .003 17.280 1 .000 1.014 
 County Voting (Republican) -.008 .005 2.304 1 .129 .992 
Judicial Increase Least Protective     35.278 5 .000   
Judicial Increase 0 1.456 .334 19.058 1 .000 4.290 
Judicial Increase 1 1.261 .363 12.081 1 .001 3.530 
Judicial Increase 2 .839 .407 4.256 1 .039 2.313 
Judicial Increase 3 1.525 .344 19.629 1 .000 4.597 
Judicial Increase Most Protective 1.732 .336 26.615 1 .000 5.651 
Legislative Increase .192 .171 1.259 1 .262 1.212 
Constant -2.312 .365 40.023 1 .000 .099 
N = 1,616.  Missing data excluded listwise. 
 
The model does predict more than 2/3rds of the votes, which is 11.9 percentage points 
more than the variable-less model (55.4% explained). 
 
Table 40  Predicted and Observed Cases, Logistic Regression 
  
Observed 
  
  
Predicted 
Vote Outcome 
Percentage 
Correct 
Lost Won   
Step 1 Vote Outcome Lost 603 292 67.4 
    Won 255 466 64.6 
  Overall Percentage     66.2 
 
 
Interpreting the variables in the model confirms what the loglinear logit model 
showed us: using the Wald statistic, the two most influential variables in the model are 
the occurrences of establishment or free exercise language.  If establishment related 
language is used, the odds of a successful vote increase by a factor of 2.706 when 
compared to votes without establishment language.  And when Free Exercise is brought 
up in an opinion, the odds of a protective vote drop to only 27.3% as likely as votes on 
cases without that language.  
The scaled judicial variable has five protective levels, and in a logistic regression, 
each factor is understood as the effect on the model with a one unit change in that factor.  
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So interpret each row as the change in probability when that row is changed to the least 
protective row.  This scaled judicial variable, when taken as a whole, has the third most 
explanatory power in the model as indicated by the Wald statistic. 
The judicial variable does not look linear at first blush, but note that each of the 
variables is a fairly drastic increase when compared to the reference category which is the 
least protective category.  It is indeed the least protective when compared to all the 
others, in other words.  The second to least protective category, coded 0, was the category 
which held all the institutionally ambiguous and not-yet-increased contexts.  That it is 
higher than other categories is not a surprise.  After accounting for those two dynamics, 
the variable makes more sense. 
To interpret this judicial variable in light of the study‘s research question: in all of the 
data considered by a listwise logistic regression, states which increase their scrutiny do 
succeed when those states use the courts to do so. 
The Legislative attempt variable is a) insignificant, but at least b) in the direction of a 
positive effect on religious actor success in court.  So the research question here is 
answered negatively for RFRAs. 
Both the legislative and judicial effects appear consistent even as other control 
variables are added to the model, such as the claimant size variable, the political 
geography variable, and the judicial selection system variable.
231
 
Judge Politics shows that with each increase by one PAJID point, the odds of a 
successful vote grow by 1.4 percent.  That effect is the fourth most predictive, followed 
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 Claimant size would be the third most explanatory variable, and predicts a 240% better chance at a 
successful vote.  The political geography variables were insignificant, as were the judicial selection system 
variables. 
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by Claimant Area Religious Agreement, which has a similar predictive rate as one point 
of increase in the rate of agreement translates into 1 percentage point more likelihood of a 
successful vote. 
The last significant variable is the Prisoners dummy variable which shows that the 
odds of a prisoner winning are .44 times the odds of non-prisoners, which are actually 
better odds for prisoners than the simple comparison of means on the data which showed 
prisoners winning only 33% of the time that others win (16% versus 48% nonprisoners.).  
Judge Politics, Claimant Area Religious Agreement and County Voting all show very 
stable effects as shown by their small standard errors.  
Variables which proved insignificant once all these effects were held constant include 
judge and claimant gender, judge and claimant religious tradition (minus being an Other 
religious claimant).  There are only 359 votes coded with a judge religious tradition 
known, which lent to the insignificance, presumably.  But the outcomes, if insignificant, 
give one pause:  the most protective judge religious tradition was the Conservative Non-
Traditional Mormon or Jehovah‘s Witness.  And the least protective category?  Jewish 
judges, in 39 votes.
232
  These outcomes surely give texture to the simple political 
generalization that left-leaning is more protective, which would be easy to take away 
from this study. 
State judicial selection system and dissenting votes showed no patterns.  County 
population is insignificant, but metro population is significant at the .05 level, but with a 
b and EXP(b) of .000, has no direction. 
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 A simple comparison of means confirms this outcome as well. 
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But the model suffers from the same issue the Loglinear Logit model suffers from: 
the votes included are biased by time in such a way that cannot be controlled.  But as the 
simpler descriptions throughout, and specific discussion above shows, the larger 
conclusions drawn regarding the effectiveness of state institutional abilities would not 
suddenly become effective if these models were to control for the effect of time.   
 
Conclusion 
Both judicial and legislative attempts to increase religious freedom fail.  Judicial 
states are more protective of religious actors, but this appears to be the case even before 
the court handed down the verdict which increased scrutiny.  Legislative states do not 
appear to be more protective than other states.  RFRAs and religious freedom increasing 
landmark decisions have no effect, in other words.  Or better, they have no positive 
effect. 
If one is interested in the control variables as more than simple controls, as this 
exploratory dissertation is, then seeing the things which contribute to religious freedom 
more is quite a benefit to the research and analysis.  And this list is lead by the legal 
language used in the opinion, even if not in the way predicted.  Sociological and 
demographic factors like the judge‘s gender or judge‘s religion, or region of the country, 
or judicial selection system all fail to explain much beyond luck when compared to a 
judge‘s using constitutional language. 
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CHAPTER 6   
CONCLUSION 
This study assessed how state attempts to increase religious freedom fared in terms of 
actual votes for religious actors in state courts.  The simple answer to the question is that 
state institutions, especially statehouses, do not fare well at all.  Based on the research 
conducted and the results of the model above, I offer a summary of the major findings, 
and some concluding remarks. 
The following are some selected findings presented in the order reported in the study. 
 
 Institutional attempts to increase religious freedom failed to increase the rate at 
which judges vote to protect religious behavior, even when the controls were 
added.  (ch. 3, 5) 
 
 The Other Religious category, with Muslims as the largest religion represented, 
saw its favorable vote-rate double after September 11, 2001.  (p. 41) 
 
 When the focus is narrowed to only the states which will increase scrutiny, the 
favorable vote-rate before increasing scrutiny is 50%, and after increasing it the 
rate drops to 42%.  (p. 65, 157-159) 
 
 The unclear states that did not increase or decrease scrutiny have a favorable vote-
rate of 57%, which is 22% better than the average of 45%.  (p. 69) 
 
 Counties which voted more Democratic had more protective voting occur in their 
courts. (p. 77)  Liberal judges voted to protect religious actors more than 
conservative judges. (p. 101)  States which attempt to increase religious freedom 
have more liberal judges than conservative judges. (101-102)  
 
 Claimants with popular religious traditions receive more favorable votes than 
claimants with unpopular religious traditions.  (p. 119) 
 
 Prisoners receive favorable votes 24% of the time in judicially increased states, 
18% of the time under RFRA contexts, and 5.6% of the time when scrutiny is not 
increased.  (p. 130) 
 
 Female judges do not vote differently than male judges, but do populate the bench 
in increased scrutiny states at significantly higher rates.  (p. 152-153)   
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 Religious litigants in groups of more than three received favorable votes more 
than twice as often as smaller groups.  (p. 156-158) 
 
Inter- And Intra-Branch Power Sharing 
Questions about legislative and judicial power sharing are raised by RFRAs which 
fail to produce higher favorable vote-rates in this study.  And this goes against recent 
research which finds that ―state supreme courts are usually deferential to [state] 
legislative will.‖233     
Judicial attempts did not increase that favorable vote-rate either, but that is a less 
clear rejection of the prediction that the rate would go up.  This is so because court 
decisions which increase scrutiny can be seen as a simple clarification of the state‘s 
judicial religious freedom doctrine, rather than a cue to increase that vote-rate which was 
then ignored.  Scholarship on intra-judicial relations is showing them to be cooperative as 
well,
234
 but this does not speak to the issue of what generally is expected from a judicial 
ruling on increased scrutiny.  The answer is likely to be unique to each case and state 
rather than something that can easily be generalized.   
 
Left-Right Or Center-Periphery Variance 
The study originally intended to construct the continuous variables (county voting, 
judge politics, area religious adherence and homogeneity, and claimant‘s religious 
popularity) so that the poles were the variable‘s average and the furthest from average.  
Or better, with a center and periphery construction, rather than the more conventional 
conservative ranging over to liberal construction.  So to be clear, originally, judges were 
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 Stumpf (1998, 428) citing the then-upcoming second edition of Canon and Johnson (1999). 
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 Stumpf 1998, 431.   
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going to range from those with average PAJID score over to those with the extreme-right 
and extreme-left PAJID scores.  And also to be clear, these constructions produced 
significant results.  But they did not capture as much of what the variable refers to as did 
the right-left construction.  So the study went with the latter.  But the former, center-
periphery construction strikes me, after having completed this study as a very fertile 
ground for future study.  The difference between conservative and liberal areas, judges 
and religions explains more of what was studied here, but the difference between the 
status quo and those outside the normal politics and religions is explanatory of 
something, and that something deserves to be explored. 
 
Future research on interest group activity at the state level may also find that the 
conservative religious legal groups put fewer resources into state cases.  That finding is 
predicted, actually, since the use of free speech language (which is the strategic tack 
taken by these groups because of the lack of success in either advancing a Free Exercise 
of Religion claim or Establishment of Religion defense) in this study was somewhat rare 
and not helpful when employed.  
 
Applying Directly To The Literature 
This study can add to the state judge characteristic literature, or as Carp and 
Stidham‘s assessment put it, judges who are ―overwhelmingly older, white, male [] 
Protestant… homegrown [and] moderately conservative.‖235  While those characteristics 
are still common, the makeup of the state court system is evolving to include more 
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women and racial minorities, and may not be moderately conservative.  Women judges 
cast 26.5% of the COLR votes in this study, which shows an increase from a 2002 study 
finding 24% of justices on state courts of last resort were women.
236
  But as scholars note, 
the percentage diminishes with the level of court: 20.4% of intermediate appeals votes, 
and only 16.6% of trial court votes were cast by women.   
As mentioned above, female judges tended to vote against the religious actor more 
once all the controls were in place, although not significantly so.  This result appears to 
be another counter-intuitive point in the unsuccessful search for compelling evidence that 
women jurists vote differently.
237
  But the significantly positive correlation between 
women being judges and increased scrutiny states suggests that evidence could be close.   
A further step in this research could attempt to determine whether women judges 
fostered the increase in scrutiny, or whether women judges appear more because the 
context is more hospitable.   
Regardless of the answer, one implication of the findings here is that searching for a 
female judge effect could be more fruitful (finding an effect or confirming the absence of 
one) by shifting from an individual level of analysis to one which considers the size of 
the female judge populations.  This suggestion is not new, though, as feminist 
jurisprudence has long held that the socializing influences and peer pressures within legal 
institutions mean that the judges who are women are not representative of women as a 
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 Martin and Pyle, 2002, 39-40. 
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 For a good literature review on the difference between the theory and evidence in gender specific 
judicial behavior studies, see Stumpf (1998, 157), and McCall, Madhavi and Michael A. McCall. 2007. 
―How Far Does the Gender Gap Extend?  Decision Making on State Supreme Courts in Fourth Amendment 
Cases, 1980-2000‖ The Social Science Journal. 44(1):67-69.  Related research is showing that female 
judges sentence criminals more often and to longer sentences, but there is not yet a consensus around 
women being tougher judges, so this study does not confirm or negate, but instead continues to fill in the 
picture. 
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whole.  With larger groups of women judges (in a county or state, for example), that 
socializing influence and pressure to conform to the male created traditions would wane.  
It is that dynamic that may be driving the correlation between increased scrutiny and 
women judges. 
 
Recent research on state judge religious identification has found that Evangelical 
judges uphold death penalties more, vote against obscenity more, and vote more 
conservatively in gender discrimination cases.
238
  And this study finds Evangelicals to be 
significantly more conservative on the PAJID scale and to identify as Republican more.    
But for reasons that are not immediately clear, and in a comparison that is not fully 
commensurate in issue areas, the findings here show a very different picture.  If I redefine 
the variable for Evangelicals to mirror the Songer and Tabrizi construction, this redefined 
group of Evangelicals was more protective of religious freedom overall.  And this finding 
was not inflated by rulings in favor of other Evangelical or Conservative Non-
Traditionals (where, surprisingly, Evangelical judges were a bit less protective.)  
Evangelical judges in this study were more protective than non-evangelical judges of 
each religious group minus Catholics, where Evangelicals voted only one percentage 
point lower than the average.  And the largest difference came with the Other Religious 
category, where this altered version of Evangelicals voted to protect 60% of the time
239
 
versus non-evangelical judges who voted to protect 18% of the time.  
Evangelical judges here were more protective of deviant behavior (59% in 29 votes 
versus a 56% favorable vote-rate from non-evangelicals), and more protective of 
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 Albeit with only 15 votes, so the small number may be responsible for the outcome.   
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prisoners (15% in only 13 votes versus a 13% favorable vote-rate from non-evangelicals.)  
This study therefore stands in contrast to the Songer & Tabrizi 1999 findings. 
 
A third way this study adds to an on-going discussion is in the area of minority 
success in the courts.  As already mentioned in the section on claimant religious 
popularity (p. 115-116) these findings generally confirm that minority religious litigants 
are less successful than average, but so are the more numerous Evangelical Protestants.  
Newer evidence that Catholics and Baptists win at lower rates than minor religions is not 
fully rejected or confirmed here.
240
  Ultimately though, this study posits the question in a 
new way.  Rather than asking whether, for example, Baptists win or lose more, I asked 
how Baptists fared in areas with many or few other Baptists.  Instead of understanding 
the popularity of the religious traditions fixed at the national level, which is what studies 
have inadvertently done to this point, I assess popularity at the immediate, metro or 
county level.  My results, as reported elsewhere, are significant. 
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Implications Of This Research 
One implication of this study is that the state courts are a better venue for religious 
actors.  Religious actors won more cases before the time frame studied here, and they 
won more during the time frame.  And despite the impotence of RFRAs and pro-religious 
freedom precedent, that more favorable context is likely to remain because a), the federal 
institutional attempts have mattered (and they are currently allowing religious behavior to 
be regulated by rational laws), and b) states have been more protective all along and there 
is no reason to believe they will lower their actual pro-religious freedom voting rates. 
But to temper this forecast, that states are friendlier venues as a whole does not help 
potential litigants in Oregon or Nebraska or the other six states where the rational basis 
standard has been accepted and judicial voting is less protective.   Nor is it likely that 
legal interest groups will focus efforts on state decisions because federal decisions are 
(conceptually at least) fifty times more encompassing than a single state decision.  Going 
from this generalized picture to the more specific picture of religious freedom is the next 
step in this line of research. 
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APPENDIX A   
LIST OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1:  States with RFRAs result in more judicial votes favoring religious 
freedom than states without RFRAs. 
Hypothesis 2:  State court precedent providing for the use of strict scrutiny or the 
equivalent protecting religious freedom result in more judicial votes 
favoring religious freedom than states without such precedent. 
Hypothesis 3:  County-level Republican presidential voting is associated with less 
favorable religious freedom votes for religious actors than County-level 
Democratic Presidential voting. 
Hypothesis 4:  More liberal judges will vote more in support of religious freedom than 
more conservative judges. 
Hypothesis 5:  Judges whose courts are in high religious adherence areas will support 
religious freedom claims more than judges from lower religious adherence 
areas. 
Hypothesis 6:  The more religiously diverse the area in which the judge sits, the greater 
the likelihood the judge will support the religious freedom claim. 
Hypothesis 7:  Religious freedom claimants from minority religions will meet with less 
success than those from majority religions. 
Hypothesis 8:  Religious freedom claims based on sexual or illicit drug usage will be less 
likely to be supported than those that are not. 
Hypothesis 9:  Religious freedom claims of prisoner are less likely to be supported than 
claims from non-prisoners. 
Hypothesis 10: Religious freedom claims that do not require public resources (tax money 
or land usage) are more likely to be supported than those that do. 
Hypothesis 11: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to 
concentrate free exercise of religion, it is more likely to be supported than 
if it is not. 
Hypothesis 12: When the religious freedom claim is recognized by the judge to concern 
the separation of church and state (an establishment clause), that claim is 
less likely to be supported by the judge than if the separation of church 
and state is not involved. 
Hypothesis 13: When the religious freedom claim is coupled with a free speech claim it is 
more likely to be supported than if it is not.  
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APPENDIX B   
 
COMPLETE LIST OF DENOMINATIONS  IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS 
The following is a reproduction of the Appendix from Brian Steensland‘s 2000 article 
detailing the religious traditions categories used in this study.
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APPENDIX 
The following list includes all denominations within the classification scheme described above.  Catholic 
(RELIG = 2) and Jewish (RELIG = 3) traditions are not listed because there are no further subspecifications 
available in the General Social Survey for these affiliations. In addition to the denominations listed, “Other 
Affiliation” includes faith traditions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Eastern Orthodoxy (RELIG = 5-
10, 12). Numbers in parentheses refer to the numeric value label for that denomination under the variable 
listed (DENOM or OTHER). 
Black Protestant 
Using Variable “DENOM” 
African Methodist Episcopal Church (20) 
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (21) 
American Baptist Association
b
 (10)  
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.
b
 (11)  
Baptist, Don‟t Know Which
b
 (18)  
Methodist, Don‟t Know Which
b
 (28) 
National Baptist Convention of America (12) 
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc. (13) 
Other Baptist Churches
b
 (15) 
Other Methodist Churches
b
 (23) 
Southern Baptist Convention
b
 (14) 
 
Using Variable “OTHER” 
African Methodist (15)  
Apostolic Faith (14)  
Christian Tabernacle (128)  
Church of God in Christ (37)  
Church of God in Christ Holiness (38)  
Church of God, Saint & Christ (7)  
Disciples of God (88)  
Federated Church (98)  
Holiness; Church of Holiness (56)  
House of Prayer (104) 
Missionary Baptistb (93) 
Pentecostal Apostolic (103) 
Primitive Baptist (133) 
Sanctified, Sanctification (78) 
United Holiness (79) 
Witness Holiness (21) 
Zion Union (85) 
Zion Union Apostolic (86) 
Zion Union Apostolic–Reformed (87) 
 
Evangelical Protestant 
Using Variable “DENOM” 
American Baptist Association
c
 (10)  
Baptist, Don‟t Know Which
c
 (18)  
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod (32)  
Other Baptist Churches
c
 (15)  
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Other Lutheran Churches (34)  
Other Methodist Churches
c
 (23) 
Other Presbyterian Churches (42) 
Southern Baptist Convention
c
 (14) 
Synod (33) 
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran 
 
Using Variable “OTHER” 
Advent Christian (10)  
Amish (111)  
Apostolic Christian (107)  
Apostolic Church (138)  
Assembly of God (12)  
Bible Missionary (109)  
Brethren Church, Brethren (20)  
Brethren, Plymouth (22)  
Brother of Christ (132)  
Calvary Bible (110)  
Chapel of Faith (122)  
Charismatic (102)  
Chinese Gospel Church (135)  
Christ Cathedral of Truth (108)  
Christ Church Unity (29)  
Christ in Christian Union (26)  
Christ in God (101)  
Christian and Missionary Alliance (9)  
Christian Calvary Chapel (125)  
Christian Catholic (28)  
Christian Reformed (32)  
Christian; Central Christian (31)  
Church of Christ (35)  
Church of Christ, Evangelical (34)  
Church of Daniel‟s Band (127)  
Church of God of Prophecy, The (121)  
Church of Prophecy (5)  
Church of the First Born (116)  
Church of the Living God (39)  
Churches of God (Except with Christ and Holiness) (36)  
Community Church (41)  
Covenant (42)  
Dutch Reformed (43)  
Evangelical Congregational (2)  
Evangelical Covenant (91)  
Evangelical Free Church (47)  
Evangelical Methodist (112) 
Evangelical United Brethren (120)  
Evangelical, Evangelist (45)  
Faith Christian (139)  
Faith Gospel Tabernacle (124)  
First Christian (51) 
Four Square Gospel (53) 
Free Methodist (13) 
Free Will Baptist (16) 
Full Gospel (52) 
Grace Brethren (100) 
Holiness (Nazarene) (18) 
Holiness Church of God (90) 
Holy Roller (55) 
Independent (24) 
Independent Bible, Bible, Bible Fellowship (3) 
Independent Fundamental Church of America (134) 
Laotian Christian (146) 
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Living Word (129) 
Macedonia (131) 
Mennonite (63) 
Mennonite Brethren (115) 
Mission Covenant (92) 
Missionary Baptist
c
 (93) 
Missionary Church (117) 
Nazarene (65) 
New Testament Christian (6) 
No Denomination Given or Nondenominational
d
 
Open Bible (27) 
Other Fundamentalist (97) 
Pentecostal (68) 
Pentecostal Assembly of God (66) 
Pentecostal Church of God (67) 
Pentecostal Holiness, Holiness Pentecostal (69) 
People‟s Church (140) 
Pilgrim Holiness (57) 
Primitive Baptist (133) 
Salvation Army (76) 
Seventh Day Adventist (77) 
Swedish Mission (94) 
Triumph Church of God (106) 
Way Ministry, The (118) 
Wesleyan (83) 
Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim (84) 
 
Mainline Protestant 
Using Variable “DENOM” 
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A.
c
 (11) 
Methodist, Don‟t Know Which
c
 (28)  
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (40) 
American Lutheran Church (30)  
Presbyterian, Don‟t Know Which (48) 
Episcopal Church (50)  
Presbyterian, Merged (43) 
Evangelical Lutheran (35)  
United Methodist Church (22) 
Lutheran Church in America (31)  
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (41) 
Lutheran, Don‟t Know Which (38)  
Using Variable OTHER 
American Reformed (99)  
Baptist (Northern) (19)  
Christian Disciples (25)  
Congregationalist (40)  
Congregationalist, First Reformed (71) 
Disciples of Christ (44)  
Evangelical Reformed (46)  
First Christian Disciples of Christ (49)  
First Church (48)  
First Reformed (50)  
Friends (54)  
Grace Reformed (89)  
Hungarian Reformed (1) 
Latvian Lutheran (105) 
Moravian (8) 
Quaker (70) 
Reformed Church of Christ (73) 
Reformed United Church of Christ (72) 
Schwenkfelder (148) 
United Brethren, United Brethren in Christ (23) 
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United Church of Canada (119) 
United Church of Christ (81) 
United Church of Christianity (96) 
 
Other Affiliation 
Using Variable OTHER 
CONSERVATIVE NONTRADITIONAL 
Christadelphians (30)  
Jesus LDS (62) 
Christian Scientist (33)  
LDS (59) 
Church of Jesus Christ of the LDS–Mormon (60) 
Restoration (145)  
LDS–Reorganized (61) 
Church Universal and Mormon (64) 
Triumphant (114)  
True Light Church of Christ (130) 
Jehovah‟s Witnesses (58)  
Worldwide Church of God (113) 
LIBERAL NONTRADITIONAL 
Christ Church Unity (29)  
Religious Science (74) 
Eden Evangelist (17)  
Spiritualist (11) 
Mind Science (75)  
Unitarian, Universalist (80) 
New Age Spirituality (136)  
United Church, Unity Church (82) 
New Birth Christian (141)  
Unity (95) 
 
a Also included within the Catholic tradition are those who belong to the Polish National Church 
(OTHER = 123). 
b Included only if race of respondent is black 
c Included only if race of respondent is not black 
d Includes only those who responded “no denomination given or nondenominational” (DENOM = 70). 
From this pool, those who attend church less than “about once a month” (ATTEND < 4) or those who 
responded “don‟t know or no answer” (ATTEND = 9) are excluded. This also includes additional respondents 
who responded with “Christian” or “interdenominational/no denomination” on the 1998 RELIG variable 
(RELIG = 11 or 13).
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